GLOBAL GUIDELINES
for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance
in the context of poliovirus eradication
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in the context of poliovirus eradication
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This document reflects contributions from field, regional and global epidemiologists, laboratorians, information system specialists and public health and gender experts in a process led by the agency partners of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI): Rotary International, the World Health Organization (WHO), the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance.
# ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>AEFI</td>
<td>Adverse event following immunization</td>
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<tr>
<td>AESI</td>
<td>Adverse event of special interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Acute flaccid paralysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFR</td>
<td>African Region (WHO)</td>
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<td>AMR</td>
<td>Region of the Americas (WHO)</td>
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<td>AS</td>
<td>Active surveillance</td>
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<tr>
<td>AVADAR</td>
<td>Auto-Visual AFP Detection and Reporting</td>
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<tr>
<td>aVDPV</td>
<td>Ambiguous vaccine-derived poliovirus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bOPV</td>
<td>Bivalent oral polio vaccine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBS</td>
<td>Community-based surveillance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIF</td>
<td>Case investigation form</td>
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<tr>
<td>COVID-19</td>
<td>Coronavirus disease (2019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cVDPV</td>
<td>Circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cVDPV1</td>
<td>Circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus type 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cVDPV2</td>
<td>Circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cVDPV3</td>
<td>Circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus type 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Director-general (WHO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EI</td>
<td>Essential immunization</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMG</td>
<td>Electromyography</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMR</td>
<td>Eastern Mediterranean Region (WHO)</td>
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<td>EPID</td>
<td>Epidemiological identification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERC</td>
<td>Expert Review Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>Environmental surveillance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUR</td>
<td>European Region (WHO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GACVS</td>
<td>Global Advisory Committee on Vaccine Safety</td>
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<td>GBS</td>
<td>Guillain-Barré syndrome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>Global Commission for the Certification of the Eradication of Poliomyelitis</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIS</td>
<td>Geographic information system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPEI</td>
<td>Global Polio Eradication Initiative</td>
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<td>GPLN</td>
<td>Global Polio Laboratory Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPS</td>
<td>Global positioning system</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced population</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPv</td>
<td>Inactivated polio vaccine</td>
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<td>ITD</td>
<td>Intratypic differentiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iVDPV</td>
<td>Immunodeficiency-associated vaccine-derived poliovirus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOH</td>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
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<tr>
<td>mOPV</td>
<td>Monovalent oral polio vaccine</td>
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<tr>
<td>mOPV1</td>
<td>Monovalent oral polio vaccine type 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mOPV2</td>
<td>Monovalent oral polio vaccine type 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mOPV3</td>
<td>Monovalent oral polio vaccine type 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCC</td>
<td>National Certification Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEC</td>
<td>National Expert Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>nOPV</td>
<td>Novel oral polio vaccine</td>
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<tr>
<td>nOPV1</td>
<td>Novel oral polio vaccine type 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nOPV2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>nOPV3</td>
<td>Novel oral polio vaccine type 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPAFP</td>
<td>Non-polio acute flaccid paralysis</td>
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<td>NPEC</td>
<td>National Polio Expert Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPEV</td>
<td>Non-polio enterovirus</td>
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<td>OBRA</td>
<td>Outbreak response assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPV</td>
<td>Oral polio vaccine</td>
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<td>PID</td>
<td>Primary immunodeficiency disorder</td>
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<td>POLIS</td>
<td>Polio Information System</td>
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<td>RCC</td>
<td>Regional Commission for the Certification of the Eradication of Poliomyelitis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNA</td>
<td>Ribonucleic acid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEAR</td>
<td>South-East Asia Region (WHO)</td>
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<td>SIA</td>
<td>Supplementary immunization activity</td>
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<tr>
<td>SL</td>
<td>Sabin-like</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOPs</td>
<td>Standard operating procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>tOPV</td>
<td>Trivalent oral polio vaccine</td>
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<tr>
<td>TORs</td>
<td>Terms of reference</td>
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<tr>
<td>VAPP</td>
<td>Vaccine-associated paralytic poliomyelitis</td>
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<tr>
<td>VDPV</td>
<td>Vaccine-derived poliovirus</td>
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<tr>
<td>VDPV1</td>
<td>Vaccine-derived poliovirus type 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>VDPV2</td>
<td>Vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VDPV3</td>
<td>Vaccine-derived poliovirus type 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP1</td>
<td>Virus protein 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>VPD</td>
<td>Vaccine-preventable disease</td>
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<tr>
<td>VRE</td>
<td>Vaccine-related event</td>
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<tr>
<td>WebIFA</td>
<td>Web-based information for action</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>WPR</td>
<td>Western Pacific Region (WHO)</td>
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<td>WPV</td>
<td>Wild poliovirus</td>
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<tr>
<td>WPV1</td>
<td>Wild poliovirus type 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>WPV2</td>
<td>Wild poliovirus type 2</td>
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<tr>
<td>WPV3</td>
<td>Wild poliovirus type 3</td>
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*Note: The list may not be exhaustive.*
ABOUT THESE GUIDELINES

These *Global guidelines for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance in the context of poliovirus eradication* are published to replace the 1996 revision of the *Field guide for supplementary activities aimed at achieving polio eradication*.

Since 1996, all regions of the World Health Organization (WHO) and several polio-endemic countries have produced their own AFP surveillance guidelines based on the Field guide, which has served the programme well. These country-level guidelines can be updated, if deemed necessary, based on these new guidelines.

The new global guidelines outline well-established strategies and activities for AFP surveillance to support countries in attaining and maintaining a surveillance system sensitive enough to detect the circulation of any polioviruses – wild polioviruses (WPVs), vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs) and Sabin-like (SL) viruses. The new guidelines also incorporate recommendations made through a recent series of field guides and job aids that address current surveillance-related challenges, and present new tools devised to enhance surveillance sensitivity and increase the speed of detection of polioviruses. In addition, they introduce new indicators that complement well-established certification standard indicators, such as those aimed at capturing the timeliness of field activities. Overall, the guidelines stress four cross-cutting issues that remain central to the success of the polio eradication programme: (1) the speed of poliovirus detection, (2) the quality of surveillance at the subnational level, (3) the importance of gender equality to polio eradication, and (4) the need for integrating polio with other vaccine-preventable disease (VPD) programmes.

These guidelines are intended for use by individuals and organizations involved in polio eradication efforts that include: national polio surveillance and immunization programme managers and staff; country, regional and global focal points for polio surveillance and immunization at the WHO and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF); polio technical advisory bodies; and partners of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI).
INTRODUCTION

Since its establishment in 1988, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) has made major progress towards the goal of eradicating wild poliovirus (WPV). Five of six regions as defined by the World Health Organization (WHO) have been certified as WPV-free: the Region of the Americas, the Western Pacific Region, the European Region, the South-East Asian Region and the African Region. Of the three WPV serotypes, the Global Commission for the Certification of the Eradication of Poliomyelitis (GCC) has certified the global eradication of two serotypes: type 2 and type 3, last reported in 1999 and 2012, respectively. At the time of this writing (October 2022), only WPV type 1 (WPV1) remains, with two countries classified as endemic: Afghanistan and Pakistan.

1. Poliovirus and poliomyelitis

Poliomyelitis is a highly contagious disease caused by a human enterovirus called poliovirus. Poliovirus consists of a ribonucleic acid (RNA) genome enclosed in a protein shell, referred to as a capsid. Of the three serotypes of poliovirus (types 1, 2, and 3), each have a slightly different capsid protein. Immunity to one serotype does not confer immunity to the other serotypes.

The virus is most often spread by the faecal-oral route through contact with the faeces of an infected person, which occurs mostly in areas with poor water, sanitation and hygiene. It can also spread through droplets from a sneeze or cough (oral-to-oral transmission), though this is less common and occurs mainly in areas with relatively better hygiene and sanitary conditions. Poliovirus enters through the mouth and multiplies in the intestine. Infected individuals shed poliovirus into the environment for several weeks, where it can spread rapidly in the community, especially in areas of poor sanitation.

Poliovirus can interact with its host in two ways:

- Most poliovirus infections are asymptomatic or cause minor illness with mild symptoms without affecting the central nervous system.
- Less than 1% of poliovirus infections result in paralysis by affecting the central nervous system, a life-threatening disease called poliomyelitis.

Poliomyelitis cannot be cured but it can be prevented. Vaccination is safe, effective and inexpensive. It is through the widespread use of the oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) that the polio eradication effort owes its success. Unfortunately, in rare circumstances (approximately 1 in 2.7 million doses), the attenuated Sabin strains in OPV cause vaccine-associated paralytic poliomyelitis (VAPP) in the vaccine recipient or a close contact.

In addition, in rare occasions through prolonged excretion or transmission, the vaccine virus can genetically mutate to a form known as vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV), which like WPV reflects the three serotypes targeted by vaccines. There are three categories of VDPVs: circulating, immunodeficiency-associated and ambiguous. VDPVs represent a challenge to polio eradication and are a focus of the programme in the last mile to eradication.

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2 For more on VDPVs, the GPEI website offers a short explanatory video (https://polioeradication.org/polio-today/polio-prevention/the-virus/vaccine-derived-polio-viruses).
2. Polio eradication

Following the widespread use of the poliovirus vaccine in the mid-20th century, the worldwide incidence of poliomyelitis declined rapidly. In 1988, the World Health Assembly adopted the goal of global polio eradication.

The benefits of the global eradication of polio are at least threefold:

1. **Reduction in morbidity and mortality**: Polio is a leading cause of disability in populations not immunized against it. With the eradication of WPV types 2 and 3 (WPV2 and WPV3), the incidences of infection caused by these two agents have already been reduced to zero, in addition to preventing millions of disability-adjusted life years (DALYs).

2. **Strengthened health systems**: The polio eradication program has enhanced the collaboration between the surveillance systems and laboratory networks. It has helped revitalize immunization programmes and it contributes to the strengthening of health system planning, management and evaluation.

3. **Economic impact**: It is estimated that US$1.5 billion will be saved per year after the final remaining serotype (WPV1) is eradicated and immunization against it stopped.

Polio can be eradicated because of the following characteristics:

- poliovirus has no animal reservoir;
- poliovirus survives for a limited amount of time in the environment; and
- inexpensive and effective vaccines exist to protect the population from the disease.

More than 200 countries and territories have eliminated polio through time-tested strategies by:

- attaining high essential immunization coverage (>90%) with at least three (3) doses of polio vaccine within the first year of life;
- conducting high-quality supplementary immunization activities (SIAs) to stop outbreaks and interrupt the spread of the virus; and
- implementing a sensitive surveillance system for poliovirus.

The following criteria will be applied for certification of WPV eradication:

- no WPV transmission detected from any population source for a period of no less than two (2) years,
- adequate global poliovirus surveillance; and
- safe and secure containment of all WPVs retained in facilities, such as laboratories and vaccine manufacturing facilities.

Global polio-free certification will be further sustained by requirements for containment of all polioviruses and the cessation of OPV immunization to mitigate the risk of re-emergence over time.

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3. Polio surveillance systems

Different types of surveillance systems for detecting the transmission of poliovirus are critical to reach global polio eradication, as high-quality surveillance permits the timely detection of poliovirus transmission due to WPV, VDPVs and the circulation of Sabin-like (SL) viruses.⁵

1. **Acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance**: This globally accepted case-based syndromic surveillance for AFP cases confirms poliovirus by testing stool specimens in polio laboratories. AFP surveillance remains one of the cornerstones of the polio eradication effort.

2. **Environmental surveillance (ES)**: AFP surveillance is complemented by environmental surveillance (ES) which systematically tests sewage samples for poliovirus in specific settings.⁶

3. **Immunodeficiency-associated vaccine-derived poliovirus (iVDPV) surveillance**: AFP surveillance is also complemented by surveillance for iVDPVs among patients with primary immunodeficiency disorders (PIDs), which is referred to as iVDPV surveillance.⁷

These three components of polio surveillance are supported by the Global Polio Network Laboratory (GPLN) for confirmatory testing using viral isolation, intratypic differentiation and genomic sequencing procedures. Ready access to data from various sources that include AFP surveillance, ES, and laboratory surveillance are supported by a comprehensive polio information system (POLIS).

**Challenges to AFP surveillance in the last mile to eradication**

Challenges faced by the polio eradication programme have evolved over the years. Currently, the main challenges that affect the quality and sensitivity of AFP surveillance are attributable to a range of factors.

- Many countries face gaps in AFP surveillance at subnational levels, especially where surveillance coverage may be limited for reasons such as an inability to routinely access special populations or hard-to-reach areas.
- Delays in specimen or sample shipment to WHO-accredited laboratories can result in late confirmation of polio cases and consequent delayed outbreak response, thereby giving poliovirus ample opportunity to spread.
- Missed opportunities for action due to the underutilization of surveillance data can create gaps where the virus can spread before detection and response.
- Attrition, rapid staff turnover and insufficient refresher trainings affect the quality of field and laboratory surveillance work through the loss of institutional memory, skills and competencies. Churn within surveillance teams also affects supervision and monitoring.
- A deprioritization of polio activities and deterioration of surveillance quality and sensitivity in countries that have been polio-free for years creates delays in detecting importations or emergences of poliovirus, which in turn affects the promptness and effectiveness of outbreak response.
- Across all countries, the COVID-19 pandemic (caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus) has also negatively affected the sensitivity and timeliness of the AFP surveillance and laboratory systems, even as the polio surveillance network itself lent crucial support to help contain COVID-19, demonstrating it can go beyond polio surveillance to track vaccine-preventable diseases (VPDs), emerging diseases, outbreaks or other major health events.*


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⁵ Some countries also use enterovirus surveillance for the purpose of certification.


PRINCIPLES of AFP surveillance

Acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance is a case-based syndromic surveillance system that has been standardized throughout the world. The same tools, indicators and reporting systems are used in every country. This standardized system has strengthened collaboration with immunization partners by sharing uniform data on a weekly basis and advocating for action and support where risks and weaknesses emerge.

A surveillance system that is specific to poliovirus is important because the characteristics of the disease make it particularly challenging to detect:

- Only 1 in 200 wild poliovirus (WPV) infections of non-immune people results in paralysis. The great majority of poliovirus infections are therefore “silent” as they do not cause paralysis.
- Even if a poliovirus infection causes paralysis, the clinical presentation of paralytic polio is similar to that of other conditions, such as Guillain-Barré syndrome (GBS).

To overcome these challenges, two key measures were universally agreed to in the 1980s to improve the sensitivity of the surveillance system:

1. adopting the syndrome of AFP as a reportable condition, and
2. laboratory confirmation of poliovirus by testing stool specimens in polio laboratories accredited by the World Health Organization (WHO).

1. Adopting AFP as a reportable syndrome

When the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) was first established, most countries were reporting clinically confirmed polio cases. Polio was reported as just one of many diseases within disease surveillance systems, often on an annual basis. Given the epidemiology and characteristics of polio, this made it difficult to detect new cases and respond to outbreaks of polio both swiftly and effectively.

Many diseases may initially look like polio. A more sensitive system was therefore needed to enable suspected new cases to be detected, reported and investigated as rapidly as possible. This led to the adoption of acute flaccid paralysis or \textit{AFP as the syndrome} to be reported. \(^8\)

This sensitive case-based syndromic definition captures not only acute poliomyelitis but also other diseases that present similarly, including GBS, transverse myelitis and traumatic neuritis, such that each case must be investigated with laboratory tests to confirm their causes. \textbf{(Annex 1. Poliovirus offers differential diagnoses and the clinical signs and symptoms which are used to differentiate poliomyelitis from other diseases: asymmetric flaccid paralysis, fever at onset, rapid progression of paralysis, residual paralysis after 60 days and preservation of sensory nerve function).}

The rate of non-polio AFP case detection is a key indicator of AFP surveillance sensitivity. In the absence of polio circulation, a sensitive surveillance system will detect at least one \((1)\) case of non-polio AFP each year for every 100 000 children under 15 years. Where polio is present or where polio is a threat, this target is modified. The objective is then to detect at least two \((2)\) cases of non-polio AFP each year for every 100 000 children under 15 years in all at-risk and outbreak countries, and to detect at least three \((3)\) cases of non-polio AFP each year for every 100 000 children under 15 years in endemic countries and outbreak-affected areas. \textbf{(See Annex 3. Indicators for AFP surveillance.)}

\(^8\) In the same way, smallpox eradication adopted detection and investigation of the “rash and fever” syndrome.
2. Testing all stool specimens in a WHO-accredited polio laboratory

Polioviruses are primarily transmitted from person-to-person through the faecal-oral route in settings with poor water, sanitation and hygiene. They replicate in the human intestinal system, where they are shed intermittently in the stool of infected individuals. Shedding is most intense up to two weeks after the onset of paralysis but can continue up to six to eight weeks after onset.

Collecting two (2) stool specimens, 24 hours apart from each AFP case and within 14 days of the onset of paralysis, and then testing them in a WHO-accredited polio laboratory is the most reliable way to confirm the presence or absence of poliovirus in the specimen and thus to confirm poliovirus infection.

One of the universally accepted indications that an AFP surveillance system is sensitive enough to detect poliovirus is that at least 80% of reported AFP cases have had their stool specimens collected adequately. The percentage of AFP cases with adequate stools is used as the second key indicator of AFP surveillance sensitivity. (See Annex 3. Indicators for AFP surveillance.)

Gold standard indicators for AFP surveillance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-polio AFP rate</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✓ At least one (1) non-polio AFP case each year for every 100,000 children aged under 15 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ In endemic countries and outbreak-affected areas, at least three (3) non-polio AFP cases each year for every 100,000 children under 15 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ In at-risk and outbreak countries, at least two (2) non-polio AFP cases each year for every 100,000 children under 15 years.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adequate stool specimen rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✓ At least 80% of reported AFP cases have had their stool specimens collected adequately.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See Annex 3 for core and non-core AFP surveillance indicators.
STRATEGIES for AFP surveillance

Acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) cases are detected using three main strategies: routine (or passive) surveillance, active surveillance (AS), and community-based surveillance (CBS). Some supplemental strategies for special populations and particular contexts also support overall AFP surveillance.

1. Routine (passive) surveillance

1.1 – What is routine (passive) surveillance?

The regular reporting of diseases or conditions of interest from reporting sites, such as health facilities and hospitals, is called routine surveillance. It is sometimes referred to as passive surveillance because public health authorities must rely on thousands of designated focal points from a variety of reporting sites to detect and notify (or report) cases. It is also sometimes referred to as zero reporting as reporting sites must report weekly, even if no case has been detected.

In a majority of countries, routine AFP surveillance is conducted as part of an existing overall notifiable disease reporting system that collects reports on cases of a group of diseases or conditions.

1.2 – AFP as a notifiable condition

Under routine surveillance, focal points at reporting sites are required to immediately report any AFP case (i.e., within 24 hours) to a designated public health surveillance team for rapid investigation.

In addition to the immediate notification, surveillance focal points at reporting sites must also submit a routine weekly or monthly report that must include “zero” (“0”) if no AFP cases were seen in their site, hence zero reporting. AFP is a rare condition, and a zero report is an important way to keep reporting sites sensitized about the need to routinely conduct AFP surveillance.

1.3 – Monitoring routine surveillance

All countries are required to monitor the completeness and timeliness of routine AFP reporting, which allows for the timely detection of gaps in reporting and surveillance quality. For most countries, monitoring routine surveillance will be the same as the completeness and timeliness of notifiable diseases reporting, as AFP is included among the list of notifiable diseases. These reports are also submitted to and regularly scrutinized by National Certification Committees (NCCs) and Regional Certification Commissions for the Eradication of Poliomyelitis (RCCs).

The indicators to monitor routine surveillance for AFP at the national and subnational level are:

- the percentage of designated sites submitting weekly reports (or “zero reports”), even in the absence of cases, for a given time period (completeness); and
- the percentage of designated sites submitting weekly reports (or “zero reports”) on time, even in the absence of cases, by the deadline (timeliness).

Surveillance teams should use this data to identify and follow up on reporting sites repeatedly failing to report or reporting late. (See Annex 3. Indicators).

---

Defining routine surveillance

Also called passive surveillance or zero reporting, routine surveillance is a process in which reporting sites are expected to send reports to public health authorities regularly and often weekly, regardless of whether an AFP case has been detected.

---

1.4 – Challenges with routine surveillance

The following challenges can be encountered with routine surveillance.

- **Incomplete reporting networks** may lead to delays in detection when the network is not comprehensive enough (i.e., no sites in certain parts of the country).
- **Incomplete weekly reports** may occur when sites do not report as required, and the field team has limited capacity either to follow up with "silent" reporting sites or to conduct training and sensitization activities for all reporting sites. In these cases, active surveillance (below) provides opportunities to strengthen routine surveillance through visits with site focal points.
- **Attrition among personnel** at the reporting site may lead to a lack of awareness of AFP as a notifiable condition and a subsequent failure to identify and immediately report AFP cases.
- **Declining awareness about polio and AFP reporting requirements** may also create confusion. Providers may forget the importance of reporting AFP as a syndrome as separate and distinct from reporting polio as a diagnosis.
- **Confusion between routine and active surveillance** may lead to insufficient engagement of both the formal and informal health sector. Under routine surveillance, district and provincial surveillance teams rely on formal health sector sites to report on AFP cases; under active surveillance, however, district and provincial surveillance teams are actively engaged in finding AFP cases by visiting health sites on a regular basis. (In some settings, inquiries about AFP cases within a routine reporting site made by the site-level focal point are mistakenly considered “active surveillance.” Such inquiries must be made by personnel external to the facility to be considered active surveillance.)

2. Active surveillance

2.1 – What is active surveillance (AS)?

In countries and areas where people may not have access to health facilities, well-implemented active surveillance (AS) has proven to be the most effective strategy for AFP surveillance.

Under AS, trained public health surveillance staff regularly visit priority reporting sites within the formal health sector (such as tertiary hospitals and district hospitals) and informal health sector (such as community health centres run by nongovernmental organizations [NGOs]) to identify and investigate any unreported AFP cases and to regularly sensitize targeted staff on polio and AFP surveillance. To be effective, AS visits must be done by well-qualified staff who understand the polio eradication programme and have good interpersonal skills.

**Annex guidance**

For more on the differences between routine and active surveillance, see Annex 4. Routine and active surveillance.

**Defining active surveillance**

AS is a process in which designated surveillance staff make regular visits to the health facility; Surveillance staff are external to the health facility. They collect data from individual cases, registers, medical records or logbooks at a health facility or reporting site to ensure that no AFP case is missed.

For more on the difference between active and routine surveillance, see Annex 4.

Experience has shown that some countries have effectively used AS for AFP as a platform for surveillance for vaccine-preventable diseases (VPDs) or other outbreak-prone diseases.

Download *Best Practices in Active Surveillance for Polio Eradication*. 
2.2 – Setting up active surveillance

The key components of setting up an AS network are: (1) selecting, prioritizing, reviewing and updating sites, (2) identifying focal points and building skilled surveillance staff capacity to carry out AS activities, and (3) following a structured procedure to ensure high-quality visits.

2.2.1 – Site selection, prioritization, and updating

**Selection:** AS sites are drawn from the formal health sector and are a subset of the routine reporting sites; however, they may also include some components of the informal health sector, such as traditional health healers. In certain contexts, NGO-run facilities can also be included in the AS network, such as where health facilities are set up in camps for refugees or internally displaced populations (IDPs).

An analysis of where AFP reports originate will show that the majority of children with AFP are detected at and reported from a relatively small number of reporting sites that are medium to large hospitals, often referred to as secondary or tertiary hospitals. The rationale behind this trend is that, when faced with a health emergency such as the sudden onset of paralysis in a child, parents and caregivers are more likely to go to the largest accessible hospital, bypassing local health centres and smaller hospitals.

Therefore, the primary criteria for selecting AS sites should be:

- the probability that children under 15 years of age with AFP are seen at the facility.

Additionally, AS sites should also be selected to ensure:

- the AS network is demographically and geographically well-distributed and representative of the population in a province or district; and
- facilities within the network represent all sectors of the health system, from public and private hospitals, to clinics and health centres, to pharmacies and even traditional healers, religious leaders or other local community resources.

The informal health sector plays an important role, especially in locations where it represents the first point of contact for families and communities to seek health care or advice. Informal health workers, such as traditional medicine practitioners and faith healers who are likely to see AFP cases but do not work within the formal health system are thus identified and sensitized to the importance of AFP and oriented on its detection. They are then asked to contact surveillance staff upon encountering a suspected AFP case.

**Prioritization:** Once all AS sites are selected, a prioritization scheme of high-, medium-, and low-priority sites must be applied to determine the frequency with which district and provincial surveillance staff will conduct AS visits (Table 1). The frequency of site visits depends on the priority of the facility. The highest priority should be given to those sites that see the most AFP cases, typically larger health facilities and hospitals. Countries experiencing an outbreak may consider adding a fourth category (“very high-priority sites”) under which targeted facilities are visited twice weekly. Annex 5 details processes and procedures for AS surveillance visits.
Table 1. Site prioritization scheme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Frequency of site visits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very high-priority sites</td>
<td>Very large national referral hospitals (in countries experiencing an outbreak)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-priority sites</td>
<td>Very large national referral hospitals (in some countries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All tertiary and secondary public and private hospitals and all hospitals with paediatric departments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium-priority sites</td>
<td>Medium-sized hospitals, smaller hospitals and large health centres (in some countries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Traditional healers renowned for treating paralysis (in certain communities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-priority sites</td>
<td>Health posts, small health facilities, traditional healers, pharmacies that could see an AFP case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not prioritized</td>
<td>Not part of the AS network, but part of the routine surveillance network</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Experience in polio-endemic countries has shown that, provided the prioritization exercise is executed appropriately, the number of sites in the high-priority group should be lowest (10–15% of the total number of AS sites), with more in the medium-priority group (25–35%), and the remainder of sites in the low-priority group.

**Updating the AS network:** National, provincial and district surveillance teams should review the AS network twice per year and make adjustments, as needed. Facilities may have closed, or new facilities opened. In many countries, the private health sector is growing rapidly, and new facilities may be predominantly in the private sector. Sites should be dropped from or added to the network accordingly.

Adjusting the AS site network is especially important in conflict settings, as conflict and insecurity may disrupt the healthcare system. In such cases, public health surveillance teams need to respond by updating and possibly expanding the AS network in those parts of the country around inaccessible areas and in host communities receiving IDPs or refugees, based on their health-seeking behaviour. Where people no longer have regular access to health facilities, surveillance activities should be expanded to include direct reporting from affected communities by including IDP and refugee camps or NGOs that provide health services (see also Community-based surveillance and Annex 6).

**Reviewing and adjusting sites**

The AS network must be reviewed and updated twice a year to account for the opening and closing of health facilities, as well as sociodemographic changes to the population.

222 – Site focal points and surveillance officers

Depending on a country’s size, district, provincial or national surveillance health officers will be responsible for organizing and scheduling regular AS visits to reporting sites in their area.

In each AS site, a suitable AFP surveillance focal point must be identified or designated if not already in place. While different groups may be considered for this function, depending on the size of the health facility, priority should always be given to a paediatrician, if available.
The AS focal point has several key roles and responsibilities that include:

- immediately notifying an identified AFP case and providing case investigation support;
- coordinating with public health staff during AS visits; and
- confirming zero reporting for routine (passive) surveillance for formal health facilities.

In the informal health sector, such as facilities held by traditional healers or private pharmacies, the focal point by default will be the service provider, whose responsibility will be to notify immediately any new AFP case. These establishments are typically not part of the routine surveillance system, hence are not expected to provide reports.

2.2.3 – Site visit procedures

At the district or provincial level, public health surveillance officers will coordinate to conduct AS visits according to the site visit calendar and prioritization scheme (Table 1 above).

Key activities for site visits

1. Meet with the facility AFP surveillance focal point to ask whether any AFP cases were seen and provide surveillance and polio eradication updates.

2. Visit all relevant departments and wards and review patient registers.
   - Look for missed or unreported AFP cases since the date of the last visit. Look for “AFP” or associated signs, symptoms, or diagnostics (Table 2). Because AFP surveillance is a syndromic-based surveillance, it is important to review symptoms, not diagnoses.
   - Highlight directly in the register (with a coloured marker, if possible) and crosscheck the line listing of all AFP cases (or possible AFP cases) which were found in the register.
   - Date and sign all patient registers that were reviewed.

3. Follow up on any unreported AFP cases.
   - If AFP cases were already reported and investigations launched, no further action is needed.
   - If AFP cases were not reported, request medical records to search for details. Visit patients in the hospital if still admitted; if discharged, obtain addresses to visit patients at home. If the suspected case is confirmed as AFP, conduct the AFP case investigation and initiate specimen collection (see Case investigation and validation under Case activities for AFP surveillance, as well as Annex 8). In addition, speak to the physician or nursing staff to inquire why the case was not reported and sensitize them to report such cases immediately. Conduct follow-up visits to ensure that no additional AFP cases are missed and that all relevant staff has been sensitized.

4. In addition, assess the overall status of polio-related functions during the visit.
   - Take opportunities to sensitize department and ward staff on polio and AFP surveillance.
   - Determine whether and when a training session may be needed, such as after staff turnover.

Experience has shown that, particularly in larger university hospitals, AS is more efficient when performed by senior staff who have experience working with clinicians. They can be shadowed by junior staff, who will in turn learn to build rapport with clinicians and eventually conduct AS visits independently.

Annex guidance

Surveillance officers should always follow standard procedures to structure AS visits. See Annex 5. Active surveillance visits and Annex 7 for an example of an AS visit form to support data collection and monitoring.
• Ensure sufficient supplies and resources are available, including forms, stool kits, and posters.
• Check immunization-related equipment and supplies, such as vaccines (oral polio vaccines [OPVs] and/or inactivated polio vaccine [IPV]) and cold chain storage and carriers.
• Check into other VPD surveillance functions alongside AFP surveillance. As the integration of AFP surveillance into VPD surveillance progresses, it is important to take advantage of AS visits and search for and collect data on other VPDs or outbreak-prone diseases.

### Table 2. Possible indications of an AFP case in patient registers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disease conditions always presenting as AFP</th>
<th>Disease conditions which may initially present with AFP</th>
<th>Other signs and history to be considered suspicious, indicating that AFP may have been present initially</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>● Paralytic polio</td>
<td>● Pott’s disease (spinal tuberculosis)</td>
<td>● Frequent falls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Guillain-Barré syndrome (GBS)</td>
<td>● Bacterial or tuberculosis meningitis</td>
<td>● Weakness, paresis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Transverse myelitis</td>
<td>● Encephalitis</td>
<td>● Abnormal gait, unable to walk, difficulty in walking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Traumatic neuritis</td>
<td>● Cerebrovascular accidents (stroke)</td>
<td>● Easy fatigability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AFP = acute flaccid paralysis; GPS = Guillain-Barré syndrome

### 2.3 – Monitoring active surveillance

The completeness and adequacy of AS visits must be monitored at the district, provincial and national level. For a list of indicators used to monitor AS, see Annex 3. Indicators for AFP surveillance.

Monitoring is best accomplished by using a form that is completed by the visiting surveillance officer and submitted after each visit to a supervisor at the provincial level. Annex 7. Examples of forms offers a sample AS visit report. The form collects key data on all AS visits: the date, time and location, facility visited, and a list of departments visited within large hospitals, as well as whether an undetected AFP case was found during the visit, whether any AFP sensitization or orientation activities were conducted, and whether supplies were provided to the facility (e.g., stool collection kits or posters).

Monitoring AS visits via mobile data and visualizing the analysed data can help identify blind spots in the surveillance network and accelerate corrective actions. See Monitoring AFP surveillance for more innovations in disease surveillance.

### 2.4 – Challenges with active surveillance

As public health teams implement AS, several challenges may arise.

**Insufficient resources:** After establishing the reporting network, surveillance teams often report insufficient resources (such as not enough time, qualified staff, or means of transportation) to conduct visits to all AS sites in the network.

- If this issue occurs, it is very important to ensure that at least all high-priority sites are visited regularly, followed by as many medium- and low-priority sites as possible. This should be feasible as a majority of high-priority sites (e.g., large hospitals) are in national or provincial capitals and relatively close to the national or provincial surveillance office.
- For facilities that cannot be visited, facility focal points should be contacted regularly by phone or email, in addition to monitoring routine reports from these sites.
- Lists of sites and a calendar of visits should be reviewed or re-adjusted regularly until more resources are made available.

**Lack of attention to capital cities:** AFP quality indicators from national capitals and the capital regions of many countries tend to be surprisingly low. This is difficult to account for, as these areas usually host large university hospitals and tertiary care facilities and large numbers of AFP cases are seen in these areas, including cases referred from the provinces. Sensitive AFP surveillance at this level is more important than anywhere else in the country.

- Large hospitals and high-priority tertiary care should be mapped and enrolled as reporting sites, with subsequent AS visits planned and conducted on a regular and frequent basis.
- Visits must be conducted by surveillance officers who are trained and experienced in sensitization and who are comfortable with medical personnel. These visits should be accompanied by supportive supervision and monitoring for timeliness and completeness.

**Inexperienced staff conducting AS visits:** To successfully use AS visits for continuous sensitization of clinicians and other hospital workers on AFP surveillance concept and practices, public health officers must be trained on establishing rapport with medical staff, including with the chiefs of units, some of whom may still not accept or fully understand syndromic AFP surveillance.

- Country programmes should commit to building junior staff capacity through supportive supervision. Good mentoring and training ensure staff are well-qualified and equipped with strong interpersonal communication skills.
- Particular attention should be given to female public health officers who may encounter gender barriers while interacting with medical and hospital administrative staff.

**Lack of access at private hospitals and facilities:** AS visits can be challenging in private, military or other sector-specific facilities. Surveillance officers should be aware of this and may need support from higher-level officials to renegotiate access at regular intervals.

**Insufficient geographic and demographic coverage or representativeness:** The AS network may possess geographic or demographic blind spots. Surveillance teams should be vigilant to identify:

- overlooked population groups that live in remote or hard-to-reach areas;
- overlooked mobile populations, such as refugees and IDPs;
- overlooked informal health sector sites, including traditional medicine or faith-based healthcare facilities, or other healthcare sites, such as military or private facilities;
- AS sites not visited for long periods;
- AS sites not updated, thus missing newer facilities or potentially key practitioners; and
- AS sites that have closed down.

Changes can only be made through regular reviews and a thorough mapping of healthcare sites. Special populations and the health-seeking behaviour of cases and their caregivers are also needed to identify and address potential weaknesses and gaps in the active surveillance network (see Annex 9, Health-seeking behaviour).

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**In most countries, passive and active surveillance are used in parallel. Both systems use the same network of reporting sites, but AS takes only a subset that are further prioritized for surveillance of AFP and classified as high-, medium-, and low-priority sites. (See Annex 4, Routine and active surveillance.)**
3. Community-based surveillance

3.1 – What is community-based surveillance?

Community-based surveillance (CBS) is a surveillance strategy in which trained community members are engaged to report suspected AFP cases to a designated focal person based on a simple AFP case definition.¹⁰

What distinguishes CBS from routine and active surveillance is that case detection occurs outside health facilities and that those performing case detection activities are community members, not health professionals.

CBS is a key method to access hard-to-reach areas and communities that are not reached by the regular AFP surveillance system (see Supplemental strategies for special populations). CBS may be particularly useful in settings or areas at high risk of undetected poliovirus transmission or at risk of new outbreaks following importation or vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV) emergence.

Settings conducive to CBS include:

- security-compromised areas;
- mobile populations such as nomads and seasonal workers;
- special populations that are underserved, such as refugees, IDPs, slum dwellers, ethnic minorities, isolated religious communities or remote populations in hard-to-reach areas; and
- areas or populations relying largely on traditional medicine, where people are less likely to seek care at a health facility.

CBS provides a link between communities and the AFP surveillance system through a designated focal point – and it may increase community engagement in health care and acceptance of immunization and surveillance activities.

While CBS can increase the sensitivity and timeliness of AFP case detection, it can also be resource-intensive and should be used only where health facility-based surveillance cannot be performed or is not functioning well. CBS methods range in resource intensity. Training, sensitization, and supervision are minimum essential activities, and the addition of other activities comes with increased costs. Major cost drivers include: training (initial training and refreshers); supervision; reporting incentives or monthly payment; and the use of digital technology, mobile phones, or other tools (initial and recurring costs).

When considering CBS, countries should note that this strategy may be more cost effective if used for multiple diseases rather than a single disease.

3.2 – Setting up community-based surveillance

Initiating CBS should be carefully assessed because of its resource-intensive nature. Other sensitization activities or adjustments to the AS network may be more efficient for closing surveillance gaps. Programmes are advised to look first at more sustainable, cost-effective solutions.

A needs assessment must be conducted to first determine if CBS should be endeavoured. The needs assessment explores key questions that include: How well does the current AFP surveillance system cover or reach special populations or hard-to-reach areas? What are the real issues behind surveillance

¹⁰ Rather than the full standard AFP case definition (see Principles of AFP surveillance, section 2), a simplified AFP case definition should be used when sensitizing community informants, such as: “Report all children with sudden presence of floppy paralysis or weakness.”
gaps? Are CBS activities currently operating for other diseases? See Annex 6 for more guiding questions that can inform a CBS needs assessment.

Steps to establish CBS include the following activities:

1. Identify key community members, such as local and religious leaders.
2. Sensitize and brief them about polio and AFP; ask for their advice to select community volunteers.
3. Select and train volunteers on their role in CBS. Engage both male and female community volunteers. Women can facilitate CBS in areas where access to female household heads or members is not customary for men. Similarly, the presence of a female team member can facilitate engaging with and accessing more traditional communities.
4. Link volunteers with a designated focal point and/or surveillance officer who will follow up and verify AFP cases, investigate and initiate stool collection.

In some countries, CBS can be set up for the purpose of AFP surveillance only, while in other countries, CBS is an already-existing network that is fully integrated in the public health system for VPDs and outbreak-prone diseases, of which AFP surveillance is only one part.

3.3 – Monitoring community-based surveillance

CBS should be carefully monitored, particularly for context-specific challenges such as hard-to-reach populations and inaccessible areas.

Key indicators to monitor CBS include:

- percent of AFP cases reported by CBS compared with AFP cases notified by reporting sites in the specific area; and
- percent of initial AFP case reports verified as “true AFP” versus “not AFP.”


3.4 – Challenges with community-based surveillance

- Implementing and sustaining effective CBS can be resource intensive. The resources needed for CBS depend upon the country context and the decisions of the surveillance team.
- Hard-to-reach areas present unique challenges for ensuring a reliable line of communication between community informants and surveillance officers. To address this, some teams offer mobile phones or dispense petty cash to pay for communication expenses.
- Low literacy levels within local communities may require more time and effort on the part of the public health staff for adapting AFP surveillance training and sensitization protocols.
- Partially or fully inaccessible areas can impede monitoring and supportive supervision of CBS informants, as well as create problems for conducting AFP case verification and investigation. If this occurs, AFP cases may need to be brought outside inaccessible areas for investigation.
- A considerable percentage of reports of “suspected AFP” may not meet the standard AFP case definition and may give a low yield of actual (“true”) AFP cases, which may increase the workload of public health staff through the added time needed for verification and investigation.

For more on CBS-related challenges and solutions, see Annex 6.
4. Supplemental strategies for special populations

Certain population groups are underserved or not served at all by health systems. They are also persistently missed by surveillance efforts. While the reasons for these gaps are varied, one finding is that persistently missed population groups often belong to high-risk mobile populations or reside in hard-to-reach or inaccessible areas, including areas affected by insecurity and conflict. These special population groups are particularly important for disease control and eradication programmes because they have higher susceptibility to infection due to low immunization coverage and are therefore more likely to transmit viruses — and more likely to be missed by surveillance systems.

Guidelines for Implementing Polio Surveillance in Hard-to-Reach Areas and Populations details some strategies (of which CBS is one approach) for implementing surveillance among special populations, with a focus on high-risk mobile populations.\(^{11}\)

### 4.1 – What are special populations?

Several different marginalized population groups are at risk of being underserved or altogether missed by surveillance efforts. These include:

- mobile populations: nomads and seasonal migrants such as agricultural, mine, brick kiln or construction workers;
- refugees and IDPs living in camps and in host communities;
- populations in settled areas which are underserved by existing health services such as cross-border populations, slum dwellers, ethnic minorities, islanders, fishermen and those living in hard-to-reach areas; and
- totally inaccessible population groups, such as those in security-compromised and conflict-affected areas.

### 4.2 – Identifying and mapping special groups

By identifying, mapping and profiling unserved or underserved populations, special surveillance strategies can ensure that such populations are covered by polio immunization and surveillance.

The following data and information are critical to better characterize and reach such groups:

- geographic location and population size for mobile groups: itineraries and routes of migration, timing and possible seasonality of nomadic movement;
- current access to health services and health-seeking behaviour (see Annex 9. Health-seeking behaviour);
- availability of the existing surveillance network (facility- or community-based) to detect AFP cases in this special population;
- identification of service providers who exist in the area but are not yet participating in polio activities (public and private, including NGOs or faith-based organizations);
- availability of options to develop communication activities targeting these special groups;
- means of communication through the availability of network coverage and/or readily available use of cell phones for public health officers and community workers and volunteers; and
- general information, such as language, literacy, community structure in terms of leaders and influencers.

4.3 – Implementing a mix of surveillance strategies for each special group

Once special populations have been identified and profiled, surveillance approaches can be specifically tailored to ensure each group is adequately covered by poliovirus surveillance (Table 3). A set or mix of suggested surveillance strategies for each kind of special population is recommended.\textsuperscript{12}

The key recommended strategies are:

1. **Enhanced AFP surveillance** with ad hoc AFP case search and systematic contact sampling.
   - Ad hoc AFP case search in large gatherings of nomads, for example during SIAs and during mobile outreach services (Annex 11).
   - Systematic AFP contact sampling for all inadequate AFP samples, with one sample each from three contacts of an AFP cases with inadequate samples, for example. However, in coordination with surveillance and laboratory teams, this can be expanded to all AFP cases from special populations (Annex 12).

2. **Targeted healthy children sampling** can be conducted in special populations that are at high risk for poliovirus; however, this is not a routine strategy and can only be initiated in coordination with and with the approval of surveillance and laboratory teams at the national and regional levels (Annex 13).

3. **Ad hoc environmental surveillance sampling sites** can enhance surveillance in areas considered at high risk of poliovirus circulation because of an outbreak or the sudden influx of an at-risk population.\textsuperscript{13} This strategy should only be considered after strengthening AFP surveillance and in coordination with the laboratory.

### Table 3. Examples of activities by type of special populations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population type</th>
<th>Activity examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Populations living in security-compromised areas     | - Access mapping and analysis of population dynamics and movements; access negotiation, if needed.  
- Coordination with armed forces or groups and relevant partners.  
- Review of surveillance network and establishment of CBS as appropriate, including identifying and training appropriate focal points.  
- Enhanced surveillance in parts of the country bordering inaccessible areas and wherever IDPs come out of inaccessible areas and are received (e.g., adding to reporting sites based on health-seeking behaviour, identification and training of local informants). |

CBS = community-based surveillance; IDP = internally displaced populations

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### Table 3 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population type</th>
<th>Activity examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nomadic populations</td>
<td>- Mapping and profiling of nomadic groups in coordination with nomad leaders; AFP focal points designated for each nomad group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Determining itineraries and migration pathways; mapping healthcare facilities and providers, as well as veterinary services, along the route.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- AFP sensitization among providers and in public places along migration pathways (i.e., in markets, at watering points and camps frequented by nomads); study of nomads’ health-seeking behaviour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Regular contact with AFP focal points established and maintained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- A similar approach should be used for other mobile population groups, as appropriate: seasonal migrants; mine, brick kiln and construction workers; etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees and IDPs in camps</td>
<td>- Camp AFP focal point identified, designated and included in the AS network.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Profile assessed of new arrivals: origin, immunization status, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Active AFP case search.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Permanent vaccination and surveillance team installed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees and informal IDPs in host communities and outside camps</td>
<td>- Key informants identified from the community and included in AS network (see Community-based surveillance).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Tracking of IDPs and refugees in the community via special “tracker teams” to support understanding their health-seeking behaviour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- AS network adjusted to include providers serving refugees and IDPs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-border groups</td>
<td>- Mapping of official and informal border crossings, villages and settlements, special groups, gathering places and seasonal movements; surveillance networks installed on both sides of the border.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Averages estimated for numbers of population moving and migrating across borders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Regular contact between AFP surveillance officers on both side of the border to ensure sharing of data, cross notification, joint investigation and tracking of mobile groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Organizations working at border entry and exit points identified (e.g., immigration, port health services and police); orientation and sensitization on polio and AFP surveillance provided to healthcare workers on both sides.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communities in urban slums</td>
<td>- Profile of communities and their origin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Health-seeking behaviour studied, with adjustments to AS network.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Active AFP case search conducted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Evaluation of any need to add environmental surveillance (ES) sites.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other hard-to-reach communities</td>
<td>- Mapping and profile of special populations who may live in remote areas such as islanders and highlanders, or ethnic minorities who may not access the same health facilities as the broader population.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Identification of and regular contact with local key informants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Study health-seeking behaviour of these communities and adjust the network.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AFP = acute flaccid paralysis; AS = active surveillance; CBS = community-based surveillance; IDP = internally displaced population

The decision to develop, implement and possibly modify any of these strategies should be discussed by all stakeholders involved at the local, national, and regional levels, including national or regional laboratories.

#### 4.4 – Challenges with supplemental strategies for special populations

Challenges to anticipate when implementing poliovirus surveillance in special groups are similar to those listed for CBS. See also Annex 10. Special population groups and Annex 6. Community-based surveillance.
CASE ACTIVITIES for AFP surveillance

Case-related activities for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance – from the onset of paralysis in a patient to final case classification – require timely coordination between field and laboratory surveillance (Fig. 1). All case-related activities should progress quickly so final classification by a National Polio Expert Committee (NPEC) takes place within 90 days of paralysis onset.

**Fig. 1. Process of AFP surveillance**

NPEC = National Polio Expert Committee

Source: WHO.
1. Timely detection

Responding swiftly to a possible case is critical: the earlier poliovirus is detected and confirmed, the faster outbreak response can be implemented to end transmission. The goal established by the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) under its 2022–2026 Strategy is that all polioviruses should be confirmed and sequenced within 35 days of the onset of paralysis.\(^\text{14}\) Given this accelerated timeline, field and logistics activities – from onset of paralysis to the arrival of stool specimens at a WHO-accredited polio laboratory – must be completed within 14 days (Fig. 2). Note that certification standards and indicators remain unchanged (see Annex 3. Indicators for AFP surveillance).

Fig. 2. Timeliness of detection, 35 days (onset to final lab result)

Source: WHO.

1.1 - Reduce delays

Every stage of the process depicted above (Fig. 2) should be targeted for time-saving interventions, as timeliness will be closely monitored (see Monitoring and Annex 3. Indicators for AFP surveillance).

Annex guidance

Annex 14. Rapid case and virus detection highlights bottlenecks and delays that may occur at various stages and administrative levels, their possible causes, and ways the programme can address them. Definitions to support case investigations are found in Annex 1. Poliovirus.

2. Case notification and verification

To support case verification and investigation, all supplies and materials should be prepared in advance to allow quick deployment of the investigation team. This includes case investigation forms (CIFs), laboratory request forms, stool specimen collection kits and stool carriers.

2.1 – Notify the case

AFP cases must be notified within seven (7) days of the onset of paralysis. A physician, health worker, or community informant or volunteer who identifies an AFP case must report it immediately to (or notify) the public health surveillance team at the district or provincial level.

*When in doubt, always report and investigate.*

3. Case investigation and validation

Once reported, the case must be **investigated within 48 hours of notification** by a trained, designated AFP focal point or surveillance officer who completes the CIF.

To minimize the risk of missing key information that may explain delays in detection, CIFs capture the social profile of cases and their community, as well as health-seeking behaviour and gender-related information. (See **Annex 7. Examples of forms** for modified CIFs for endemic and non-endemic countries.)

### 3.1 – Verify the case

Before starting the investigation, the AFP focal point or surveillance officer must verify whether the case meets the AFP case definition. An AFP case is defined as a child younger than 15 years of age presenting with sudden onset of floppy paralysis or muscle weakness due to any cause, or any person of any age with paralytic illness if poliomyelitis is suspected by a clinician.

Verification ensures cases are systematically prepared for review and investigation.

- If the case meets the case definition, the investigation is carried out.
- If the case does not meet the case definition, the AFP focal point/surveillance officer stops the investigation and records the case as ‘not an AFP’ on the CIF. The reasons for which the case was verified as ‘not an AFP’ should be clearly documented. A list of these cases should be kept separately.
- If the case has died, the investigation still needs to be conducted. The CIF must be filled with the case history (date of paralysis onset; travel history of the case; history of health seeking; household members and visitors) and AFP contact specimen collected. (See **Section 5. AFP contact sampling** and **Annex 12**). Such cases will be sent to the NPEC for classification.
- If in doubt as to whether the case meets the definition or not, the case should be investigated.

For this step, verification does not require filling out any separate forms, and the verification is not recorded as an activity in any line list.

### 3.2 – Investigate the case

Within 48 hours of the notification, the surveillance officer proceeds to investigate the case by performing the following steps.

1. **Speak to the physician or health worker who reported the case and inquire about the working or provisional diagnosis currently being considered if the case was seen by a physician.**
   (See “Differential diagnosis” under **Annex 1. Poliomyelitis**. Signs and symptoms to look out for are asymmetric flaccid paralysis, fever at onset, rapid progression of paralysis and the preservation of sensory nerve function.)

2. ** Invite the attending physician or health worker to join in the case investigation.**

3. **Document the case by taking the patient’s history from the caregiver, transcribing it to the CIF, including both the travel history and past history of healthcare-seeking contacts.**

4. **Conduct a physical examination. Note that the objective of the clinical examination in AFP case investigation is to establish whether there is any degree of paralysis or paresis or not, regardless of the current clinical diagnosis. It is therefore NOT to establish an exact medical-neurological diagnosis.**

5. **Begin to organize the collection of two stool specimens.**

---

**Annex guidance**

For a detailed explanation of how to conduct the investigation of an AFP case (case documentation, history taking, physical examination and stool collection), see **Annex 8. AFP case investigation**.
3.3 – Assign an EPID number

A unique case epidemiologic identification (EPID) number must be assigned to each AFP case. The EPID identifies the location and year the onset of paralysis took place and indexes the AFP case count of that location. The EPID number should be assigned at the time of case investigation so that it can be used in the CIF and the laboratory request form. This is usually done with coordination at the provincial or the national level, depending on the country.

The EPID number is a 14-character string that consists of the following codes (Figs. 3 and 4):

- 1st to 3rd characters specify the country code in letters
- 4th to 6th characters specify the first administrative level (usually province) in letters.
- 7th to 9th characters specify the second administrative level (usually district) in letters.
- 10th to 11th characters specify the year of paralysis onset.
- 12th to 14th characters represent the 3-digit number of the case (using a chronological order)

**Fig. 3. Nomenclature for EPID**

Country - Province - District - Year - AFP case number

**Fig. 4. Example of EPID number assignment**

Country name: Newland
Province name: Province A
District name: District B
Onset year: 2022
Chronological order of case notification (i.e., 3rd case notified in this district in 2022)

International and national cross-notification: If it is ascertained that the onset of paralysis occurred in a country other than where the AFP case was detected, the AFP case will be assigned (or reassigned) to the location where onset occurred. All parties should be informed, including field, data and laboratory surveillance teams. International cross-notification is facilitated by the WHO regional office. National cross-notification is usually coordinated at the subnational level, according to national guidelines. The EPID number assigned to the case may also need to be modified accordingly.

3.4 – Validate the case

Crosschecking the accuracy of information and data recorded in the CIFs by someone other than the person who reported the case is referred to as AFP case validation. It is ideally conducted within 14 days of the original case investigation by senior surveillance staff, typically by secondary and tertiary supervisors, with the case and caregivers. The focus of case validation should be given to critical data: date of onset, place of onset, areas visited prior to onset, stool collection dates/processes, vaccine doses received by essential immunization (EI) and supplementary immunization activities (SIAs), health-seeking history, and collection of appropriate contact samples. AFP surveillance data must be updated based on validation findings, and discrepancies systematically recorded.

For a subset of reported AFP cases either selected at random or based on country programme-specific criteria (such as an unexpected increase in reporting), the target for case validation is 30% measured on a monthly or quarterly basis, depending on the country’s epidemiological status and risk.
4. Stool collection and transport to the laboratory

4.1 – Collect stool specimens

To optimize isolation of poliovirus from a WHO-accredited polio laboratory, two stool specimen must be collected as soon as possible, preferably within 14 days and no later than 60 days after the onset of paralysis (Fig. 5).

Fig. 5. Stool collection based on onset of paralysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paralysis onset ≤14 days</th>
<th>Paralysis onset &gt;14 days to &lt;60 days</th>
<th>Paralysis onset ≥60 days to ≤6 months</th>
<th>Paralysis onset &gt;6 months</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Conduct AFP case investigation</td>
<td>• Conduct AFP case investigation</td>
<td>• Conduct AFP case investigation</td>
<td>• Record information on “Unreported AFP Case” line list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Collect stool specimens</td>
<td>• Collect stool specimens</td>
<td>• Conduct 60-day follow-up examination</td>
<td>• No AFP case investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Remember, stool specimens can be deemed inadequate upon arrival at the laboratory.</td>
<td>• Additionally, conduct:</td>
<td>• No stool specimens collected from AFP case or AFP contacts</td>
<td>• No stool specimens collected from AFP case or AFP contacts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AFP = acute flaccid paralysis
Source: WHO.

The chances of isolating poliovirus are greatest when the two specimens:

- are collected as soon as possible after onset of paralysis (the first specimen should therefore be collected at the time of the investigation or as soon as possible thereafter);
- are collected within 14 days of paralysis onset and no later than 60 days;
- are collected at a minimum of 24 hours apart from each other’s collection; and
- arrive at a WHO-accredited laboratory within three (3) days of collection with good reverse cold chain.

Virus shedding is intermittent, hence the need to collect two specimens 24 hours apart. It is also most intense during the first two weeks after paralysis onset, hence the need to collect the two specimens as soon as possible and no later than 60 days after paralysis onset (Fig. 6). For cases detected after 60 days after paralysis onset and up until six months after onset, a CIF should still be completed but no stool specimens should be collected (see Fig. 5 above).

Fig. 6. Poliovirus detection in stool specimens

Stool specimens should ideally be collected at a health facility by trained personnel. If specimens cannot be collected at a health facility and must be collected by a caregiver at the home of the case, a sample collection and transport kit with frozen ice packs should be left with the caregivers. Ensure the instructions are clearly understood, using simple language if needed, with contact information in case of questions or problems arise. Make an appointment to change melted ice packs and collect both specimens.

**Annex 8. AFP case investigation** provides a standardized, step-by-step procedure for stool collection, including a list of materials and supplies. Stool specimen collection needs to be adequate to maximize the laboratory’s chances of isolating and confirming the presence of poliovirus. **Inadequate collection of stool specimens** points to gaps in surveillance quality and may lead to missed transmission of the virus.

Inadequate stool collection can be due to:

- late detection of the case (samples collected >14 days of the onset of paralysis);
- late investigation (samples collected >14 days of the onset of paralysis);
- the death of the case or loss to follow-up of the case before sample collection;
- constipation of AFP case (i.e., zero or one stool specimen collected);
- improper collection procedure or bad conditioning (such as leaks from non-recommended containers);
- poorly maintained reverse cold chain; and
- samples lost in transit.

The probability of not isolating poliovirus in inadequate stool specimens is high. **AFP contact sampling** is therefore recommended to increase the probability of confirming polio through epidemiological linkage for all AFP cases with inadequate stool specimens (see **Section 5** and **Annex 12**).

**Temperature effects on poliovirus**

The properties of wild poliovirus type 1 (WPV1) show the risks of exposing stool specimens to prolonged high temperatures.

- At 25°C, WPV1 is highly stable for at least 28 days
- At 35°C, WPV1 is stable for four days but becomes undetectable by 16 days.
- At 45°C, WPV1 is undetectable by day four.

The probability of detecting virus is further reduced if the concentration of virus in the specimens is low. To be confident the virus is retained if it is present, stool specimens must be sealed in containers and stored immediately inside a refrigerator or placed between frozen ice packs at 4-8°C in a cold box, ready for shipment to a laboratory. Undue delays or prolonged exposure to heat on the way to the laboratory may destroy the virus.

**4.2 – Store and transport specimens**

In many countries, the WHO and the Ministries of Health (MOH) have contracts with commercial courier companies to provide ground transport and/or air transport service to speed and/or facilitate specimen transport. Based on established indicators, transport time from collection of the second stool specimen to arrival to the WHO-accredited laboratory should not exceed three (3) days, irrespective of whether the laboratory is located within the country. Specimens should be kept in a reverse cold chain at all times.
Global guidelines for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance in the context of poliovirus eradication

Stool specimens should arrive at the laboratory in good condition with the following criteria met:

- adequate quantity (8–10 grams in each container, the size of two adult thumbnails);
- no leakage and no desiccation or drying out of the specimens;
- appropriate temperature and reverse cold chain maintained; and
- complete documentation (CIF and laboratory request form).

4.2.1. Maintain the reverse cold chain during storage and transport

*Reverse cold chain* refers to a system of storing and transporting samples at a temperature between 4° and 8°C from the moment of collection until arrival at the laboratory. It is critical as an interruption of the reverse cold chain through prolonged exposure to higher temperatures or repeated freezing and thawing may decrease the ability of the laboratory to isolate the poliovirus.

Specimens must be stored at precise temperatures determined by when they can be sent to the laboratory (Table 4). “Batch send-off,” or delayed shipping to the laboratory until several specimens have been collected, should be avoided as it increases the risk of interrupting the reverse cold chain and inactivating the poliovirus so that virus detection is delayed or impossible.

Table 4. Storage requirements based on transport schedule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>If transport occurs ...</th>
<th>Storage mechanism and temperature requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>≤72 hours after collection</td>
<td>Store samples in specimen carriers with frozen ice packs 4°–8°C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;72 hours after collection</td>
<td>Store samples in a freezer at or below -20°C until transport to the laboratory is ready. Do not freeze with vaccines or food.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. AFP contact sampling

The sensitivity of an AFP surveillance system to detect ongoing circulation of WPV1 or VDPVs can be increased by collecting and examining stool specimens from children who have been in direct contact with the AFP case as they are likely to have a subclinical or asymptomatic infection.

AFP contact sampling is the collection and testing of one (1) stool specimen from three (3) children who have been in direct contact with an AFP case in the week prior to the onset of paralysis and/or in the two-week period after onset.

The recommended criteria to define AFP contacts are:

- children preferably younger than 5 years of age;
- children in contact with the AFP case within the week prior to or two weeks after onset of paralysis; and
- children with frequent contact with the AFP case, such as siblings and other children living in the same household and/or neighbouring children who played with the AFP case during the period of interest (e.g., touching, sharing toys and food).

5.1 – Determine if AFP contact sampling should be conducted

Select circumstances may warrant conducting AFP contact sampling to increase the sensitivity of the surveillance system.

- **Initial case investigation**: AFP contact sampling should be conducted during the initial AFP case investigation if it is known that two stool specimens cannot be collected in a timely manner (within 14 days of onset). The contact sampling should ideally be conducted within seven (7) days of case notification. It can be done up to 60 days (two months) after onset of paralysis of the AFP case, though it should be noted that the longer the wait to conduct the investigation, the lower the probability of detecting virus (if present) in the stool specimens.
Global guidelines for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance in the context of poliovirus eradication

- **Follow-up based on inadequate stool specimens**: AFP contact sampling should be conducted if the laboratory reports the stool specimens of the AFP case were received in poor condition.

AFP contact sampling can also be performed either as a part of regular AFP surveillance activities or as a part of outbreak response activities (Table 5). However, any decision to expand AFP contact sampling must be made in close consultation between regional and national polio teams and the laboratory to ensure both that the expansion is justified and that the increase in laboratory workload can be accommodated.

Table 5. AFP contact sampling during field surveillance and outbreak response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommended conditions for AFP contact sampling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Field surveillance</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outbreak response</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AFP = acute flaccid paralysis

**AFP contact sampling should not be done** when the AFP case has already been confirmed as WPV or VDPV, as contact sampling will not provide additional information, or when the onset of paralysis of the AFP case occurred more than 60 days earlier.

### 5.2 – Conduct AFP contact sampling

AFP contact sampling should be done adhering to a standardized procedure:

1. Identify potential contacts. Give priority to younger children (under five years of age) who are in frequent, direct contact with the AFP case. Include siblings, household members or playmates. If the AFP case stayed in other locations one week prior to and/or two weeks after paralysis onset, then identify additional contacts at these locations.

2. Explain the purpose of collecting samples to parents or guardians of the selected contact.

3. Collect one stool sample each from three separate contacts.

4. Follow AFP surveillance protocols for collection, storage, and transport of stool specimens.

5. Fill out a separate laboratory request form for each contact.

6. Each specimen should be labelled clearly as a contact of the AFP case, using the EPID number of the AFP case with an added contact indicator ("C") and number; that is, the suffixes: -C1, -C2, -C3 (Figs. 7 and 8).

---

**Annex guidance**

A job aid to support contact sampling is available in Annex 12. AFP contact sampling.
Fig. 7. Nomenclature for EPID of contacts

EPID number of AFP case

Country - Province - District - Year - AFP case number – CONTACT number

Fig. 8. Example of EPIDs for the three contacts of AFP case “NEW-PRA-DIB-22-003”

NEW-PRA-DIB-22-003-C1  NEW-PRA-DIB-22-003-C2  NEW-PRA-DIB-22-003-C3

5.3 – Interpret AFP contact sampling results

Table 6 summarizes how laboratory results of AFP contacts should be interpreted to link AFP cases to poliovirus epidemiologically.

Table 6. AFP case and contact epidemiological link

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Days since paralysis onset</th>
<th>AFP case info</th>
<th>AFP contact</th>
<th>Interpretation and final classification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recommend stool specimen collection?</td>
<td>Specimens adequate?</td>
<td>If poliovirus detected from stool of AFP case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Days 0 - 14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>No (See remark)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Days 15 - 60</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Inadequate</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(See remarks 3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AFP = acute flaccid paralysis; NPEC = National Polio Expert Committee

Further details to support interpreting laboratory results on AFP contact sampling:

1. If the AFP case was WPV-negative or VDPV-negative, the isolation of WPV or VDPV from a contact confirms the AFP case as a WPV or VDPV case, even if the AFP case had adequate stool specimens.
2. If the AFP case was WPV-positive or VDPV-positive, the isolation of WPV or VDPV from a contact still represents a programmatically valuable information. However, the virus-positive contacts of AFP cases are not classified as confirmed poliovirus cases because they do not meet the case definition, which requires AFP. Results are included as “others” or “other human” in the poliovirus isolation count.
3. AFP stool specimens collected after 60 days will be considered as inadequate, and no AFP contact sampling should be conducted. Any positive isolate found in the AFP stool specimen will be interpreted as an incidental finding, and polio positive human source will not be used as epidemiological link to confirm poliomyelitis in the AFP case.
6. Laboratory testing and reporting

Sensitive surveillance to detect polioviruses requires effective collaboration between clinicians, epidemiologists, immunization programmes and laboratories at the national, regional and global levels.

6.1. The Global Polio Laboratory Network

The Global Polio Laboratory Network (GPLN) was established by the WHO to ensure that high-quality diagnostic services are available to all countries. The GPLN processes over 220,000 stool samples from AFP cases and their contacts and more than 12,000 sewage samples per year. As of 2022, the network consists of 145 WHO-accredited polio laboratories in 92 countries across six WHO regions (Fig. 9).

Fig. 9. Laboratories within the GPLN by lab role

![Laboratories within the GPLN by lab role](image)

Source: GPLN, 2021.

WHO-accredited polio laboratories are laboratories that conform to GPLN standards or codes of practice. The accuracy and quality of testing is monitored by WHO through an annual accreditation programme that includes onsite reviews of infrastructures, equipment, standard operating procedures (SOPs), work practices, performance and external proficiency testing. To be included in the network, laboratories must have the proven capability and capacity to detect, identify and promptly report WPVs and VDPVs that may be present in clinical and environmental specimens.

The primary roles of GPLN laboratories are to:

- detect poliovirus from stool specimens and sewage samples by isolation using cell culture;
- identify and differentiate isolated polioviruses using intratypic differentiation (ITD);
- genetically characterize poliovirus using sequencing methods, which also determine whether isolated viruses are wild, vaccine-like or vaccine-derived;
- trace the origin of polioviruses isolated from AFP cases and contacts or from sewage samples;
- maintain a reference bank of nucleotide sequences of known viruses to allow rapid tracing of the geographic origin of new isolates;
- assess vaccine potency and efficacy if circumstances indicate possible failure;
- conduct serosurveys if knowledge of the antibody status of the population is important; and
- provide evidence that polio has been eradicated.
All national, regional and global polio laboratories in the GPLN follow WHO-recommended procedures for detecting and characterizing polioviruses from stool specimen and sewage samples derived from AFP cases/contacts and environmental surveillance, respectively.

### Laboratory tools for polio eradication

Molecular detection and comparative genomic sequencing are major surveillance tools for eradication.

- Poliovirus patterns of transmission can be inferred from analysing patterns of poliovirus evolution. Poliovirus is a rapidly evolving virus with approximately 1% substitutions per year in the capsid region of the virus. Viral strain evolution is analysed to estimate the extent and duration of infections and virus circulation.

- Molecular epidemiological analysis provides additional information to link cases and identify persistent reservoirs. Sequence comparisons can also determine the source of a poliovirus infection and distinguish among viruses imported into a new area or country, endemic virus circulation, re-introduction of poliovirus to a population, and VDPV strains, all of which help to inform eradication efforts. All WPV and VDPV isolates are subjected to partial (viral protein 1 [VP1] or capsid) or full genomic sequencing and phylogenetic analysis.

- While interpreting genetic trees, long horizontal branches indicate missing information. Viral sequences at ends of long branches are called “orphans” if isolates are >1.5% different in the VP1 capsid nucleotide sequence from any isolate previously detected. Isolation of an orphan virus suggests silent circulation or no detection for an extended period, both of which indicate potential gaps in surveillance.

At a basic level, results from genomic sequencing help to:

- confirm a polio diagnosis;
- characterize the poliovirus isolates at the molecular level;
- define and monitor how poliovirus is spreading by comparing the nucleotide sequences of different poliovirus isolates detected over time and in different localities; and
- detect specimen or sample cross-contaminations as part of a GPLN quality assurance system.

### 6.2 – Coordination between field and laboratory surveillance

Polio field and laboratory surveillance teams work closely to:

- collaborate on surveillance activities that affect workload and testing capacities, such as AFP contact sampling and targeted healthy children sampling;
- ensure that the laboratory is notified in advance of the shipment of stool specimens;
- ensure that the laboratory provides feedback on the condition of stool specimens, particularly if there is a need to recollect specimens;
- collaborate on data sharing to ensure accurate case details (e.g., EPID numbers), with corrective action taken when there are problems;
- share epidemiological findings, laboratory results, classification and genomic sequence results;
- coordinate so there are no discrepancies between the data held by the field team and laboratory to support the calculation on indicators; and
- reduce the period between the identification of an AFP case and final laboratory results so new positive cases can be responded to as swiftly as possible. The duration of specimen transport is used as one of the key indicator for timeliness: ≥80% of stool specimens should arrive at a WHO-accredited polio laboratory under reverse cold chain conditions within three (3) days of collection of the second stool specimen collection.

### 6.3 – Possible laboratory results

Possible laboratory results can include: OPV-like, Sabin-like (SL), or nOPV2-like, WPV, VDPV, non-polio enteroviruses (NPEV), non-enteroviruses, or no virus isolated (Table 7).
Orphan virus: The detection of a virus that is >1.5% different in its sequence from any virus previously detected, referred to as an ‘orphan virus,’ signals the existence of potential gaps in surveillance. As such, an orphan virus triggers the following actions:

- the immediate (within 24 hours) completion of a detailed case investigation;
- the completion, within 72 hours of receipt of the genetic sequencing result, of an initial risk assessment to determine the level of risk for further spread and to inform the type and scale of the response;
- in the event of an outbreak in a previously polio-free country or area: the development of a joint (MOH and GPEI partners) vaccination and surveillance strengthening response plan and budget, which may be extended to include several countries, based on the findings of the risk assessment and depending on the context; and
- the completion of a desk review and a field investigation aimed at identifying possible surveillance gaps and missed transmission. Identifying the population group(s) or geographic area(s) the virus may have been circulating in undetected is especially important, as it enables the programme to hone its response by developing surveillance interventions tailored for these specific population group(s) or area(s).

Table 7. Possible laboratory results from the testing of stool and environmental samples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lab results</th>
<th>Type of virus</th>
<th>Reported as</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OPV-like or Sabin-like (SL), or nOPV2-like</td>
<td>Vaccine strain poliovirus type 1, 2 or 3</td>
<td>SL1, SL2, SL3, nOPV-like</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wild poliovirus</td>
<td>Wild poliovirus type 1, 2 or 3</td>
<td>WPV1, WPV2, and WPV3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaccine-derived poliovirus</td>
<td>Vaccine-derived poliovirus type 1, 2 or 3, further classified as:</td>
<td>VDPV1, VDPV2, VDPV3, further reported as:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• circulating VDPVs (cVDPVs)</td>
<td>• cVDPV1, cVDPV2, cVDPV3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• immunodeficiency-associated VDPVs (iVDPVs)</td>
<td>• iVDPV1, iVDPV2, iVDPV3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• ambiguous VDPV (aVDPV)</td>
<td>• aVDPV1, aVDPV2, aVDPV3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>This is done by combining laboratory results with epidemiological and clinical information.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* For nOPV2, specific terminology will be used when sufficient data will be gathered</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-polio enteroviruses</td>
<td>Non-polio enteroviruses</td>
<td>NPEV or NPENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-enteroviruses</td>
<td>Non enteroviruses</td>
<td>NEV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No virus isolated</td>
<td>No virus isolated</td>
<td>NVI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aVDPV = ambiguous vaccine-derived poliovirus; cVDPV = circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (types 1,2,3); iVDPV = immunodeficiency-associated vaccine derived poliovirus (types 1,2,3); NEV = non-enterovirus; nOPV = novel oral polio vaccine; nOPV2 = novel oral polio vaccine type 2; NPENT = non-polio enterovirus; NPEV = non-polio enterovirus; NVI = no virus isolated; OPV = oral polio vaccine; SL = Sabin-like (types 1,2,3); VDPV = vaccine-derived poliovirus (types 1,2,3); WPV = wild poliovirus (types 1,2,3)

A combination of findings is possible for: OPV-like, SL, nOPV-like; WPV; VDPV; and NPEV. Results that fall under the second or third categories (i.e., WPV or VDPV) may indicate an event or outbreak and should be followed by appropriate response. All results should be communicated to all relevant administrative levels of the polio eradication programme, as well as the submitting physician or health facility. If available, further clinical management can be offered by the attending physician, or a polio rehabilitation programme in some countries.
6.4 – Monitoring laboratory timeliness

The GPLN routinely measures the timeliness of the work done in its laboratories, with the following indicators for stool specimen processing and their targets (see also Annex 3. Indicators for AFP Surveillance).

- ≥80% of specimens with final results available within 21 days of receipt from a direct detection country OR within 28 days of receipt from a non-direct detection country at a WHO-accredited polio laboratory.
- ≥80% of specimens with WPV/VDPV final results available within 21 days of receipt from a direct detection country OR within 28 days of receipt from a non-direct detection country at a WHO-accredited polio laboratory.
- ≥80% of poliovirus specimens with sequencing results available within 7 days of receipt of isolate at a WHO-accredited Polio sequencing laboratory.

The overall target and indicator for the timeliness of obtaining final laboratory results (interval from paralysis onset to specimen testing and result) is:

- ≥80% of WPVs and VDPVs reporting final laboratory results within 35 days of AFP onset.

7. 60-day follow-up investigation

7.1 - Determine which cases should undergo a 60-day follow-up examination

The hallmark of poliomyelitis is that most paralytic cases will not fully recover but will suffer permanent residual neurological sequelae, or residual paralysis. All surviving AFP cases should therefore be examined again for residual paralysis between the 60th and the 90th day after the onset of paralysis. The presence of residual paralysis at that time could be further evidence that the cause of paralysis was due to the poliovirus.

The 60-day follow-up examination is especially important for AFP cases with no stool specimen collected or inadequate specimens, for which reliable laboratory results may not be available. The presence of residual paralysis upon follow-up will be a key element for the NPEC to consider in their final case classification. The programme therefore strongly recommends that all AFP cases with inadequate specimens receive a 60-day follow-up examination.

Likewise, given the programmatic importance of vaccine viruses (e.g., Sabin, Sabin-like viruses, nOPV2, nOPV2-like viruses), the programme strongly recommends that all AFP cases with vaccine-type (Sabin-type, nOPV2 type) poliovirus in their stool specimens receive a 60-day follow-up examination. This facilitates a later possible diagnosis of vaccine-associated paralytic polio (VAPP).

In some WHO regions, such as the Region of the Americas and the Eastern Mediterranean Region, a 60-day follow-up examination is required for all AFP cases, irrespective of stool specimen’s condition, as the exam provides valuable information to allocate a final diagnosis to those non-polio AFP cases.

7.2 – Conduct a 60-day follow-up examination

The result of the 60-day follow-up examination depends considerably on the experience and clinical skills of the person conducting the exam. This examination should ideally be conducted by a paediatrician experienced in examining children. Well-trained paediatricians will detect even small degrees of residual weakness which less trained health workers may not be able to find. It is also preferred to have it done by the physician/officer who initially examined the case.
A 60-day follow-up examination is conducted using both the original CIF and the 60-day follow-up examination form (Annex 7. Examples of forms). During the exam, the clinician or officer should systematically assess the patient.

**60-day follow-up examination process**

1. Verify with the family that all information on the previously documented CIF is correct.
2. Inquire if the paralysis or weakness has improved, has remained the same, or has progressed.
3. Observe how the child moves their limbs or affected areas of the body. Watch the child walk, or move arms, and look for signs of atrophy.
4. Examine muscle tone, power, and reflexes. Verify sensation.
5. Even mild residual weakness should be considered as ‘residual paralysis.’
6. Complete the 60-day follow-up examination form and send it to the national Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI) or polio programme.

**8. Final AFP case classification**

Once laboratory results have been received, all AFP cases undergo final case classification. The target is to classify all cases within 90 days of the onset of paralysis.

The final classification of cases with inadequate stools is done by the National Polio Expert Committee (NPEC). Depending on the region, this committee may also be known as National Polio Expert Group, National Polio Expert Review Committee (with the acronyms ERC or NEC) or National Polio Expert Panel. (See Annex 15. Polio committees and commissions.)

**National Polio Expert Committee (NPEC)**

The NPEC is an honorary, volunteer group of paediatricians, neurologists, virologists and epidemiologists that meets regularly and on an ad hoc basis, generally between once a month to four times a year. The committee’s membership varies in size and composition. Its role is to:

- classify all AFP cases but, at a minimum, all AFP cases with inadequate stool specimens that have residual paralysis at 60-day follow-up, that have died or are lost to follow-up;
- review cases with suspected VAPP, which is assigned after excluding all possible diagnoses. (VAPP cases with a history of receiving nOPV2 should be referred to the causality assessment committee to assess an association with the use of nOPV2. In some countries, the NPEC performs causality assessment as part of its terms of reference. See Annex 16. Safety surveillance for nOPV2.);
- provide technical advice pertaining to AFP cases and final diagnosis (if appropriate); and
- monitor quality of the AFP surveillance system in general.

**8.1 – Determine final AFP case classification**

In reviewing all AFP cases, The NPEC provides final case classification (Fig. 10).

**AFP cases with adequate specimens** are either:

- **confirmed** as polio, if WPV or VDPV was detected in any stool specimens from either the case or contacts; or
- **discarded** as non-polio AFP, if no WPV or VDPV was detected in adequate stool specimens from either the case or contacts.

**AFP with inadequate specimens** will be:

- **confirmed** as polio if WPV or VDPV was detected in any stool specimens from either the case or contacts;
Global guidelines for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance in the context of poliovirus eradication

- **compatible** if the NPEC has concluded so after reviewing that (1) no WPV or VDPV was detected in any stool specimen from either the case or its contacts, and that (2) there is residual paralysis (or weakness) at the time of the 60-day follow-up visit, or that the follow-up was not done due to death or loss to follow-up of the case, and (3) upon review, the possibility of polio could not be ruled out; or
- **discarded** as non-polio AFP, if no poliovirus was detected from the case or his/her contacts, and no residual paralysis was observed at the 60-day follow-up visit of the case, or if the NPEC concludes after reviewing that (1) no poliovirus was detected in any stool specimens from either the case or contacts, and that (2) even though there was residual paralysis, or the case was lost to follow-up, or had died, there was sufficient evidence (clinical evidence and supportive documentation) to discard the case as non-polio.

**Fig. 10. Virologic AFP classification scheme**

**Non-polio and polio-compatible cases**

For cases classified as non-polio AFP and for which no prior working diagnosis was given, the NPEC will be expected to assign a final diagnosis based on all information at its disposal, such as the initial investigation, the 60-day follow-up examination results, and other clinical evidence.

Polio-compatible cases can only be classified as such by the NPEC. Those cases are neither confirmed as polio nor discarded as non-polio. Such cases are important because they indicate a surveillance failure in any of the steps required to collect adequate specimens, from delays in the AFP case seeking health care to specimens received at a WHO-accredited polio laboratory in good condition. A cluster of polio compatible cases in a short period of time is worrisome as the programme cannot rule out polio as one of the reasons for this cluster of AFP cases.

Regular mapping and review of polio-compatible cases helps to find areas with poor surveillance to address the underlying problem that has caused late specimen collection.
8.2 – Further investigate, if needed

Certain critical situations require further investigation to supplement the initial case investigation and gain a better understanding of the context and circumstance of the case or cluster of cases and thus uncover possible reasons for the occurrence and assess the risk of virus spread if present.

Any one of the following situations warrants a prompt detailed case investigation:

- a single isolate of WPV through AFP or ES;
- a single isolate of VDPV1, VDPV2 or VDPV3 through AFP or ES;
- any SL2 poliovirus in an area with no recent vaccination campaign with type 2-containing vaccine;
- a clustering of AFP cases classified as polio-compatibles, i.e., usually defined as two or more cases in either a single district or two neighbouring districts within four weeks;
- a clustering of AFP cases within a district or in neighbouring districts, i.e., at least twice the number of expected AFP cases reported within a month, in a limited geographical area (please refer to Table 11b in Monitoring); and
- in some cases, a “hot” AFP case in advance of laboratory confirmation.\(^{15}\)

The main elements to launch a detailed case investigation are included in the Detailed Case Investigation Form or Report (**Annex 7. Examples of Forms**).\(^{16}\) The form compiles information on the case (or environmental site), as well as information about the community (or catchment area).

The objectives of detailed investigations are to:

- define characteristics of the case(s), including demographics and socio-cultural aspects to better identify and address possible risk factors;
- identify possible origins or causes for the virus circulation or source of importation of poliovirus;
- assess the potential spread of the virus by looking for some unreported cases in the area; and
- formulate control measures (immunization and surveillance) to interrupt the transmission and prevent spread or improve the ability to detect circulation.

Following the detailed case investigation of any polio event or outbreak, it is critical to assess and enhance poliovirus surveillance.\(^{17}\)

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\(^{15}\) A “hot” AFP case is a case that looks clinically like polio (rapid progression of paralysis; asymmetrical paralysis; fever at onset) plus or minus any of the following criteria as defined by the country or region: less than five years of age; fewer than three doses of polio vaccine or unknown vaccination status, contact with infected area. See Table 11a in Monitoring for further information on “hot” cases.


MONITORING AFP surveillance

1. Data management

Data that are complete, accurate and timely are key to monitoring progress toward eradication. For data to be of use, data collection and processing tools must be used correctly, and the data must be analysed on a regular basis and interpreted properly to produce information to support decision making.

The programme gathers data from several sources for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance:

- Case-based AFP data is collected through case investigation forms (CIFs) and 60-day follow-up exams, where it is compiled in a database and shared weekly with WHO regional offices and headquarters. It is also placed on an online platform, the Polio Information System (POLIS).
- Specimen-based data on AFP cases, case contacts and targeted healthy children stool specimens is gathered from the laboratory, compiled in databases and shared weekly with both WHO regional offices and headquarters. It is also placed on POLIS.
- Genetic sequencing results for poliovirus isolates also provide a source of data for AFP surveillance, some of which are placed on POLIS.
- Routine surveillance data (“zero-reporting”) is collected from all reporting sites and compiled at national level
- Active surveillance data is collected from AS visits conducted by surveillance officers and should be compiled at national level.

1.1 – Polio Information System (POLIS)

Hosted at the WHO headquarters, POLIS consolidates, harmonizes, performs quality checks and analyses data from AFP surveillance, environmental surveillance (ES), supplemental immunization activities (SIAs), and laboratory testing. POLIS thus offers a central repository that permits access to standardized data, reports and outputs by country programmes and partners (Fig. 11).

Fig. 11. POLIS visualization

18 POLIS can be accessed online at: https://extranet.who.int/polis/Help (log-in required).
Broadly, AFP surveillance data management is indispensable to support decision-making (Table 8). With a focus on AFP surveillance, the role of data managers is to ensure that:

- AFP data is collected and shared, where applicable, in a timely manner;
- AFP data is complete and free of data entry errors (data quality checks);
- AFP data is accurate (e.g., logical chronology of dates); and
- AFP data is filed and archived properly.

In addition, and together with surveillance officers, data managers ensure that:

- accurate and up-to-date data is analysed, and information is presented clearly so as to best support data-driven decision making; and
- reports and feedback are complete and provided in a timely manner, particularly as they support monitoring surveillance performance.

Table 8. The uses of AFP surveillance data to programme decision-makers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country context</th>
<th>Use of AFP surveillance data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All countries</td>
<td>● Calculate standard AFP quality indicators for surveillance performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Focus corrective efforts on low-performing areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All countries</td>
<td>● Provide evidence on surveillance quality to national and regional certification bodies as the basis for regional and global polio-free certification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endemic countries, outbreak areas</td>
<td>● Track WPV, VDPV circulation to inform immunization activities and monitor progress towards interrupting transmission</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AFP = acute flaccid paralysis; VDPV = vaccine-derived poliovirus; WPV = wild poliovirus

5.2 – Mobile applications and mobile data collection

New technologies can help improve surveillance processes and data management. Such innovations have traditionally been used to improve timeliness in the collection, storage and dissemination of data and to improve monitoring and supervision activities. Innovation can also be used to locate populations and get a better understanding of the scope of the surveillance network.

The widespread use of mobile devices facilitates cleaner, faster and more reliable data capture and increases communication between surveillance officers and the healthcare network. Many successful innovations with mobile devices are currently in use across the polio programme (Table 9). It is recommended that country programmes consult with WHO regional offices to make sure certain data standards are met and ensure data can be captured in POLIS.

Table 9. Examples of successful polio programme innovations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Innovation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Benefits</th>
<th>Tool</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| E-surv Electronic surveillance | Real-time monitoring and reporting system on active surveillance (AS) visits. | ● Registers time, location and record data on AS visits.  
● Tracks the coverage of AS visits | Mobile phone or tablet |
| ISS Integrated supportive supervision | Real-time monitoring and reporting system on supervisory visits for essential immunization, cold chain and vaccines, and incidence of VPDs. | ● Registers time, location and record data on supervisory visits 
● Tracks coverage of supervisory visits 
● Displays trends across time and geographies | Mobile phone or tablet |

AS = active surveillance; E-surv = electronic surveillance; ISS = integrated supportive supervision; VPD = vaccine-preventable disease
Table 9 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Innovation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Benefits</th>
<th>Tool</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| AVADAR                                                          | Reporting and monitoring tool for CBS to enable community members (i.e., birth attendants, traditional healers, village healers) to detect and report AFP cases | • Reminder to look for AFP cases  
• Time and location of notification of “suspected AFP case”  
• Directs electronic notification of suspect AFP case to supervisor(s)                                      | Mobile phone or tablet |
| Geo-localization                                                | Mobile devices with global positioning system (GPS) receivers can allow geolocation of cases                           | • Allows exact localization of AFP cases or health facilities                                           | Mobile phone or tablet |
| WebIFA                                                         | Designed to collect, report and analyse surveillance data using a mobile device                                        | • Centralized and harmonized data from field collection and laboratory reporting for AFP, environmental, and iVDPV surveillance  
• Improves data quality, streamlines workflow between surveillance teams                              | Mobile phone or tablet, computer |
| Barcode                                                         | QR code system to track samples from collection to testing                                                            | • Real-time tracking of samples  
• Avoids data entry errors  
• Linked to WebIFA for tracking and data verification                                                        | Mobile phone or tablets Currently being pilot tested |
| WhatsApp                                                        | Chat groups                                                                                                          | • Improves communication within surveillance teams, strengthens and connects teams  
• Supports direct information dissemination and issue resolution.  
• Motivates frontline surveillance efforts, provides training opportunities by taking and sharing pictures of their work. | Mobile phone          |

*Information on AVADAR is available online ([https://www.ehealthafrica.org/avadar](https://www.ehealthafrica.org/avadar)), as well as in Diallo M, Traore A, Nzioki MM et al. Auto Visual AFP Detection and Response (AVADAR) Improved Polio Surveillance in Lake Chad Polio Outbreak Priority Districts. J. Immunological. Sci. (2021); 5 (002); 73-85 ([https://doi.org/10.29245/2578-3009/2021/S2.1101](https://doi.org/10.29245/2578-3009/2021/S2.1101)).

AFP = acute flaccid paralysis; CBS = community-based surveillance; GPS = global positioning system; iVDPV = immunodeficiency-associated vaccine-derived poliovirus; QR code = quick response code; WebIFA = web-based information-for-action system

5.3 – Geographic information system (GIS) mapping

GIS mapping and satellite imagery are also useful to identify and locate populations and catchment areas. GIS is now widely used by the programme for vaccination campaigns but also in the context of surveillance to:

- map surveillance network and AFP cases to ensure that populations are covered by the surveillance network; and
- better understand population movements and where populations are located. This helps to understand the performance of the surveillance system (indicators) and areas where surveillance strategies need to be adapted (e.g., hard-to-reach populations).

While not possible in all contexts, the wider deployment and use of GIS mapping and satellite imagery is encouraged, including to capture the GPS coordinates of where AFP cases reside, of health facilities, reporting sites, etc., and to better visualize catchment areas.
2. Monitoring

Monitoring should be conducted on a regular basis and should highlight both trends and anomalies in the performance and quality of surveillance.

2.1 – Collect, analyse, and use data

Data should be consolidated and analysed at district, provincial and national levels to assess the sensitivity, timeliness and quality of surveillance. All data should be updated promptly in the event of an error. Data should also be updated after laboratory results are received and once a final case classification is assigned.

Monitoring should be done:

- for case- and specimen-level data (line listing) ⇔ monitor the quality of case investigations (including completeness of forms) and ensure accurate and up-to-date case- and specimen-based data is available for performance analyses;
- for site visits, including active surveillance (AS) and supervisory ⇔ monitor completeness and timeliness of AS and supervisory visits and related data; and
- for reports, including AS and zero-reporting ⇔ monitor completeness of data and timeliness of report.

Data should be disaggregated by space and time:

- within and/or across geographies: local, district, province, national; and
- over time: by month, by quarter, semester, yearly.

Data should also be stratified, where possible and whenever a more descriptive analysis is required:

- by sex (e.g., “number of unreported AFP cases by sex identified during AS visits”);
- by special population group (e.g., “number of AFP cases reported by category of special population”); and
- by health-seeking behaviour (e.g., “number of AFP cases with ≤2 health encounters between onset and notification / number of AFP cases (stratify by sex)”).

Routine analyses include the following set of reports and products:

- graph of confirmed polio cases by year (indicates progress made towards eradicating polio);
- graph of confirmed polio cases by month (indicates the season of high and low polio transmission and is useful for planning supplementary immunization activities [SIAs]);
- dot map of confirmed polio cases (shows where poliovirus is circulating and high-risk areas to be targeted with special strategies);
- dot map of AFP cases and compatible cases (identifies possible areas of low performance);
- table showing the key indicators by the first administrative level (see Annex 3);
- disaggregation of indicators by sex and by special population/high-risk groups or areas (helps pinpoint possible reasons for suboptimal performance or gaps in surveillance; hence can direct to possible solutions); and
- graph of OPV/IPV status of non-polio AFP cases aged 6-59 months (indicates whether immunization efforts should be intensified and areas of possible risk of virus emergence and/or spread).

AFP surveillance indicators

Performance indicators are used to monitor the quality of disease surveillance and laboratory performance using both core and non-core indicators. For a comprehensive list, see Annex 3.

Indicators for AFP surveillance.
Two indicators remain the gold standard to assess AFP surveillance quality:

✓ non-polio AFP rate, and
✓ stool adequacy.

Indicators for the timeliness of activities, as introduced in the GPEI 2022-2026 Strategy, are of particular importance (Table 10). They generally only apply to outbreak and at-risk countries. Delays in detection can happen at any stage of field, logistic, and laboratory activities. Countries must monitor timeliness at every stage of the process. Annex 14 provides insight into causes of delays and ways the programme can address them.

Table 10. AFP surveillance indicators related to timeliness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timeliness of Activities</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Detection</td>
<td># of AFP cases with WPV/VDPV final laboratory results ≤ 35 days of onset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notification</td>
<td># of AFP cases reported within 7 days of paralysis onset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigation</td>
<td># of AFP cases investigated within 48 hours of notification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stool collection</td>
<td># of AFP cases with 2 samples collected ≥ 24 hours, both within 11 days of paralysis onset</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AFP = acute flaccid paralysis; VDPV = vaccine-derived poliovirus; WPV = wild poliovirus

2.2 – Report on progress and provide feedback

Progress reports: Weekly, monthly and/or quarterly reports on AFP surveillance sensitivity and quality are critical to maintaining effective surveillance and keeping health staff and concerned parties (both local and international) engaged.

Similarly, periodical progress reports to local, regional, and global actors, as well as the media, are needed to maintain awareness of polio and a commitment to the wider goal of eradication.

Feedback: Providing written feedback within a week of receiving reports and conducting supervisory visits is crucial to address identified gaps in surveillance, some of which can be due to insufficient training or dwindling motivation. If no issues are noted, supervisors should provide feedback in the form of acknowledging receipt of the report with thanks.

Furthermore, providing feedback information to all designated reporting sites is needed to:

- report progress and problems;
- compare performance across the country;
- facilitate discussions on inaccuracies in data, surveillance gaps, and ways to close gaps;
- encourage complete, timely reporting and inform concerned parties of programme progress; and
- motivate health staff/agents.

Responding to AFP surveillance data (using data for action)

Both data managers and surveillance officers should monitor and analyse AFP data routinely and go beyond the regular indicators to identify issues that may point to gaps in surveillance and allow the early detection of outbreaks. Issues may include anomalies, such as a sudden drop in performance or an increase in the number of AFP cases reported, or unusual trends or patterns, such as repeated, periodical drops in the timeliness of reporting (Tables 11a and 11b). Annex 3 lists both core and non-core indicators, which provide an additional means of looking at available data beyond the regular indicators.
Analysing beyond the indicators is done by:

- reviewing line listings for AFP, AFP contact and healthy children, and laboratories;
- reviewing CIFs retrospectively over a determined period (generally three or six months); and
- disaggregating data by sex and special population/high-risk groups, as well as performing health-seeking behaviour analyses. (See Annex 9. Health-seeking behaviour)

### Table 11a. Virus and performance triggers for responding to AFP surveillance data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>What to do</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Underperforming areas**  | Areas that record low performance in key indicators such as non-polio AFP rates or stool adequacy (or, on the contrary, experience a sudden increase in the number of AFP cases reported); areas whose performance intermittently falls below expectations such as repeated drops in timeliness of reporting. | ● Follow-up by visits, telephone, e-mail to identify reasons for the performance issue.  
● Address any problems immediately (e.g., re-training, lack of resources…) |
| **Silent areas**           | The definition of “silent” is country-specific and usually refers to any area (province or district) that should have but didn’t report at least one AFP case (based on time and under 15 population). That is, an area (usually a district) that did not report a single AFP case in a period varying from 6–12 months or more depending on the population size and expected AFP case reporting, taking into consideration that the non-polio AFP rate is 1/100 000 or more depending on the polio eradication situation (certified polio-free, endemic, outbreak). | ● Issue an alert or other communication to district team that highlights the potential gap  
● Review the surveillance functioning and process (including AS) and conduct sensitization activities  
● Conduct full surveillance review (if required)  
● Trigger an ad hoc case search in health facilities |
| **Data “too good to be true”** | Indicators that show unusually and unexpectedly high performance, e.g., close to 100% of AFP cases have 2 stools collected ≤14 days post paralysis onset. Possible reasons include: cases detected more than 14 days after onset are not being reported; or, the reporting date is being changed to <=14 days after onset. | ● Check for manual errors or issues with data manipulation or migration.  
● Seek confirmation with the data manager (and surveillance officer, if needed) who collected and entered the data  
● Review CIFs and proceed to field validation of cases/questionable CIFs, if needed. |
| **“Hot” cases**            | AFP cases that clinically looks like polio by meeting all three cardinal signs of poliomyelitis: rapid progression of paralysis; asymmetrical paralysis; and fever at onset. Additional criteria, as defined by the country or region depending on epidemiology, may include: less than five years of age; fewer than three doses of polio containing vaccine or have an unknown vaccination status; contact with areas/groups with recent virus circulation. The identification of a “hot case” must trigger the fast-tracking of specimen processing by the laboratory. | ● Ensure the stool specimens reach the laboratory as quickly as possible and priority is given for lab processing.  
● Prioritize field investigation  
● Check for possible clustering of (other) “hot cases.” In the event of a cluster, follow instructions for clustering (see below). |

AFP = acute flaccid paralysis; AS = active surveillance; CIF = case investigation form
Table 11a (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>What to do</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Over-discarding cases and “potential compatible” cases** | AFP cases that may be considered as “potentially polio compatible” have inadequate stools specimens and either a) have a 60-day follow-up finding as: residual paralysis or “lost to follow-up” or “died before follow-up” or b) have not received any 60-day follow-up visit and have not been classified or have been “discarded” by the NPEC. The existence of such cases may flag an “over-discarding” of cases by the NPEC, which rejected these cases as “non-polio” when there was potentially a justification to classify them as “polio compatible.” A clustering in time and space of such cases of concern (i.e., cases with inadequate specimens, residual paralysis that were discarded), should be investigated promptly. | - Check for possible clustering of (other) “potentially compatible” cases (using the AFP line list). In the event of a cluster, follow instructions for clustering (see below).  
- Consider having the NPEC members re-oriented. |
| **“Breakthrough” transmission**    | Any WPV or cVDPV detected in an AFP case, healthy child or ES with the date of onset of paralysis (for AFP cases) or the date of sample collection (for healthy child or ES) >21 days after the first day of the last SIA in an area where at least two SIAs have been implemented is evidence of breakthrough transmission. Where there is a high-risk of continued circulation, a shorter threshold of 14 days rather than 21 may be considered, e.g., inaccessibility, evidence of very poor quality SIAs, surveillance gaps. | - Conduct thorough field investigation and risk assessment (epidemiology, surveillance quality and sensitivity, as well as campaign quality). Any decision on additional campaigns will depend on the result of these activities. |

AFP = acute flaccid paralysis; cVDPV = circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus; ES = environmental surveillance; NPEC = National Polio Expert Committee; SIA = supplementary immunization activity; WPV = wild poliovirus

Table 11b. Cluster-specific triggers for responding to AFP surveillance data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of clusters</th>
<th>What to do</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| The detection of at least two times the number of expected AFP cases occurring in a district (or province in small countries) within a month period. Look out for clusters of polio-compatible cases, “hot” cases, “potential compatible” cases, or “zero-dose” cases. Possible reasons for clusters: | Cluster investigations are similar to polio outbreak investigations. It includes:  
- Detailed case investigation: validating information, dates, doses, more info on movement, visitors, links with other cases  
- Looking for more cases and viruses / surveillance assessment and enhancement  
- Active case search in community and health facilities.  
- Raise awareness through meeting and interpersonal communication.  
- Assess surveillance performance and identify possible gaps.  
- ensure that all the high-risk groups are covered by surveillance and that their health-seeking behaviour is taken into consideration.  
- Assessing the risk for virus emergence or importation as well as possible spread and its direction: review of immunization activities and coverage which is in favour of possible VDPV emergence/WPV1 importation, investigating the sociocultural characteristics of the area, pop density and population movement in and out of the area.  
- It is important to flag specimens of these cases and their contacts in the lab for fast tracking and prioritization and continue sensitization and enhancement of surveillance activities in the district and connected areas. |

AFP = acute flaccid paralysis; VDPV = vaccine-derived poliovirus; WPV1 = wild poliovirus type 1
3. Evaluation

Evaluations can take the form of audits and desk or field reviews. For outbreak-affected countries, outbreak response assessments (OBRAs) are also conducted.

3.1 – Conduct audits

All countries benefit from internal annual audits of their AFP surveillance system to assess, identify and respond to subnational performance gaps. The findings of an audit are particularly useful for annual surveillance planning.

Audits involve carrying out analyses on data that has been disaggregated by high-risk status, sex and health-seeking behaviour. They also explore context-specific risk factors, such as special populations or hard-to-reach geographies. Audits should include all components of the AFP surveillance system: passive reporting, AS visits and coverage, CBS, staffing and more. Audits are typically performed internally by the national team and may include desk and/or field assessments.

3.2 – Conduct desk and field reviews

Periodic evaluations of AFP surveillance systems are done through desk reviews, often followed by field reviews.

- **Desk reviews** thoroughly review existing data and analyse indicators to assess overall AFP surveillance performance. Desk reviews provide an overview of surveillance sensitivity over a defined period, usually three years, and aim to highlight possible gaps. These reviews can be done at the office, i.e., at a “desk,” unlike field reviews that involve site visits.

- **Field reviews** build on desk reviews by targeting a set of provinces or districts for visits. Field reviews are conducted by a team of peer (internal) reviewers or a mix of internal and external reviewers, if the field review has international participation, to assess the performance of the surveillance system and the quality of the surveillance network.

Recommendations from desk and field reviews are translated into a surveillance plan to either maintain the level achieved or to strengthen where gaps were identified. Depending on the purpose and scope of these reviews, special attention may be paid to high-risk, access-compromised and hard-to-reach areas and populations as these areas and populations require special strategies and added resources, which should be the object of periodical assessments.

3.3 – Conduct outbreak response assessments (OBRAs)

Poliovirus surveillance quality is a key component of outbreak response assessments (OBRAs), conducted by the GPEI for all polio outbreaks. OBRAs assess whether vaccination and surveillance activities are robust enough to detect and stop poliovirus transmission. They also identify further activities to address remaining gaps and interrupt transmission of the outbreak virus.

OBRAs are conducted regularly throughout an outbreak until an OBRA mission declares the outbreak to be over. Closure of the outbreak can only be done if there is evidence of high-quality surveillance sensitivity.¹⁹

SUSTAINING AFP surveillance

1. Building a skilled workforce

To ensure that all acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance stakeholders have up-to-date technical and interpersonal skills, human resources administrators should work together with surveillance supervisors and managers to select, train, support and retain an effective and motivated surveillance workforce.

1. Selection: The selection of surveillance officers, supervisors, routine surveillance focal points and community-based surveillance (CBS) informants should be based on a candidate’s ability to perform the role and their potential for development. Gender balance and appropriateness to culture and norms should be prioritized and upheld for all roles (see Annex 18. Gender and polio surveillance).

2. Capacity building: While capacity building is a larger function that represents a shared responsibility between managers and staff, it is fundamentally rooted in training. All surveillance staff should be equipped with an initial training and advanced formal trainings, offered either in-person or virtually, at least every two years and with regular refresher trainings, preferably with certificates that reference a validity period, such as an annual certification.

3. Maintaining performance: Managers should follow through on training and capacity building to make sure field staff are supported in their roles – so their skills are applied and further developed.

- Effective supportive supervision: AFP surveillance activities must be monitored and supervised to ensure the system remains highly sensitive. Such continuous supervision should follow a predefined plan, using checklists for staff performance and including staff feedback and follow-up on potential corrective actions. Regular on-the-job supportive supervision visits for provincial and district surveillance teams should focus not on fault-finding, but on sensitization, training, problem-solving and two-way communication. Structured tools should be used to cover activities and present findings. Visits should review different surveillance components such as a surveillance plan, regularly updated reporting network, an updated list of active surveillance (AS) sites, prioritization criteria, site visit schedule, and site visit procedures. Evaluating supervision is equally important and should be made from the national to the province or state level, and from the province or state level to the district level.

- One-on-one mentoring helps to build field staff capacity and confidence. As part of their mentoring and monitoring roles, managers should regularly conduct active surveillance visits and case investigations with field staff, where they can provide on-the-job demonstration and real-life examples. Ad hoc mentoring opportunities should also be offered, based on needs.

- Managers should hold review meetings – both regular (ideally quarterly) group review meetings and one-on-one personal reviews – to discuss performance, provide updates, and set objectives and goals.

Six signs of effective supportive supervision

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Surveillance officers have the appropriate technical knowledge and skills to conduct surveillance activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Surveillance officers are – and feel – supported in their job.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Feedback is provided to surveillance officers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Reporting procedures for cases are correctly followed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Cases are investigated in a thorough and timely manner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Active surveillance visits are of high quality.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A training package on AFP surveillance is available online. Download through POLIS
4. **Staff retention:** Retention among staff is bolstered when managers prioritize supportive supervision, reward and recognize good performers, advocate for career development, add motivational inputs during meetings (focusing on contribution to the “big picture”), and involve celebrities and well-known figures to elevate the public perception of the programme.

Staff retention is also dependent on managers and supervisors being sensitive and responsive to gender-related issues. Supervisors and managers must ensure that a gender lens is applied to the programme both by promoting gender equality and addressing any gender-related barriers or other factors that may impact the staff safety and performance as well as their career advancement. For more details, see **Annex 18. Gender and polio surveillance.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ways to improve supportive supervision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Include regular (monthly or at least quarterly) supervisory visits in workplans and plan for them as a recurring, funded cost.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Arrange observations in the field by accompanying staff on a visit to a high-priority large hospital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Structure visits by sharing objectives, following up on previous recommendations, and preparing updates or refresher trainings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Identify gaps and generatively solve problems, making sure to give positive feedback in public and performance tips in private conversation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Openly discuss findings and recommendations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Not all staff tasked with supervision are trained on supportive supervision. Country teams should include a supervisor training that details the role and responsibilities of supervisors. Up-to-date training modules that cover all aspects of polio surveillance are available online and aligned with the current guidelines. **Download AFP surveillance training modules** (requires POLIS access).

2. **Integrating disease surveillance, the future of polio surveillance**

As the world prepares for polio eradication, the WHO and other GPEI partners are actively working to transition the polio programme to ensure key assets and capacities, including surveillance, are not lost but successfully integrated into other programmes. This will help to sustain polio surveillance within country systems while also strengthening other surveillance programmes by building on the polio platform where it proves beneficial.  

**Table 12** lists specific deliverables of a well-functioning AFP surveillance system that must be maintained, as well as potential steps that can be taken to ensure integration of polio surveillance with other programmes. These activities are foundational of AFP surveillance and must continue to support broader, comprehensive VPD surveillance efforts, including outbreak-prone disease and syndromes.

---


Table 12. Components of AFP surveillance that should be addressed by integration efforts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specific deliverables of a well-functioning AFP surveillance</th>
<th>Steps that can be taken to support integration at the country level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>● Weekly reporting from health facilities including “zero-reporting.” Where necessary, regular reporting from informal health service providers</td>
<td>● One comprehensive surveillance operational workplan at country-level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Active surveillance including physical visits of priority health facilities and informal service providers</td>
<td>● Core team of trained human resources at the national and subnational level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Community-based surveillance in selected areas</td>
<td>● Harmonized data collection tools and data management infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Active case search, if triggered by events</td>
<td>● Investigation of ALL AFP cases, collection of stool samples from cases and, if indicated, AFP contact samplings, and 60-day follow-up examinations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Testing of all stool samples at a WHO-accredited laboratory</td>
<td>● Meet surveillance standards at national and subnational levels</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AFP = acute flaccid paralysis; WHO = World Health Organization

Resources to support integration and transition efforts

As the GPEI approaches certification, new guidance related to planning for the post-certification era will be needed to address the latest challenges to eradication, including surveillance. All stakeholders of the polio eradication effort are encouraged to consult the resources below.

- For the latest information, consult the GPEI website: polioeradication.org.
- For more information on transition planning, the GPEI maintains a dedicated page: https://polioeradication.org/polio-today/preparing-for-a-polio-free-world/transition-planning,
- To support post-certification planning, the GPEI published the Polio Post-Certification Strategy (PCS) in 2018,22 and planning is underway to support its revision. For future updates, consult the GPEI website: https://polioeradication.org/polio-today/preparing-for-a-polio-free-world/transition-planning/polio-post-certification-strategy.

Annex guidance

Annex 19 provides further resources for GPEI programme information, as well as dedicated resources for AFP surveillance, community-based surveillance, poliovirus laboratory testing, gender training and surveillance for integrated VPD platforms.

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Annex 1. Poliovirus

Poliovirus is a member of the enterovirus subgroup of the family Picornaviridae. Enteroviruses are transient inhabitants of the gastrointestinal tract and are stable at an acidic pH. Picornaviruses are small, ether-insensitive viruses with a ribonucleic acid (RNA) genome. Heat, formaldehyde, chlorine and ultraviolet (UV) light rapidly inactivate the poliovirus.

Poliovirus has three serotypes: type 1, type 2 and type 3. All three serotypes of poliovirus cause paralytic disease, and there is minimal heterotypic immunity between the three serotypes.

Epidemiology

Reservoir

Humans are the only known reservoir of poliovirus, which is transmitted most frequently by persons with inapparent infection. There is no asymptomatic carrier state except in immune-deficient persons.

Transmission and temporal pattern

Poliovirus is spread by both the faecal-oral route (i.e., the poliovirus multiplies in the intestines and is spread through the faeces) and by the respiratory route. Infection is more common in infants and young children. Polio occurs at an earlier age among children living in poor hygienic conditions. In temperate climates, poliovirus infections are most common during summer and autumn. In tropical areas, the seasonal pattern is less pronounced.

The time between infection and onset of paralysis is 7–21 days. The virus spreads rapidly to non-immune persons and transmission is usually widespread by the time of paralysis onset. The virus is intermittently excreted for one month or more after infection. The heaviest faecal excretion of the virus occurs just prior to the onset of paralysis and during the first two weeks after paralysis occurs.

Communicability

Poliovirus is highly infectious with seroconversion rates in susceptible household contacts of children nearly 100% and of adults over 90%. Cases are most infectious from 7–10 days before and after the onset of symptoms.

Immunity

Protective immunity against poliovirus infection develops by immunization or natural infection. Immunity to one poliovirus type does not protect against infection with other poliovirus types. Immunity following natural infection or administration of a live oral polio vaccine (OPV) is believed to be lifelong. The duration of protective antibodies after administration of an inactivated polio vaccine (IPV) is unknown but likely lifelong after a complete series. Infants born to mothers with high antibody levels against poliovirus are protected for the first several weeks of life.

Pathogenesis

The virus enters the body through the mouth from faecal-oral or respiratory contact. Primary multiplication of the virus occurs at the site of implantation of the poliovirus receptor in tissues: tonsils, intestinal cells, gut or ‘Peyer’s patches’ that line the small intestine, and lymph nodes. The virus is usually present in the throat and in the stools before the onset of illness. One week after onset, there is little virus in the throat, but virus continues to be excreted in the stools for several weeks. The virus invades local lymphoid tissue, enters the blood stream, and then rarely may infect cells of the central nervous system. The virus has “tropism” for nerve tissue and is thought to spread back along nerves (“axons”) to the spinal cord. Replication of poliovirus in motor neurons of the anterior horn and brain stem results in cell destruction and causes the typical manifestations of poliomyelitis in paralysis. Paralysis extent depends on proportion of motor neurons lost. See Fig. 1.1.

Clinical manifestations of infection (symptoms)

The incubation period of non-paralytic poliomyelitis is 3–6 days. For the onset of paralysis in paralytic poliomyelitis, the incubation period usually is 7–21 days (with a range from 3–35 days).

Infection with poliovirus results is a spectrum of clinical manifestations from inapparent infection to non-specific febrile illness, aseptic meningitis, paralytic disease and death. Poliovirus infection is not apparent in 90–95% of infected individuals.

The following clinical pictures may present the disease (Fig 1.2):

- **Abortive polio** occurs as a non-specific febrile illness in 4–8% of cases characterized by low-grade fever, sore throat, vomiting, abdominal pain, loss of appetite and malaise. Recovery is rapid and complete with no paralysis. It cannot usually be distinguished from other mild viral illnesses with mild respiratory tract or gastrointestinal manifestations.

- **Non-paralytic aseptic meningitis** occurs in 1–2% of infections with symptoms of headache, neck, back and/or abdominal, extremity pain, fever, vomiting, lethargy and irritability after a prodromal illness similar to abortive polio. Cases recover within 2–10 days. It cannot be clinically distinguished from other causes of aseptic meningitis.

- **Paralytic poliomyelitis** occurs in <1% of cases following a minor illness, sometimes separated by several days without symptoms (biphasic). Paralytic symptoms generally begin 1–10 days after prodromal symptoms and progress for 2–3 days. It begins with muscle pain, spasms and return of fever, followed by rapid onset of flaccid paralysis with diminished deep tendon reflexes that is usually complete within 72 hours. Patients do not experience sensory loss or changes in cognition.

Depending on the sites of paralysis, poliomyelitis can be classified as spinal, bulbar or spino-bulbar disease. Classically certain groups of muscles are affected in an asymmetrical pattern. The lower limbs are affected more often than the upper limbs, and one leg or one part of the leg may be involved. The affected muscles are weak and floppy (flaccid). In a very small number of cases the virus also attacks the motor nerve cells that control the muscles of the face, throat, and tongue, and muscles of respiration. The ability to swallow, speak and breathe becomes affected. This is known as bulbar polio and may be fatal. Of paralytic polio cases, 2–10% are fatal due to affection of respiratory muscles, 10% recover completely, and the remainder of cases show some residual paralysis or permanent disability. Prognosis for recovery can usually be established within six (6) months after onset of paralytic manifestations.
Global guidelines for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance in the context of poliovirus eradication

Figure 1.2. Phases of occurrence of symptoms in poliomyelitis Infection


Prevention

Polio vaccines provides the best protection against polio.

Poliovirus vaccines

The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) maintains descriptions of polio vaccines.24

1. Oral poliovirus vaccines (OPVs)

OPVs are the predominant vaccine used in the fight to eradicate polio (Table 1.1). The attenuated poliovirus(es) contained in OPV can replicate effectively in the intestine, but it is around 10 000 times less able to enter the central nervous system than the wild virus. This enables individuals to mount an immune response against the virus. Virtually all countries which have eradicated polio used OPV to interrupt person-to-person transmission of the virus.

Advantages

- OPVs are safe, effective and inexpensive, and their oral administration does not require health professionals.
- For several weeks after vaccination, the vaccine virus replicates in the intestine, is excreted and can be spread to others in close contact. In areas with poor hygiene and sanitation, immunization with OPV can therefore result in “passive” immunization of people who have not been vaccinated.

Disadvantages

- OPV is safe and effective. However, in extremely rare cases (at a rate of approximately 2–4 events per 1 million births),\textsuperscript{25} the live attenuated vaccine virus in OPV can cause paralysis. In some cases, it may be triggered by an immunodeficiency. The extremely low risk of vaccine-associated paralytic poliomyelitis (VAPP) is well accepted by most public health programmes.

- Very rarely, when there is insufficient coverage in a community, the vaccine virus may be able to circulate, mutate and, over the course of 12 to 18 months, reacquire neurovirulence. This is known as a circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV).

Once polio has been eradicated, all OPV use will be stopped to prevent re-establishment of transmission due to vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs).

Table 1.1. Indications of use for OPVs by serotype

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPV type</th>
<th>Serotype</th>
<th>Indications for use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monovalent oral poliovirus vaccines (mOPVs)</td>
<td>Type 1 (mOPV1)</td>
<td>Elicit the best immune response against the serotype they target. mOPV2 is stockpiled in the event of a cVDPV2 outbreak but is progressively being replaced by nOPV2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type 2 (mOPV2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type 3 (mOPV3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novel oral polio vaccine type (nOPV)</td>
<td>Type 2 (nOPV2)</td>
<td>Provides comparable protection against poliovirus while being more genetically stable, therefore making it less likely to be associated with the emergence of VDPV2 in low-immunity settings. At the time of writing these guidelines (2022), nOPV2 is only being used for type 2 outbreak response under an Emergency Use Listing of the WHO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (bOPV)</td>
<td>Type 1 and type 3 (bOPV)</td>
<td>Contains attenuated virus of serotypes 1 and 3. bOPV elicits a better immune response against poliovirus types 1 and 3 than tOPV, but it does not give immunity against serotype 2. Since April 2016, the trivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (tOPV) has been replaced with bOPV in essential immunization and for outbreak response against types 1 and 3 outbreaks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (tOPV)</td>
<td>Type 1, type 2 and type 3 (tOPV)</td>
<td>Withdrawn in April 2016 from essential immunization and replaced with bOPV, tOPV can still be used in outbreak response under specific circumstances, such as co-circulation of type 1 and type 2 polioviruses.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

bOPV = bivalent oral polio vaccine; cVDPV2 = circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2; mOPV = monovalent oral polio vaccine; mOPV1 = monovalent oral polio vaccine type 1; mOPV2 = monovalent oral polio vaccine type 2; mOPV3 = monovalent oral polio vaccine type 3; nOPV = novel oral polio vaccine; nOPV2 = novel oral polio vaccine type 2; tOPV = trivalent oral polio vaccine; VDPV2 = vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2; WHO = World Health Organization

2. Inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV)

IPV consists of inactivated (killed) poliovirus strains of all three poliovirus types. IPV is given by intramuscular or intradermal injection and as such needs to be administered by a trained health worker. It produces antibodies in the blood to all three types of polioviruses. In the event of infection, these antibodies prevent the spread of the virus to the central nervous system and protect against paralysis.

\textsuperscript{25} This rate is expected to significantly decline, as the type 2 component of oral polio vaccine was removed from essential immunization worldwide in April 2016; this type was responsible for approximately 40% of all VAPP cases.
IPV is used in essential immunization and, in some instances, in outbreak response. As IPV does not stop transmission of the virus, OPV is the vaccine of choice for outbreak response activities even in countries that rely exclusively on IPV for their essential immunization programmes.

Advantages

- As IPV is not a 'live' vaccine, it carries no risk of VAPP. It is one of the safest vaccines in use.
- IPV triggers an excellent protective immune response in most people.

Disadvantages

- IPV induces very low levels of immunity in the intestine. As a result, when a person immunized with IPV is infected with wild poliovirus, the virus can still multiply inside the intestines and be shed in the faeces, thereby risking continued circulation.
- Administering the vaccine requires trained health workers, as well as sterile injection equipment and procedures.
- IPV is over five times more expensive than OPV.

Laboratory diagnosis

Poliovirus isolation in culture is the most sensitive method to diagnose poliovirus infection. Poliovirus is most likely to be isolated from stool specimens. It may also be isolated from pharyngeal swabs. Isolation is less likely from blood or cerebral spinal fluid.

To increase the probability of isolating poliovirus, two stool specimens are collected 24 hours apart from patients with suspected poliomyelitis, ideally within 14 days after onset.

Real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) is used to differentiate possible wild strains from vaccine-like strains (“intratypic differentiation”), using virus isolated in culture as the starting material.

Molecular techniques are done to fully characterize the poliovirus. Maintaining a reference bank of the molecular structure of known viruses allows the geographic origin of new isolates to be traced.

Differential diagnosis

The differential diagnosis of acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) includes paralytic poliomyelitis, Guillain-Barré syndrome (GBS) and transverse myelitis. Less common etiologies are traumatic neuritis, encephalitis, meningitis, other enterovirus infections and tumours (Table 1.2).

Distinguishing characteristics of paralytic polio are asymmetric flaccid paralysis, fever at onset, rapid progression of paralysis, residual paralysis after 60 days and preservation of sensory nerve function.

Clinical case management

There is no specific treatment for poliomyelitis. Suspected AFP cases should be referred to a hospital immediately for medical care. Any problem with respiration suggesting involvement of the diaphragm requires immediate attention. Supportive care should be given to paralytic cases under physician management.
Table 1.2. Differential diagnosis of poliomyelitis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key features</th>
<th>Poliomyelitis</th>
<th>Guillain-Barré syndrome</th>
<th>Traumatic neuritis</th>
<th>Transverse myelitis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Progression of paralysis</td>
<td>24–72 hours onset to full paralysis</td>
<td>From hours to 10 days</td>
<td>From hours to 4 days</td>
<td>From hours to 4 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fever at onset</td>
<td>High, always present at onset of flaccid paralysis, gone the following day</td>
<td>Not common</td>
<td>Commonly present before, during, and after flaccid paralysis</td>
<td>Rarely present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flaccid paralysis</td>
<td>Acute, usually asymmetrical, principally proximal</td>
<td>Generally acute, symmetrical and distal</td>
<td>Acute, asymmetrical and affecting only one limb</td>
<td>Acute, lower limbs, symmetrical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muscle tone</td>
<td>Reduced or absent in affected limb</td>
<td>Global hypotonia</td>
<td>Reduced or absent in affected limb</td>
<td>Hypotonia in lower limbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deep-tendon reflexes</td>
<td>Decreased to absent</td>
<td>Globally absent</td>
<td>Decreased to absent</td>
<td>Absent in lower limbs early, hyperreflexia late</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sensory symptoms and sensation</td>
<td>Severe myalgia, backache, no sensory changes</td>
<td>Cramps, tingling, hypoesthesia of palms and soles</td>
<td>Pain in gluteus, hypothermia</td>
<td>Anaesthesia of lower limbs with sensory level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cranial nerve involvement</td>
<td>Only when bulbar involvement is present</td>
<td>Often present, affecting nerves VII, IX, X, XI, XII</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Absent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respiratory insufficiency</td>
<td>Only when bulbar involvement is present</td>
<td>In severe cases, enhanced by bacterial pneumonia</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Sometimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomic signs and symptoms</td>
<td>Rare</td>
<td>Frequent blood pressure alteration, sweating, blushing, body temperature fluctuations</td>
<td>Hypothermia in affected limb</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cerebrospinal fluid</td>
<td>Inflammatory</td>
<td>Albumin-cytologic dissociation</td>
<td>normal</td>
<td>Normal or mild in cells</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bladder dysfunction</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Transient</td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nerve conduction velocity: third week</td>
<td>Abnormal: anterior horn cell disease (normal during the first two [2] weeks)</td>
<td>Abnormal: slowed conduction, decreased motor amplitude</td>
<td>Abnormal: axonal damage</td>
<td>Normal or abnormal, no diagnostic value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electromyography (EMG) at three weeks</td>
<td>Abnormal</td>
<td>Normal</td>
<td>Normal</td>
<td>Normal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sequelae at two (2) months and up to a year</td>
<td>Severe, asymmetrical atrophy, skeletal deformities developing later</td>
<td>Symmetrical atrophy of distal muscles</td>
<td>Moderate atrophy, only in affected lower limb</td>
<td>Flaccid diplegia, atrophy after years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Annex 2. Vaccine-derived poliovirus classification and response

There are three categories of vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs), each with a unique classification and associated mode of response (Fig. 2.1).

Circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV): Through serial transmission of vaccine virus in an undervaccinated community, the attenuated polioviruses can regain neurovirulence and transmission characteristics of wild poliovirus (WPV). VDPVs that have been established through community circulation in undervaccinated populations are classified as circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPVs). These have become an urgent issue for the polio eradication programme as cVDPVs have been responsible for thousands of poliomyelitis cases since their first characterization in 2000. Strengthening essential immunization systems and conducting supplemental immunization activities (SIAs) are necessary to avoid an emergence of cVDPV. After community transmission has become established, interrupting cVDPV requires outbreak response measures, including high-quality SIAs to reach every child in affected communities.

Immunodeficiency-associated vaccine-derived poliovirus (iVDPV): A far smaller but potentially serious challenge to sustaining global polio eradication is represented by VDPVs that evolve in and are excreted by patients with inherited primary immunodeficiency disorders (PIDs) affecting the B-cell system. Following exposure to oral polio vaccine (OPV) viruses, PID patients may shed immunodeficiency-associated vaccine-derived polioviruses (iVDPVs) that can cause paralytic polio for the individual and can re-establish transmission within the community. Infected PID patients may shed iVDPV for months or years before the patient becomes paralysed or before the virus they shed initiates community circulation. To mitigate the individual and community risks posed by iVDPVs during the polio endgame and the post-eradication era, iVDPV surveillance will be important. Once country programmes identify non-paralytic PID patients excreting polioviruses, iVDPV surveillance provides strategies and treatments to rid both the individual and the community of the risk posed by iVDPVs.

Ambiguous vaccine-derived poliovirus (aVDPV): A final category of poliovirus is the ambiguous vaccine-derived poliovirus (aVDPV), termed “ambiguous” because these viruses cannot be genetically linked to previously known VDPVs and because the individuals excreting the virus do not have a known immunodeficiency. aVDPVs may be an early indication of the possibility of a cVDPV developing, and therefore surveillance needs to be ramped up as soon as one is detected.

---

Fig. 2.1. Classification and response to reported VDPV isolates

Note: Note that the classification of VDPV isolates is done by the sequencing laboratory in collaboration with the WHO regional polio team. aVDPV = ambiguous vaccine-derived poliovirus; cVDPV = circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus; iVDPV = immunodeficiency-associated vaccine-derived poliovirus; PID = primary immunodeficiency disorder; VDPV = vaccine-derived poliovirus

Annex 3. Indicators for AFP surveillance

**Indicators highlighted in bold** are monitored at the country, regional and global levels; indicators that are not bolded are monitored at the regional and/or country levels only.

### Core indicators on timeliness

Core indicators on timeliness, as introduced by the GPEI 2022-2026 Strategy, capture the overall capacity of the programme to identify rapidly any wild poliovirus (WPV) or vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV). This capacity has been defined as: (1) the capacity of the programme to report a positive acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) case rapidly so that a response can be mounted fast; and (2) the capacity to process rapidly any positive specimen (Table 3.1). Additional indicators highlight the capacity of the programme to report any laboratory results rapidly, regardless of the final result.

#### Table 3.1. Overall indicators on timeliness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Calculation (expressed as a percentage)</th>
<th>Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall detection of WPV/VDPV</td>
<td># of AFP cases* with WPV/VDPV final lab results &lt;=35 days of onset / # of AFP cases* with WPV/VDPV final lab results</td>
<td>&gt;=80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System capacity (2)†</td>
<td># of WPVs and VDPVs with final lab results &lt;=35 days of onset for AFP cases / # of WPVs and VDPVs</td>
<td>&gt;=80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFP detection – system</td>
<td># of AFP cases* with final lab results &lt;=35 days of onset / # of AFP cases*</td>
<td>&gt;=80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*AFP = acute flaccid paralysis; VDPV = vaccine-derived poliovirus; WPV = wild poliovirus
†Specimen-based calculation

#### Table 3.2. Indicators on timeliness for field activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Calculation (expressed as a percentage)</th>
<th>Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Timeliness of notification</td>
<td># of AFP cases reported &lt;=7 days of onset / # of AFP cases</td>
<td>&gt;=80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timeliness of investigation</td>
<td># of AFP cases investigated &lt;=48 hours of notification / # of AFP cases</td>
<td>&gt;=80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timeliness of field activities</td>
<td># of AFP cases with 2 <strong>stool specimens</strong> collected &gt;=24 hrs apart AND &lt;=11 days of onset / # of AFP cases</td>
<td>&gt;=80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timeliness of field and shipment activities</td>
<td># of AFP cases with 2 <strong>stool specimens</strong> collected &gt;=24 hours apart AND received in good condition* at a WHO-accredited laboratory AND &lt;=14 days of onset / # of reported AFP cases</td>
<td>&gt;=80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timeliness of stool specimen shipment</td>
<td># of <strong>stool specimens</strong> that arrive in good condition* at a WHO-accredited lab AND &lt;=3 days of specimen collection / # of <strong>stool specimens</strong> collected</td>
<td>&gt;=80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*AFP = acute flaccid paralysis; WHO = World Health Organization
*For calculations: missing stool condition = poor condition
Table 3.3. Indicators on timeliness for laboratory activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Calculation (expressed as a percentage)</th>
<th>Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFP: Timeliness of reporting laboratory results (system performance)</td>
<td># of stool specimens with final lab results available &lt;=21 days from a direct detection country OR &lt;=28 days from a non-direct detection country of receipt at a WHO-accredited lab / # of stool specimens collected</td>
<td>&gt;=80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFP: Timeliness of reporting WPV/VDPV results (detection)</td>
<td># of stool specimens with WPV/VDPV final lab results available &lt;=21 days of receipt from a direct detection country OR &lt;=28 days of receipt from a non-direct detection country at a WHO-accredited lab / # of stool specimens collected positive for WPV/VDPV</td>
<td>&gt;=80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFP: Timeliness of reporting poliovirus laboratory results</td>
<td># poliovirus stool specimens with sequencing results available &lt;=7 days of receipt at a WHO-accredited sequencing lab / # of PV stool specimens positive by ITD requiring sequencing</td>
<td>&gt;=80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AFP = acute flaccid paralysis; ITD = intratypic differentiation; VDPV = vaccine-derived poliovirus; WHO = World Health Organization; WPV = wild poliovirus

Core indicators on surveillance quality
Table 3.4. Core indicators on AFP surveillance quality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Calculation</th>
<th>Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NPAFP rate*</td>
<td>(# of cases discarded as NPAFP in children &lt;15 years of age / # of children &lt;15 years of age) x 100 000 per year Note: Endemic countries are encouraged to have &gt;=3</td>
<td>AFR, EMR, SEAR: &gt;=2 AMR, EUR, WPR: &gt;=1 OB-affected:† &gt;=2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPAFP rate – subnational</td>
<td>(# of districts with &gt;=100 000 children &lt;15 years old that meet the NPAFP rate target / # of districts with &gt;=100 000 children &lt;15 years old) x 100 Note: Need to reach &gt;=3 per 100,000 in all high-risk districts within an outbreak country</td>
<td>AFR, EMR: &gt;=80% SEAR: &gt;=50% AMR, EUR, WPR: NA OB-affected districts:* 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stool adequacy</td>
<td>(# of AFP cases with 2 stool specimens collected &gt;=24 hours apart AND &lt;=14 days of onset AND received in good condition‡ in a WHO-accredited laboratory / # of AFP cases) x 100 Note: Certification indicator (14 days)</td>
<td>&gt;=80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AFP = acute flaccid paralysis; AFR = African Region; AMR = Region of the Americas; EMR = Eastern Mediterranean Region; EUR = European Region; NA = not applicable; NPAFP = non-polio acute flaccid paralysis; OB = outbreak; SEAR = South-East Asia Region; WHO = World Health Organization; WPR = Western Pacific Region

*Rate should be annualized.
†Outbreak-affected country is defined as: any country experiencing an outbreak of WPV or circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV) currently or in the previous 12 months.
‡For calculation: missing stool condition = poor condition

AFR = African Region; ITD = intratypic differentiation; VDPV = vaccine-derived poliovirus; WHO = World Health Organization; WPV = wild poliovirus

AFR = African Region; ITD = intratypic differentiation; VDPV = vaccine-derived poliovirus; WHO = World Health Organization; WPV = wild poliovirus
**Table 3.4 (continued)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Calculation (expressed as a percentage)</th>
<th>Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stool adequacy – subnational</strong></td>
<td>(\frac{\text{(# of districts that reported } \geq 5 \text{ AFP cases that meet the stool adequacy target}}{\text{# of districts that reported } \geq 5 \text{ AFP cases}} \times 100)</td>
<td>(\geq 80%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stool timeliness</strong></td>
<td>(\frac{\text{(# of AFP cases with 2 stool specimens collected } \geq 24 \text{ hrs apart, AND } \leq 14 \text{ days of onset}}}{\text{# of reported AFP cases}} \times 100)</td>
<td>(\geq 80%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stool condition</strong></td>
<td>(\frac{\text{# of AFP cases with two stool specimens arriving in good condition}}{\text{# of reported AFP cases}})</td>
<td>(\geq 80%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Composite index – national</strong></td>
<td>Population living in districts that meets both NPAFP rate target and stool adequacy target / Population living in all districts (Admin2)</td>
<td>(\geq 80%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Composite index – subnational</strong></td>
<td>(\frac{\text{# of districts with } \geq 100,000 \text{ children } &lt; 15 \text{ years old that meet NPAFP rate target and stool adequacy target}}{\text{# of districts with } \geq 100,000 \text{ children } &lt; 15 \text{ years of age}})</td>
<td>(\geq 80%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Adequacy of active surveillance visits**† (2 calculations) | 1. \(\frac{\text{# visits to HP sites conducted}}{\text{# HP site visits planned}}\)  
2. \(\frac{\text{# HP sites visited}}{\text{Total # HP sites}}\) | 1. \(\geq 80\%\)  
2. \(100\%\) |
| **Completeness of 60-day follow-ups**               | \(\frac{\text{# of inadequate AFP cases with a follow up exam for residual paralysis completed } \geq 60 \text{ days AND } \leq 90 \text{ days of onset}}{\text{# of inadequate AFP cases}}\) | \(\geq 80\%\) |
| **Completeness of weekly zero reporting (WZR)**     | \(\frac{\text{# of sites reporting}}{\text{# of designated reporting sites for AFP surveillance}}\) | \(\geq 80\%\) |
| **Timeliness of WZR**                               | \(\frac{\text{# of sites reporting by the deadline}}{\text{# of designated reporting sites for AFP surveillance}}\) | \(\geq 80\%\) |

AFP = acute flaccid paralysis; HP = high-priority; NPAFP = non-polio acute flaccid paralysis; WZR = weekly zero reporting

†(a) High-priority sites are those facilities where there is a high likelihood of seeing an AFP case; they are visited at least on a weekly basis and sometimes more often. (b) Combination indicator in which “all HP sites have &geq;1 visit each month” to be used as a flag. (c) Calculated per month.
### Non-core indicators

**Table 3.5. Non-core indicators on AFP surveillance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Calculation (expressed as a percentage)</th>
<th>Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unreported AFP cases found during active surveillance</td>
<td># of unreported AFP cases found in the register during active surveillance visits / month</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of supervised active surveillance visits‡</td>
<td># of active surveillance visits supervised per month / # of active surveillance visits conducted per month</td>
<td>&gt;=25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of supervisory visits in high-priority sites</td>
<td># HP sites with &gt;=1 supervised visit in the last 6 months / # of HP sites</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFP case field validation</td>
<td># of AFP cases validated &lt;=14 of investigation / # of AFP cases</td>
<td>&gt;=30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completeness of AFP contact sampling</td>
<td># of inadequate AFP cases with contact sampling§ / # of inadequate AFP cases</td>
<td>&gt;=80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timeliness of AFP contact sampling</td>
<td># of contact stool specimens of inadequate cases collected &lt;=7 of days of investigation / # of contact stool specimens of inadequate cases</td>
<td>&gt;=80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**AFP = acute flaccid paralysis; HP = high-priority**

*For priority countries (very high risk, high risk, and medium-high risk), indicators should be analysed monthly.

† For non-priority countries, indicators should be reviewed quarterly and included in desk reviews.

‡ Calculated by priority site, by geography, and by quarter.

§ 2 or 3 contact samples per inadequate AFP case, as per regional recommendation.
Table 3.6. Non-core indicators on health-seeking behaviours†

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Calculation (expressed as a percentage)</th>
<th>Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AFP case encounters‡</strong></td>
<td># of AFP cases with &lt;=2 health encounters between onset and notification</td>
<td>&gt;=80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>/</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># of AFP cases</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adequacy of notification by designation</strong></td>
<td># of 1st health encounters that led to a notification, by designation [reporting source]§</td>
<td>&gt;=80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>/</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># of health encounters by that same designation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>** Appropriateness of surveillance network**</td>
<td># of AFP cases with first health encounters with a reporting site within the AFP surveillance network</td>
<td>&gt;=80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>/</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># of AFP cases</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Late reported AFP cases:</strong></td>
<td>Among AFP cases reported &gt;14 days after paralysis onset:</td>
<td>&gt;=80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Completeness of health encounter information</strong></td>
<td># of AFP cases with no information on health encounters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>/</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># AFP cases reported &gt;14 days after paralysis onset</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*AFP = acute flaccid paralysis
† For non-priority countries, indicators should be reviewed quarterly and included in desk reviews.
‡ Results should be stratified by sex.
§ This is the “percentage of 1st encounters by designation (e.g., doctor, nurse, traditional healer, vaccinator, other) that led to the notification of an AFP case.”

Table 3.7. Non-core indicators on community-based surveillance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Calculation (expressed as a percentage)</th>
<th>Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proportion of AFP cases reported by CBS</strong></td>
<td># of AFP cases (those on linelist) identified by community informant / # of AFP cases on linelist</td>
<td>TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proportion of ‘verified’ AFP reported by CBS</strong></td>
<td># of ‘suspect’ AFP cases identified by community informant / # of AFP cases ‘verified’ by surveillance officers</td>
<td>TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Completeness of weekly/monthly zero reporting</strong></td>
<td># of reports received from community informants / # of expected reports from community informants</td>
<td>&gt;=80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(WZR/MZR)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Timeliness of WZR/MZR</strong></td>
<td># of reports received on time from community informants / # of expected reports from community informants</td>
<td>&gt;=80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proportion of female informants</strong></td>
<td># of female informants / # of informants</td>
<td>&gt;=50%-80%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proportion of informants from local area</strong></td>
<td># of local informants / # of informants</td>
<td>&gt;=80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Target to be adjusted at the country level; priority countries to regularly analyse.
### Table 3.7 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Calculation (expressed as a percentage)</th>
<th>Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supervision of informants† ‡</td>
<td># of informants who have received at least one supervisory visit in last 3 months / # of informants</td>
<td>&gt;=80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informant training† §</td>
<td># of informants with training within the last year / # of informants</td>
<td>&gt;=80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informant turnover rate† § ¶</td>
<td># of informants who left during the previous year / # of informants</td>
<td>TBD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

† To be reviewed quarterly; priority countries to regularly analyse. Suggest to stratify results by supervisor.
‡ Results should be stratified by sex.
§ To be reviewed annually; priority countries to regularly analyse.
¶ Informant turnover rate is a flag; the target is to be defined at the country level. The calculations should be based on the number of informants at the beginning of the review period.

### Table 3.8. Gender-related indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Calculation (expressed as a percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Case detection</td>
<td># of AFP cases* by sex with final lab results ≤35 days of onset / # of AFP cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timeliness of field activities</td>
<td># of AFP cases by sex with 2 samples collected ≥ 24 hrs apart, both within 11 days of paralysis onset / # of reported AFP cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timeliness of notification</td>
<td># of AFP cases by sex reported within 7 days of paralysis onset / # of reported AFP cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health contact</td>
<td># of AFP cases by sex with ≤2 healthcare encounters between onset and before notification / # of AFP cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional profile by sex (by category)</td>
<td># of women [professional profile] / total # of staff or informants (by category: surveillance officer, supervisor, CBS informant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff with completed PRSEAH</td>
<td># of surveillance staff having completed PRSEAH training / # of staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AFP = acute flaccid paralysis; CBS = community-based surveillance; PRSEAH = preventing and responding to sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment
*Aggregated results: all lab results (AFP + contacts) used to classify AFP case as confirmed/discarded
Annex 4. Routine and active surveillance

Field reviews of acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance have shown that the difference between routine (passive) and active surveillance is not sufficiently clear in many countries. At the most basic level, routine surveillance relies on “reports being sent,” while active surveillance (AS) is the process of “surveillance staff going physically to visit health facilities” (Figs. 4.1 and 4.2). While the AS network includes routine surveillance sites that report on AFP, the activity of prioritizing, scheduling and conducting AS visits to actively search for AFP cases in facility records distinguishes AS from routine surveillance (Fig. 4.3)

A. Routine surveillance

- All facilities that are part of the routine (passive) surveillance network ("reporting sites") should immediately notify any AFP case they see to the district / provincial level.
- All facilities should also send weekly and/or monthly reports to the district / provincial level (blue arrows).

Fig. 4.1. Representation of routine (passive) surveillance

B. Active surveillance (AS)

- Reporting sites in the formal sector that are most likely to see AFP cases are selected for AS (blue-green boxes).
- Informal sector actors (not in passive surveillance reporting) are engaged for AS because of their likelihood of seeing AFP cases (green boxes).
- All AS sites, whether formal or informal, should also notify an AFP case immediately.
- District and provincial surveillance teams regularly visit all AS sites (green arrows).

Within hospitals, AS visits should be conducted in wards that are likely to see AFP cases: paediatric wards, internal medicine, inpatient, outpatient, emergency, etc.

Fig. 4.2. Representation of active surveillance

Source: WHO.
C. Prioritizing AS sites

The sites with the highest likelihood of seeing an AFP case should be prioritized over other sites. This could include large hospitals with a paediatric ward or a medium-sized health centre in a province. The red boxes highlight high-priority sites; yellow boxes, medium-priority sites, and green boxes, low-priority sites. The frequency of AS site visits depends on the priority of the facility with high-priority sides often visited weekly or twice a week, medium-priority sites visited every two weeks or monthly, and low-priority sites visited monthly or quarterly. The frequency must be adjusted based on the local epidemiological context.

Fig. 4.3. Representation of approaches to AS site prioritization

Source: WHO.
Annex 5. Active surveillance visits

The World Health Organization (WHO) has published guidance for active surveillance (AS) that includes tips on making the best use of surveillance sites and informants and for improving the overall sensitivity of active surveillance for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP).

Download “Best practices in active surveillance for polio eradication.”

Steps in conducting active surveillance (AS) visits

Before you leave your office

1. Make sure you have:
   ✓ stool collection kits
   ✓ case investigation forms
   ✓ the most recent AFP line list
   ✓ communications material (e.g., posters)
   ✓ notebook and pen
   ✓ tape and thumbtacks (to put up posters or case definitions)

When you arrive at the AS site

2. Meet with the facility surveillance focal person. (Note: If this is your first visit to the site, pay a courtesy visit to the director of the facility to explain the purpose of your visit and ask permission to conduct regular visits.)

3. Ask the surveillance focal person if the site has received or seen a case meeting the definition of AFP since the last visit.

4. Conduct a case search by:
   ✓ visiting the children’s wards and specialized services (e.g., orthopaedics, rehabilitation centres); and
   ✓ checking the patient register(s) in the inpatient, outpatient, emergency and paediatrics departments for any preliminary or final diagnosis of disease or condition that could have caused an AFP. If no diagnosis, look for signs or symptoms. Do this for all visits since the last visit.

5. Collect in your notebook the names and addresses of AFP cases you find.

6. In the register, note the result of your search below the last registered patient (number of AFP cases found in the register, e.g., “0 AFP cases found,” if none found) with today’s date. Add your signature, so that supervisors will know that you have visited.

Active surveillance is detective work

Records rarely indicate diagnoses. If there is a polio case, you may not find “polio” or “poliomyelitis” in health records. Furthermore, signs and symptoms described will rarely correspond to the AFP case definition.

Some words and phrases you might see:
- Paralysis, paresis (weakness), flaccid (soft)
- Weakness, hypotonia of a limb, weakness of unknown origin
- Frequent falls, walking distortion
- “Can no longer walk”
- “Can no longer stand up”

Keep in mind:
These can be in any language or dialect.
7. If you find a case in the register that looks like a missed AFP case, ask whether this case was already reported. Also, compare it to the national AFP line list.

8. If you establish that the case is “new” – that is, not previously reported – plan to investigate it as soon as possible.

9. Sensitize the surveillance focal person, if new to the job, and other people likely to encounter a case, such as nurses, if they’re not familiar with AFP surveillance. (Note: If the facility has no surveillance focal point yet, for example if it is a new site, make sure that a focal point is identified and trained.) See Table 5.1 for a summary of focal point responsibilities.

10. Give feedback on the facility’s “zero reports” (routine reporting), if necessary (i.e., in case of incomplete or late reports).

11. Provide the site with:
   - AFP case investigation forms and stool collection kits for high-priority sites; and
   - case definitions, posters, flyers, etc., for all sites.
     If possible, put up the case definitions and posters yourself.

12. Thank the staff and remind them of the date of your next visit.

Note: If a country is implementing integrated surveillance, the AS visit will cover several diseases and may also involve checking the vaccine stock and cold chain. Officers conducting AS visits should receive training to build their capacities on those integrated activities. AS forms are usually modified to reflect integration of disease surveillance with other vaccine-preventable diseases (VPDs).

After you return to the district office

11. Note the salient results of the visit in the supervisory notebook (including people met and sensitized, weaknesses observed, number of cases found) for your record and reports.

12. Immediately notify any new AFP case(s) to the national level and launch AFP case investigations.

Communicating with focal points

- With clinicians, “I’m looking for AFP cases, not polio. There will be no additional work for you.”
- With traditional practitioners and midwives, “Your patients will remain your patients. There is no competition, and all test results will be shared with you.”
- With refugee camps and at entry points, “Here’s an AFP case definition, which is the purpose of my visit.”

Experience has shown that suitable focal points vary by facility.

- In smaller hospitals, it may be the person already designated for reporting notifiable diseases or sending the weekly or monthly routine report.
- In larger hospitals, routine reporting is often carried out by an experienced nurse or infection control nurse; however, a clinician may also be designated.
- In hospitals with paediatric departments, paediatricians actively involved in managing patients in the emergency department or paediatric wards (not necessarily the chief of the paediatric department) should be designated as facility focal point.
### Table 5.1. Focal point responsibilities for active surveillance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th>Related duties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Immediate notification of an identified AFP case</strong></td>
<td>● Whenever a doctor or nurse in an AS site encounters a patient with AFP, the designated AFP focal point should be immediately informed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>and case investigation support</strong></td>
<td>● The AFP focal point without delay should contact the responsible district or province surveillance team to report the AFP case.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● The AFP focal point may initiate stool collection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● The AFP focal point will liaise with and lend support to public health staff or surveillance officers who arrive to conduct an AFP case investigation, to include gathering pertinent information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coordination with public health staff during AS visits</strong></td>
<td>● The AFP focal point is the primary contact for public health staff visiting regularly to conduct AS visits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● During each visit, the public health officer will contact the AFP focal point to ask whether cases have been seen and discuss recently reported cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Confirmation of zero reporting</strong></td>
<td>● Before a routine report is sent, the AFP focal point must make sure that sending a “zero report” means no AFP case was seen in the facility during the reporting period.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AFP = acute flaccid paralysis; AS = active surveillance
Annex 6. Community-based surveillance

Needs assessment

Before implementing community-based surveillance (CBS), a needs assessment must first be carried out and other potential surveillance strengthening options must be explored.

The needs assessment is a situational analysis that explores the following questions:

- How well does the current acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance system cover special populations or hard-to-reach areas?
- What are the real issues behind surveillance gaps? Are they related to healthcare access and utilization or cultural acceptability?
- Is the current system an event-based surveillance (EBS) where polio is one of the signals?
- Who are primary reporters of AFP cases in the community? Are they included in the AS network?
- Are CBS activities currently operating for other diseases?
- Is linking informants to existing health facilities an option?
- What are the health-seeking behaviours of the communities and what are the influencing factors? (e.g., gender, ethnicity, internally displaced population (IDP) or refugee, place of residence, etc.)
- What resources in the area should be consulted, such as healthcare facilities and providers (public and private), humanitarian agencies (United Nations [UN], etc.), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)?
- What healthcare providers and existing community networks, particularly women’s groups, professional and political networks, and grassroots organizations, could be engaged?

Process to establish CBS

If the conclusion of the needs assessment is that CBS is the most effective strategy to improve AFP surveillance sensitivity and no other surveillance strategies can deliver for a specific population or area, the process to establish CBS is to decide on the modality and follow the process below.

CBS generally has two modalities:

- **Formal CBS** has a high resource intensity with incentives, close supervision, and telecommunication tools (e.g., auto-visual AFP detection and reporting, or AVADAR). It usually functions independently of the facility-based surveillance with informants directly linked with surveillance officers.
- **Informal CBS** has a low-resource intense modality with volunteers or informants sensitized annually and receiving minimal incentives for reporting verified true AFP cases. Informants are usually linked to focal points within nearby health facilities, so informal CBS often works more closely with facility-based surveillance.

The process to establish CBS involves the following steps:

1. **Sensitization**: Identify, sensitize and brief key community actors (local and religious leaders, traditional healers, female leaders) to engage and gain their support for leadership for CBS.
2. **Selection**: Select community informants or volunteers jointly with community leaders based on certain criteria. Choose informants who possess a good character, who are invested with community trust and acceptance, and who are knowledgeable of the area, live within the community and speak the local language/dialect, as well as who represent an education level, age and gender suited to the community culture and norms.
3. **Support**: Identify barriers and challenges that the community and/or informants may face, particularly related to gender, and build support to resolve them. For example, evaluate an informant’s access to information, literacy levels or training, decision-making power, or restricted mobility/transport/money. Issues related to security and safety should also be addressed, as well as the acceptability of tools, equipment and mobility, particularly for female informants.
4. **Capacity building:** Train community informants using concise educational materials, the simplified AFP case definition, suspected AFP case recording and reporting policies, stool collection and handling procedures, and clear roles and responsibilities. Provide materials to support tasks, such as visual job aids, case investigation forms (CIFs), tools to record information, focal point contact information, and stool collection kits.

5. **Activities:** Community informants/volunteers will:
   - actively search for suspected AFP cases through rumours, regular (biweekly) home visits, and more frequent (weekly) visits to traditional healers and religious leaders;
   - keep records on vaccination and basic demographic data for families and children; and
   - immediately report a suspected case of AFP to the designated CBS focal point and/or the surveillance officer. The surveillance officer will follow up to confirm that the suspect AFP case meets the AFP case definition, initiate investigation and specimen collection, and notify the district health authority.

6. **Supportive supervision:** Establish an oversight structure that supports community informants/volunteers by conducting regular supervisory visits and providing feedback and conduct periodic refresher trainings to ensure informants maintain their knowledge and skills.

### Challenges and troubleshooting

Certain challenges should be anticipated in setting up, implementing and maintaining CBS (Table 6.1).

**Table 6.1. Issues and possible actions to troubleshoot community-based surveillance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Possible actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Difficulty to sustain CBS due to cost</td>
<td>● Build on existing local CBS networks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Explore less resource-intensive CBS modalities to balance available funds with sufficient activities to address surveillance gaps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Advocate for internal resources and reinforce community and government ownership of CBS (government budgets, bilateral cooperation) to ensure continuity, rather than external support which may not be sustainable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Consider integrated surveillance (e.g., VPDs) or integrated interventions (e.g., health education and immunization) to share costs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficulties finding the “right” community volunteers, as many programmes compete for suitable volunteers and may have different incentives</td>
<td>● Adapt case definitions, forms, protocols and training to the literacy level of the community volunteers to carry out on-the-job mentoring and motivation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Coordinate and collaborate with other agencies and community networks and use shared volunteers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficulty in recruiting women as community informants (due to existing gender norms and rules restricting women’s participation, safety and security risks faced by female frontline workers, lower literacy rates, women’s restricted mobility or lack of acceptable modes of transport)</td>
<td>● Systematically analyse and address gender-related barriers to increase women’s meaningful participation, safety and job satisfaction. Engage with community/religious leaders to pave the way for women’s participation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Develop strategies to increase gender balance among volunteers, including actions for revising selection criteria, retention, equal remuneration and capacity building; address specific barriers affecting women’s participation in training activities (such as transport options, the timing and location of training).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Ensuring that policies and training for the prevention of all forms of harassment, sexual exploitation and abuse and other forms of gender-based violence (GBV) are in place, actively communicated and implemented, sharing information about existing confidential reporting mechanisms and safeguarding policies for community volunteers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CBS = community-based surveillance; GBV = gender-based violence; VPD = vaccine-preventable disease
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Possible actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Lack of community cooperation and trust                              | ● Build trust by engaging the community in the selection process for volunteers, in the recognition and motivation of volunteers, and in the provision of feedback – all with respect to local social/cultural norms.  
● Engage key influencers within communities, including women’s groups, community organizations, religious leaders and other opinion influencers (based on context analysis).  
● Ensure the provision of observable benefits to the community (e.g., interventions, health education). |
| Ineffective communication with targeted communities                   | ● Consider including popular local media (radio, mobile messaging) to respond to the different preferences, needs and challenges of diverse women and men in the community (for example, different channels and platforms, different literacy levels).  
● Target both men and women as caregivers in all polio and AFP-related community outreach, encouraging men’s increased participation in children’s health care.  
● Utilize toll-free numbers or communication networks to report AFP cases. |
| Difficulties in quickly conducting AFP case investigation in inaccessible areas and among some special populations. | ● Consider having the interview of the suspected AFP case (or collection and transport of specimen) done by the community volunteer; ensure appropriate training and coaching.  
● Consider investigating the AFP case outside of his/her catchment area by the community volunteer; ensure provision for transportation cost for examination and/or specimen collection. |
| Limited ability or inability to perform monitoring and supportive supervision in inaccessible or hard-to-reach areas. | ● Explore innovative ways of working remotely (e.g., phones, WhatsApp) or relying on local organizations. Refer to *Guidelines on Implementing Poliovirus Surveillance in Hard-to-Reach Areas & Populations*.  
● Ensure means of communication for community volunteers and surveillance officers: petty cash, phone or other access to means of communication.  
● Consider using an electronic system for connecting informants’ activities and suspected AFP cases to the public health system. |
| Waning interest and motivation of informants over time which leads to deteriorating reporting quality and high turnover of staff | ● Keep informants motivated. An integrated CBS may be more rewarding as community informants can directly observe the benefits from their work.  
● Provide a strong supervisory structure and regular feedback and periodic refresher trainings.  
● Maintain support and offer recognition for activities that are well done.  
● Welcome the report of suspected AFP cases, even if they do not meet the “true” AFP case definition. |
| Simplified AFP case definitions make CBS less specific               | ● Balance the sensitivity and specificity of the overall CBS system with repeated training, close supervision and feedback.                                                                                       |
| Increased workload in polio laboratory                               | ● Coordinate on a regular basis with the laboratory and inform them if expected workload is likely to increase.                                                                                                    |

AFP = acute flaccid paralysis; CBS = community-based surveillance

**Monitoring and evaluation**

CBS should be well monitored and reviewed to guide timely corrective action (Table 6.2). Monitoring activities can be done with the help of existing partners and community networks (e.g., community mobilizers) and through engagement of local government authorities.
### Table 6.2. Indicators for community-based surveillance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Calculation (expressed as a percentage)</th>
<th>Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of AFP cases reported by CBS</td>
<td># of AFP cases (those on linelist) identified by community informant / # of AFP cases on linelist</td>
<td>TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completeness of weekly/monthly zero reporting (WZR/MZR)</td>
<td># of reports received from community informants / # of expected reports from community informants</td>
<td>&gt;=80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timeliness of WZR/MZR</td>
<td># of reports received on time from community informants / # of expected reports from community informants</td>
<td>&gt;=80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of female informants</td>
<td># female informants / # informants</td>
<td>&gt;=50%-80%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of informants from local area</td>
<td># local informants / # informants</td>
<td>&gt;=80%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervision of informants† ‡</td>
<td># informants who have received at least one supervisory visit in last 3 months / # number of informants</td>
<td>&gt;=80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informant training‡ §</td>
<td># informants with training within the last year / # of informants</td>
<td>&gt;=80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informant turnover rate† ‡ ‣</td>
<td># informants who left during the previous year / # informants</td>
<td>TBD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AFP = acute flaccid paralysis; CBS = community-based surveillance; MZR = monthly zero reporting; TBD = to be determined; WZR = weekly zero reporting

* Target to be adjusted at the country level; priority countries to regularly analyse.

† To be reviewed quarterly; priority countries to regularly analyse. Suggest to stratify results by supervisor.

‡ Results should be stratified by sex.

§ To be reviewed annually; priority countries to regularly analyse.

¶ Informant turnover rate is a flag; the target is to be defined at the country level. The baseline is the number of informants at the beginning of the review period.

The first three indicators can be monitored monthly, with the rest monitored annually.
### Annex 7. Examples of forms

#### 7.1 - Active surveillance visit form

**Active surveillance (AS) for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP)**

**AS visit report form**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Doctor in charge</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>AFP / surveillance focal point</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Paediatrician of the facility</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>Neurologist of the facility</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>Physiotherapist of the facility</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>Other health facility staff. <em>Specify:</em></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Check for new / missed AFP cases:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Outpatient register (OPD) checked for AFP cases</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Inpatient register (IPD) checked for AFP cases</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Internal medicine department / ward</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>Neurology unit</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Orthopaedic department</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>Physiotherapy unit</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>Other departments / units / wards. <em>Specify:</em></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Check for supplies and material availability:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Stool specimen kit(s)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Specimen carrier(s)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>AFP poster(s) visible in the facility</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Summary: New and unreported cases since last visit:</td>
<td>New (all new)</td>
<td>Unreported (out of the new cases found)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Number of AFP cases found during this visit, since the last visit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Feedback:</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>EPID of cases for result pending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Number of AFP cases for which results have not reached the facility in &gt;60 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Other checks done:</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Vaccine cold chain fully functional</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Polio vaccine in stock</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>Other: <em>Specify:</em></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Name of person in charge of facility:** ____________________________________________  
**Signature of person in charge of facility:** __________________________  **Date:** ____________

**Signature of officer:** __________________________  **Date:** ____________
7.2 - Case investigation forms (version 2022 for non-endemic and endemic)

### Polio Eradication – AFP Case Investigation Form (v. 2022 – non-endemic)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EPID Number:</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Region/Province</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Year Onset</th>
<th>Case Number</th>
<th>Received</th>
<th>Month/Day/Year</th>
<th>at National level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Region/Province:**

**District:**

**City/Town:**

**village:**

**Address:**

**Phone number:**

**Case coordinates (WGS 1984 format):**

**Latitude:**

**Longitude:**

**Nearest Health Facility:**

**Type:**

**Distance (circle):**

- < 5 km / 5-10 km / > 10 km

**Patient’s name:**

**Sex (circle):**

- Male / Female

**Date of birth (DOB):**

**Age:**

- (If DOB unknown) **year**

**Date of admission to hospital:**

**If applicable:**

**Documented by:**

**Hospital Name / Address:**

**Date Investigated:**

**Notified by:**

**Facility (Name):**

**Type of Facility (circle appropriate option):**

- Public / Private / Armed Forces / 4-National Health Care provider / 5-NGO / 6-Other (specify)

**Was this facility (circle applicable option):**

- Active Surveillance site / Zero-reporting site (not an Active Surveillance site) / Outside network

**Date Case Investigated:**

**Investigated by:**

**Title / Designation:**

**Hospitalized?**

- Yes / No

**If Yes, Date of admission:**

**If applicable:**

**Hospital record:**

**Hospital Name:**

**Address:**

**Fever at onset of paralysis?**

- Yes / No / Unknown

**Progressive Paralytic C3 days?**

- Yes / No / Unknown

**Site of Paralysis:**

- LA / RA / LL / RL

**Was there any injection just before onset of paralysis?**

- Yes / No

**If yes, mention the site of injection in the table below:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Right</th>
<th>Left</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arm</td>
<td>Forearm</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Provisional diagnosis:**

**Did the case seek help at any other place after parent(s) or caregiver(s) noticed paralysis or weakness in the child and before being seen at the current place?**

- Yes / No

**If Yes, in chronological order, list the place(s) and/or person(s) the case visited for health care between onset and visiting this place:**

**Total Number of Health Encounters for this case:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Health Encounter</th>
<th>1.</th>
<th>2.</th>
<th>3.</th>
<th>4.</th>
<th>5.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name of facility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of person</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of facility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of person</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location / address</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phone number</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is this site a part of the reporting network?</td>
<td>Yes / No</td>
<td>Yes / No</td>
<td>Yes / No</td>
<td>Yes / No</td>
<td>Yes / No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was the case notified?</td>
<td>Yes / No</td>
<td>Yes / No</td>
<td>Yes / No</td>
<td>Yes / No</td>
<td>Yes / No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action(s) taken if case was not notified</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) “Name of Person” if Traditional or Faith Healer, or other individual

(2) 1: Hospital / 2: Clinic or Health Center / 3: Pharmacy / 4: Traditional or Faith healer / 5: Other (specify)
Global guidelines for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance in the context of poliovirus eradication

### AFP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>After investigation, was this a true AFP?</td>
<td>Yes / No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of polio vaccine doses (exclude birth dose):</td>
<td>______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPV dose at birth: 1st dose: 2nd dose: 3rd dose:</td>
<td>______ / ______ / ______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th dose: 5th dose: 6th dose: if &gt;6, last dose:</td>
<td>______ / ______ / ______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total OPV doses received through SI:</td>
<td>______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total OPV doses received through RI:</td>
<td>[99=Unknown]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of last OPV dose received through SI:</td>
<td>______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of last OPV dose received through RI:</td>
<td>[99=Unknown]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total IPV doses received through SI:</td>
<td>______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source of RI vaccination information (circle):</td>
<td>Card / Recall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date specimen sent to national level:</td>
<td>______ / ______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date specimen sent to inter-country/national laboratory:</td>
<td>______ / ______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of follow-up examination:</td>
<td>______ / ______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results of exam:</td>
<td>1=Residual paralysis 2=No residual paralysis 3=Lost to follow-up 4=Died before follow-up 5=Residual spastic paralysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual Paralysis?</td>
<td>LA RA RL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immunocompromised status suspected?</td>
<td>Yes / No / Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1=Confirmed polio 2=Compatible 3=Discarded 6=Not an AFP case</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigator Name:</td>
<td>______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigator Title:</td>
<td>______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit:</td>
<td>______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Address:</td>
<td>______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone:</td>
<td>______</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NB: this example of ‘non-endemic country’ CIF is based on the CIF used in AFRO.
Global guidelines for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance in the context of poliovirus eradication

---

### Polio Eradication – AFP Case Investigation Form (v.2022 – endemic countries)

#### Urgent Case (i.e., clinically Poly)? Y / N

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EPID NUMBER</th>
<th>Date of onset of weakness / paralysis</th>
<th>Date of Notification</th>
<th>Date of Investigation</th>
<th>Notifying District / Agency / Town</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>/ / / /</td>
<td>/ / / /</td>
<td>/ / / /</td>
<td>/ / / /</td>
<td>/ / / /</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### AFP Case Coordinates (WGS 1984 format): Latitude: __________ __________ Longitude: __________

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Patient’s Name</th>
<th>Sex: Male / Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date of birth (DOB): / / / or (if DOB is unknown) Age at Onset: years months</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Father’s Name</th>
<th>Grand Father’s Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mother’s Name</td>
<td>Caregiver’s Name</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### First Language: Urdu / Punjabi / Saraiki / Sindhi / Balochi / Brahui / Pashto / Hindko / Pahari / Shina / Other: __________

#### Tribe: __________ Religion: __________

#### Address: House No.: __________ Street / Mohalla: __________ Landmark: __________ Village: __________

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Union council</th>
<th>UC code</th>
<th>Tehsil / Taluka / Town:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District:</td>
<td>__________ Mobile (cell) phone number: __________</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Case lives in: Hard-to-reach location / community: Yes / No; Insure location: Yes / No; Geographically difficult to reach: Yes / No; Urban slums: Yes / No; Informal settlements: Yes / No; IDP or Refugee Camp: Yes / No; Informal settlements: Yes / No

#### Case belongs to migrant / mobile community? (circle appropriate answer): Yes / No; if ‘Yes’, specify (circle):

8. Others (please specify): __________

#### Notified by: Name: __________ Title / Designation: __________

| Name of Health Facility / Unit: __________ Health Facility Code: __________ |
| --- | --- |

#### Type of facility (circle one option): Public / Armed Forces / Private / NGO / informal health care provider / Community based

#### Is this health facility (circle one option): 1. Active surveillance site / 2. Zero reporting site (not an active site) / 3. Outside network

#### Case admitted to hospital / Health facility? Yes / No, if ‘Yes’, Date of admission: / / / __________

#### If the patient died, date of death: / / / __________ Cause of death (+ obtain death certificate)

#### Provisional diagnosis:

#### Did the case consult (formal or informal) at any other place after parent(s) / caregiver(s) noticed the weakness/paralysis in the child and before being seen at the current place? Yes / No

In chronological order, list the place(s) and/or person(s) the case visited for health care between onset and visiting this place (notification). Please fill out the table below in chronological order, including this place:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Visit</th>
<th>1 / /</th>
<th>2 / /</th>
<th>3 / /</th>
<th>4 / /</th>
<th>5 / /</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name of Facility / Person(s):</td>
<td>__________</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Facility / Person(s):</td>
<td>__________</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location and Phone number:</td>
<td>__________</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Is this site a part of the reporting network? Yes / NO Yes / NO Yes / NO Yes / NO Yes / NO Yes / NO

#### Was the case notified? Yes / No Yes / No Yes / NO Yes / NO Yes / NO Yes / NO

#### Actions taken if case was not notified

(1) “Name of Person” if Traditional or Faith Healer or other Individual
(2) 1=Hospital / 2=Clinic or Health Center / 3=Pharmacy / 4=Traditional or Faith healer / 5=Other (specify)

People(s) who took the case to the 1st health contact (circle): Mother / Father / Caregiver / Aunt / Uncle / Grandmother / Grandfather / Other (specify): __________

Did you consult (formal/informal) for this problem within 2 days of onset? Yes / No / Don’t know / If ‘No’, what are possible reasons for the delay? (circle all applicable options): 1. Waiting for improvement or complete recovery by itself / 2. Cost of travel and/or health care / 3. Distance to (preferred) health care / 4. Needed permission of family member to go to health facility / 5. Insecurity / 6. Other (specify): __________

#### Total Number of Health Encounters for this case: __________
Global guidelines for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance in the context of poliovirus eradication

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Signs &amp; Symptoms</th>
<th>Right Leg</th>
<th>Left Leg</th>
<th>Right Arm</th>
<th>Left Arm</th>
<th>Others (specify e.g. difficult swallowing)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Right leg</td>
<td>breathing muscles</td>
<td>neck muscles</td>
<td>facial muscles</td>
<td>ocular muscles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proximal</td>
<td>proximal</td>
<td>distal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distal</td>
<td>proximal</td>
<td>distal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ocular</td>
<td>both</td>
<td>both</td>
<td>both</td>
<td>neither</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neuromotor Examination</th>
<th>Upper Limb</th>
<th>Lower Limb</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arm</td>
<td>proximal</td>
<td>forearm (distal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right</td>
<td>Left</td>
<td>Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biceps</td>
<td>Biceps</td>
<td>Knee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrist</td>
<td>Wrist</td>
<td>Ankle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Injection History</th>
<th>Arm</th>
<th>Forearm</th>
<th>Buttock</th>
<th>Thigh</th>
<th>Leg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Right</td>
<td>Left</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Travel History</th>
<th>Villages / UC</th>
<th>Tehsil</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>When and for how long</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immunization History</th>
<th>Number of OPV doses received in routine immunization (exclude birth/no dose):</th>
<th>doses or 'Unknown' (circle 'Yes'):</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Was routine OPV doses verified by EPI card?</td>
<td>Yes / No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Number of OPV doses (DTPV/OPV/OPV2) received in vaccination campaigns/series (recall): | doses or 'Unknown' (circle 'Yes'): | Yes |
| Max child received any OPV | Yes / No | No |
| Date of last OPV dose received (circle): | Data of the last OPV dose received through GIA: |

| Are there other AFP cases in patient’s community within 10 days of weakness/paralysis onset? | Yes / No | No |
| Name(s) and address(es) of other case(s) found (add another sheet if required): |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Final Examination</th>
<th>Date of collection:</th>
<th>Date sent to Lab:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other AFP Cases</th>
<th>Uncompromised status suspected?</th>
<th>Yes / No</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Final classification (circle): confirmed polio / compatible / discarded / NOT an AFP</td>
<td>CYDPV / AYDPV / IVDPY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaccine type (circle): 1 / 2 / 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please retain a copy of this form for record at Hospital and District Health Office and send a copy to the Polio Area Manager. - Adapted EPI, Pakistan, Jan, 1993

Note: This includes reasons like "house not in the micro-plan", "house is in the micro-plan but not visited by team", "team could not reach the house due to lack of mobility support (e.g. flung area), etc., team reached the house but could not vaccinate the child," inappropriate vaccination team (e.g., language inappropriate, male team), etc.
7.3 - Detailed case investigation form

The main elements to include in a detailed case investigation form (CIF) or report are:\(^{29}\)

- **Case notification**
  - Name and unique epidemiological identification (EPID) number
  - Date of notification
  - Name of respondent and relationship with case
  - Name of interviewer, contact information and affiliation
  - Date of case investigation

- **Demographic**
  - Residence (province, district, village, etc.)
  - Date of birth, age
  - Sex

- **Vaccination**
  - Total number of oral polio vaccine (OPV) doses received in essential immunization (incl. code for unknown, i.e., 99)
  - Total number of OPV doses received during supplemental immunization activities (SIAs) (incl. code for unknown, i.e., 99)
  - Total number of inactivated polio vaccine (IPV) doses received in essential immunization (incl. code for unknown, i.e., 99)
  - Total number of IPV doses received in SIAs (incl. code for unknown, i.e., 99)
  - Date of last OPV dose

- **Clinical information**
  - Date of paralysis onset
  - Fever at onset of paralysis?
  - Asymmetric paralysis?
  - Neurological examination

- **Risk factors**
  - Occupation of parents/caregivers
  - Ethnicity
  - Special population (check all that apply): refugee, internally displaced population (IDP), reside in security-challenged area, migrant/mobile population
  - Travel history of case and household members (outside of district or country) within one (1) month of onset of paralysis
  - History of attendance at gathering of case and household members (large scale market/fair, other) within one (1) month of onset of paralysis
  - History of visitors to the household within one (1) month of onset of paralysis

- **Specimens**
  - Specimen numbers
  - Date of collection of stool specimens
  - Date stool specimen received in laboratory
  - Condition of stool (good, poor, unknown)

- **Laboratory results**

- **History of care-seeking prior to notification**
  - Name and location of sites / facilities visited by the case between onset and notification
  - Dates of visits

- **Other AFP cases in area?**

- **Geographic and demographic information, population size of area**

- **Rapid OPV/IPV coverage survey of area**

- **Essential immunization and SIA coverage**

- **Map**

If the polio isolate was detected through environmental surveillance (ES), special focus should go towards understanding the catchment area of this ES site, the sociodemographic characteristics and level of vaccination coverage of the population living in that catchment area. In addition, the investigation should look for missed AFP cases in/around the ES site catchment area.

### 7.4 - 60-day follow-up examination form

**60-DAY FOLLOW-UP EXAMINATION FORM FOR ACUTE FLACCID PARALYSIS CASES**

(to be completed starting on the 60th day after onset of paralysis, and no later than on the 90th day)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EPID number</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Region/Province</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Year of onset of paralysis</th>
<th>Case number</th>
<th>Received on</th>
<th>by the nation level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**IDENTIFICATION**

Name of the nearest health facility: 

District: 

Region: 

Nomad: 1=YES; 2=NO 

Address: 

Village: 

Town/City: 

Date of case: 

Father / Mother: 

If DOB is unknown: Age ___ years, and ___ months 

Sex: M=Male, F=Female

**HISTORY OF ILLNESS**

Date of onset of paralysis: 

Acute flaccid paralysis: 

Asymmetry: 

Paralysed: 1=YES, 2=NO, 9=UNKNOWN

**FOLLOW-UP EXAM:**


**MEDICAL BACKGROUND**

Clinical exam and Physical signs:

Other information:

**INVESTIGATING OFFICER**

Name: 

Affiliation: 

Address: 

Tel: 

Date of investigation: 

---

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EXPLANATORY NOTES FOR THE FILLING OUT OF THE
60-DAY FOLLOW-UP EXAMINATION FORM OF
AFP CASES

1. **EPID number, Identification, History of illness, Follow-up Examination**
   (See instructions on the AFP case investigation form for details on how to fill out this section)

2. **Medical history**
   Mention other information that has occurred with the patient since the last examination, such as vaccinations and other illnesses that may explain the patient's current condition.

3. **Clinical examination (current symptoms)**
   Mention all the symptoms that the patient presents at the interview with the parents/caregivers and the patient him/herself.

4. **Physical signs**
   Describe the physical signs observed during the examination, including the condition of the limbs.

5. **Other information**
   Mention any other information on the child's health status that could guide the members of the National Committee of Experts on Poliomyelitis (CNEP) in their decision-making.
Annex 8. AFP case investigation

How to document the case history

While observing the patient for signs of paralysis or weakness, the surveillance officer should take the history of the case from the patient's caregiver (or the patient, if an older child), transcribing key elements on the case investigation form (CIF), including:

(1) Patient identification
   - Patient / caregiver identification (names, address or location, mobile phone, etc.) that will be key to tracing the family back, if needed.
   - Date of onset of paralysis. Key for further analyses.

(2) Immunization history
   - Number of oral polio vaccine (OPV) and/or inactivated polio vaccine (IPV) doses received prior to onset of weakness, whether through supplementary immunization activities (SIA) or essential immunization (confirm with immunization card, if available).
   - Siblings (OPV and/or IPV) vaccination status.

(3) History of illness
   - First symptoms; date and place of onset of weakness or paralysis (key for the assignment of the epidemiological identification [EPID] number); fever or other symptoms at onset, incl. whether the weakness progressed rapidly or not, and whether the weakness affected both extremities equally or not.
   - If one or more health providers (formal, informal) were consulted prior to the case being notified, this should be noted, as well as the dates and the names of providers and what treatment, if any, was provided.
   - The caregiver should be asked whether there is anyone else in the community with similar symptoms.

(4) Travel history
   - Travel by the case or anyone else in the household during the 30 days prior to onset of weakness (record details: person, place, time).
   - Visitors received during the 30 days prior to onset of weakness (record details: person, place, time).

(5) Special population or high-risk group
   - Nomads, internally displaced population (IDP), refugees, people living in inaccessible areas, or other special population or high-risk group should be recorded on the CIF, if applicable.

How to conduct the examination

The objective of the clinical examination in a case investigation of acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) is to establish whether there is any degree of paralysis or paresis or not, regardless of the current clinical diagnosis. It is therefore NOT to establish an exact medical-neurological diagnosis. The physical examination should then be done ideally by a person qualified to do so – either the person charged with the investigation or the attending physician in the hospital.

In most cases, the investigator will have learned much about the presence or absence of flaccid paralysis just through the initial observation of the patient. Depending on the patient's age and ability to cooperate, the investigator should request the patient to walk (if there is an involvement of lower limbs)
and then observe the patient's gait. If there is involvement of the upper limbs, request the patient to lift his/her arms. While the physical examination is easier with a cooperative older child, it must also be done with infants and toddlers, and thus, trust must be secured.

The focus of the examination should be on simple neurological testing, including an assessment of motor power, muscle tone and reflexes. Status of sensation should be verified. A brief overall clinical examination should be conducted to assess the health status of the child, including a temperature check for a fever and any signs of malnutrition and dehydration. Where / when feasible, a neurological examination through a paediatrician or neurologist can be carried out and attached to the CIF but is not essential.

How to collect and store stool samples for AFP cases

Materials and supplies

✓ Specimen carrier
✓ Frozen ice packs (4)
✓ Case investigation form (CIF)
✓ Laboratory request form
✓ 2 screw-top specimen collection containers
✓ Container labels (adhesive)
✓ Water-resistant pen for labelling
✓ Absorbent material (e.g., cotton)
✓ Gloves
✓ 4 Ziploc plastic bags (to hold containers and forms)
✓ Contact information of parent/guardian
✓ EPID numbers, if available

Step-by-step instructions

For a process flow on collecting stool samples for AFP cases, see Fig. 8.1.

1. Use only the designated stool carrier (not the carrier used for vaccines), which should be lined with frozen ice packs.
2. Use the designated screw-top specimen containers. Should such containers not be available, use any dry, clean, leak-proof container or bottle.
3. WEAR GLOVES DURING SPECIMEN COLLECTION!
4. Collect fresh stool from the patient’s diapers or bed pan, or have the patient defecate onto a piece of paper or plastic.
5. Collect a volume of stool about the size of two adult thumbnails (approximately 8-10 grams). Note that the laboratory may reject extremely watery samples and the laboratory also considers rectal swabs inadequate.
6. Use the spatula provided in the kit container to place the specimen in a clean, leak-proof, screw-capped container and firmly screw the cap back on.
7. Use an indelible or permanent marker to record the following on the self-adhesive label (or a piece of tape or directly on the container, if labels are not available):
   - First and last name of the case
   - EPID number
   - Date of collection for each specimen
   - Time of collection for each specimen
   - Specimen number (“1st” or “2nd”)
Fig. 8.1. Process flow for collecting stool samples for AFP cases

1. All AFP cases should be investigated including the collection of stool specimens.

2. Label specimen container with patient name, unique ID number, date of collection, and specimen number.

3. Collect an appropriate amount of stool, (adult thumbnail size), and place in labeled container.

4. A 2nd stool should be collected at least 24 hours after the 1st and packaged / stored as described.

5. Place each specimen in a plastic bag and then store in a specimen carrier with frozen ice packs. Ice packs should be replaced every 24 hours.

6. The completed case investigation form should be placed in a plastic bag. Then both specimen bags, and the bag with the case investigation form, should be placed in another larger plastic bag.

7. The specimens and case investigation form should be stored in a specimen carrier with 4 frozen ice packs until arrival at the laboratory.

8. Ship specimens as soon as possible.

Source: WHO.
**Additional storage information**

Store specimens according to when they can be sent to the laboratory:

- ≤72 hours after collection, store in specimen carriers with frozen ice packs.
- >72 hours after collection, store in a deep freezer (-20°C) until transport. Do not freeze with vaccines or food.
Annex 9. Health-seeking behaviour

Delays in detecting cases or missing cases altogether may arise from a limited understanding of the health-seeking behaviour of acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) cases and their caregivers, as well as the barriers they may experience in accessing health care.

To address this, country programmes must collect health-seeking behaviour data disaggregated at the lowest possible administrative level by gender and by risk status, for example in the case of special population groups. When analysed, such data can point to possible subnational surveillance gaps and may help strengthen programme activities through a deeper understanding of the underlying causes.

Case investigation forms (CIFs) should be modified to include the following:

- the number of health encounters the case had before it was notified;
- whether the reporting sites (facility/person) that saw the case before it was notified are part of the reporting network; and
- whether or not the encounter(s) led to a notification.

Countries should make sure that their case investigation forms (CIFs) are revised to collect data on previous health encounters that cases had before they were officially reported.

Refer to CIFs in Annex 7 for a section on previous health encounters to capture health-seeking behaviour information.

Fundamentals of health-seeking behaviour assessments

- **Why**: Health-seeking behaviour assessments aim to identify healthcare facilities or persons that cases and their caregivers seek out, but that may miss reporting AFP cases or may report cases but are not currently in the AFP reporting network.
- **What**: Once these individuals or facilities have been identified, the programme can take the appropriate action to increase the sensitivity of the AFP surveillance system – for example, by re-training a focal point on AFP reporting or by adding a focal point to the reporting network.
- **When**: Health-seeking behaviour assessments can be coordinated as part of the periodic review of the reporting network or during outbreak response assessments (OBRAs), surveillance reviews or other activities aimed at reviewing and strengthening AFP surveillance.
- **How**: These assessments review information collected on modified CIFs where AFP cases detail their health encounters before their case was officially reported through the AFP active surveillance network.

Steps of a health-seeking behaviour assessment

1. Review the reporting network through analysis of CIFs to answer the following questions:
   - How many reporting sites missed reporting an AFP case? Which ones, and where?
   - What are the sites outside the network (i.e., not part of the reporting network) that (a) received and (b) reported an AFP case?
2. Review for possible clusters of AFP cases that were detected late with the aim to identify geographical areas where delays in detecting AFP cases may be linked to particular habits or attitudes within a special population towards health care and seeking care, or where AFP surveillance may be overlooking local, more traditional service providers.
3. Identify and implement actions to close surveillance gaps based on health-seeking behaviour of a particular community (Table 9.1)
Table 9.1. Specific actions to close surveillance gaps related to health-seeking behaviour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Case went to a reporting site but was not notified</td>
<td>● Identify the possible reason(s) a case was missed (e.g., staff turnover, untrained recruit, vacation, workload, case absconded) and address the gap.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Review the prioritization (i.e., high-, medium-, low-priority sites); monitor and supervise closely for 6 months for any missed cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cases seek care in a health facility or site that is not included in the network</td>
<td>Conduct a visit to each health facility/site/person (if feasible) and evaluate the need for inclusion in the reporting network:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● If the location/person fits the criteria (high-, medium-, or low-priority site), include it in the network and sensitize on the need to report immediately.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● If the location/person does not meet the criteria, sensitize and monitor for 6 months for additional cases. If additional cases, reconsider inclusion as reporting unit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clustering of late detected cases (cases that were not reported upon their 1st visit or were notified beyond 7 days after onset of paralysis)</td>
<td>● Conduct quick social mapping of area to identify possible reasons (e.g., high-risk group, limited coverage of health facilities).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● If feasible, visit the area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Discuss with community the possible reasons for delays.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Sensitize communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Sensitize and train healthcare providers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Consider introducing CBS (after need assessment as per Annex 6).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Health-seeking behaviour should be monitored to guide timely corrective action (Table 9.2).

Table 9.2. Health-seeking behaviours indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Calculation (expressed as a percentage)</th>
<th>Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFP case encounters†</td>
<td># of AFP cases with &lt;=2 health encounters between onset and notification / # of AFP cases</td>
<td>&gt;=80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adequacy of notification by designation</td>
<td># of 1st health encounters that led to a notification, by designation [reporting source]§ / # of health encounters by that same designation</td>
<td>&gt;=80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appropriateness of surveillance network</td>
<td># of AFP cases with first health encounters with a reporting site within the AFP surveillance network / # of AFP cases</td>
<td>&gt;=80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late reported AFP cases: Completeness of health encounter information</td>
<td>Among AFP cases reported &gt;14 days after paralysis onset: # of AFP cases with no information on health encounters / # AFP cases reported &gt;14 days after paralysis onset</td>
<td>&gt;=80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

§ This is the “percentage of 1st encounters by designation (e.g., doctor, nurse, traditional healer, vaccinator, other) that led to the notification of an AFP case.”
## Annex 10. Special population groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Special populations are groups that are not served or are underserved by the regular health delivery system.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Categories** | 1. Populations living in security-compromised areas  
2. Mobile populations: nomads and seasonal migrants (e.g., agricultural or mine workers, brick kilns, construction workers, etc.)  
3. (a) Refugees and IDPs in camps and (b) those living in host communities  
4. Special populations in settled areas (e.g., cross-border population, urban slums, islanders, fishermen, etc.) |
| **Identification & mapping** | It is important to identify and profile these populations based on:  
- geographic location, population size, movement routes, timing/seasonality of movement;  
- access to health services, health-seeking behaviours, ability of the current surveillance network (health facilities, community-based) to detect AFP cases within the group;  
- identification of service providers (public and private, including NGO’s, faith-based organizations, etc.);  
- vaccination coverage and immunity status; and  
- availability of communication activities targeting these special population. |
| **Rationale for special activities to reach particular populations** | These populations may have more susceptibility to the disease and more likelihood of missing and spreading transmission.  
- Underserved populations may not be covered by the surveillance system.  
- There is likely lower population immunity due to low vaccination.  
- High movement makes them prone to spread the virus to vulnerable populations. |
| **Challenges and anticipated issues for surveillance among special populations** |  
- Difficulties with mapping and population estimates  
- Lack of coordination with stakeholders  
- Lack of community involvement  
- High cost of resources and logistics: trainings, transportation, supervision, monitoring  
- Lack of security |
| **Tips for success** | Special population surveillance is facilitated by:  
- Special teams dedicated to surveillance in special population  
- Close coordination with partners (UNHCR, IOM, INGOs, civil society, veterinary services, etc.) |
| **Surveillance strategies applicable to the special population** |  
1. Populations living in security-compromised areas  
- Access mapping and analysis that identifies key partners and factions, population dynamics and changes.  
- Access negotiating  
- Sensitizing and briefing armed forces, relevant partners and community members about polio and AFP case reporting.  
- Revising surveillance network by identifying and training appropriate focal points for case reporting—i.e., community-based surveillance (CBS) as appropriate.  
- Conducting periodic active case search in community and healthcare facilities.  
- Contact sampling around AFP cases (one sample, three contacts).  
- Conducting healthy children stool surveys and ad hoc environmental surveillance (ES), to be decided in coordination with WHO country and regional teams.  
- Ensuring access tracking and segregated data analysis to monitor surveillance by population group. |

AFP = acute flaccid paralysis; CBS = community-based surveillance; ES = environmental surveillance; IDP = internally displaced population; INGO = International nongovernmental organization; IOM = International Organization on Migration; NGO = nongovernmental organization; UNHCR = United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; WHO = World Health Organization
### Special population groups (continued)

#### 2. Mobile populations
- Mapping and profiling with leaders or persons identified as surveillance focal points.
- Determining itineraries of the population and mapping healthcare facilities and providers (including veterinarians) along the route.
- Sensitizing population and providers.
- Conducting market sensitization along the route and close to water points and camps.
- Establishing regular contact with focal points for reminders and feedback on reporting.
- Conducting active case search in large gatherings of nomadic groups during SIAs and mobile outreach services.
- Collecting contact sampling around AFP cases (one sample, three contacts).
- Conducting healthy children stool surveys to be decided in coordination with WHO country and regional teams.

A similar approach will be used for other mobile population groups as appropriate – e.g., seasonal migrants such as agricultural or mine workers, brick kilns, or construction workers.

#### 3a. Refugees/IDPs in camps
- Identifying focal points in camps (IDP or refugee) to include in the surveillance network.
- Profiling new arrivals (origin and immunization status).
- Conducting active case search in health facilities of camps and during SIAs.
- Collecting contact sampling around AFP cases (one sample, three contacts).
- Collecting healthy children sampling (new children under five year), to be decided in coordination with WHO country and regional teams.
- Installing a permanent vaccination/surveillance team.

#### 3b. Informal IDPs and refugees in host community
- Identifying key informants from the community to include in surveillance network.
- Providing appropriate job aids.
- Initiating community IDP and refugee tracking (tracker team).
- Determining health-seeking behaviour.
- Adjusting surveillance network.
- Conducting active case search during SIAs and mobile activities.
- Collecting contact sampling around AFP cases (one sample, three contacts)
- Collecting healthy children sampling (health facilities used by IDPs or refugees), to be decided in coordination with WHO country and regional teams.

#### 4. Special populations in settled areas

**Cross-border populations**
- Mapping official and non-official border crossings
- Mapping seasonal movements
- Estimating population flow averages
- Mapping and profiling villages/settlements, special populations, security and access, gathering places on both sides
- Mapping areas of one district/country only accessible from the neighbouring district or country
- Mapping of surveillance network on both sides
- Identifying organizations working at border entry and exit points (e.g., immigration, port health services, police)
- Providing orientation and sensitization of populations and healthcare providers on both sides
- Using supplemental strategies
- Active case search on both sides in the community (entry points, permanent vaccination sites, markets) and in health facilities
- If there are security-compromised areas or special populations as refugees or IDPs, implement the specific proposed activities/strategies

AFP = acute flaccid paralysis; IDP = internally displaced population; SIA = supplementary immunization activity; WHO = World Health Organization
### Special population groups (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. Special populations in settled areas (continued)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urban slums</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Profiling communities and their origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Studying health-seeking behavior and modification of surveillance network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Conducting active case search</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Consider adding ES sites</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Monitoring and Evaluation

- Conduct a segregated analysis to ensure surveillance coverage and quality by population groups (starting with appropriate data collection)
- Conduct regular mapping and risk assessment
- Review/assess implementation of plans
- Engagement of partners for independent monitoring

ES = environmental surveillance
## Annex 11. Ad hoc active case search

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Ad hoc active case search for AFP cases</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Definition</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ad hoc active case search (ACS) is an extraordinary, ad hoc activity conducted to identify unreported acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) cases. ACS is done through retrospective case search in health facility records and interviews of healthcare providers (facility-based) and community leaders and parents (community-based). As an ad hoc activity, ACS enhances active surveillance (AS) activities in the short term under certain criteria, such as a new event or outbreak or when other concerning surveillance gaps are identified.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Rationale and indications** |
| ACS is done to enhance the sensitivity of detecting AFP cases in areas that experience either suboptimal surveillance or new epidemiological risks. This activity can help identify gaps in the AFP surveillance system when new events or outbreaks occur — and it can help supplement activities during the beginning of a response plan. |

### Conditions that may warrant ACS include:

1. Activities where opportunities to look for AFP cases exist, such as during house-to-house searches, while canvassing to collect geospatial data, while vaccinating newly accessible populations (e.g., refugees or internally displaced populations [IDPs] from inaccessible areas), or during supplementary immunization activities (SIAs).

2. Events, outbreaks and other triggers
   a) In a polio event or outbreak setting
      i) As part of the investigation, retrospective case searches and facility-based ACS are implemented.
   b) As part of enhanced surveillance by activating AFP case finding and record review

### Procedure (steps)

Setting up ACS can be resource-intensive, so it’s important to have clear parameters, including the geographic scope, target population and time period of interest (typically previous 6 months). Geographic scope can be defined in review of outbreak-related risk assessments, current epidemiology, genetics of new polio cases or other important risk factors to identify unreported cases. When there are positive ES samples but no AFP case, the geographic scope may be more complex because of the catchment area, requiring additional planning considerations.

ACS involves all or a subset of activities, depending on the situation. The steps below can be considered in setting up ACS activities, but it is important to be focused so the search doesn’t become larger and more resource-intensive than needed. Activities should be consistently documented throughout the entire process.

### ACS = active case search; AFP = acute flaccid paralysis; AS = active surveillance; ES = environmental surveillance; IDP = internally displaced people; SIA = supplementary immunization activity; WPV = wild poliovirus; VDPV = vaccine-derived poliovirus
### Ad hoc active case search for AFP cases (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Procedure (steps) - continued</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Conduct subgroup analysis to determine if surveillance reaches all subsets of a population.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Decide if the search will be facility- and/or community-based (usually both).</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Develop tools (e.g., checklist, reporting formats) for recording ACS process and outcomes.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Consider enlisting help from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) for inaccessible areas.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Provide training to those who will conduct searches.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Develop reporting channels for identified AFP cases.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Establish a strong supportive supervision and monitoring mechanism at the field level.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Additional steps for facility-based ACS**

1. Identify and profile all healthcare facilities within and outside the reporting network (public, private, traditional).

2. Retrospective case searches should look for unreported AFP cases up to 6 months prior to the search date. (Interview health providers, review facility registers, make visits to wards.)

**Additional steps for community-based ACS**

1. Map and profile areas and populations and identify leaders or contact persons.
2. Ensure community engagement for information gathering and facilitation (e.g., IDPs/refugees: identify elders, camp management committee, host community informants).
3. House-to-house case search, community case search.

All AFP cases should be added to the line list and should follow case investigation guidelines, including stool specimen collection within 60 days of paralysis onset and contact sampling.

### Frequency
This is generally an ad hoc activity when new events/outbreaks are identified in initial response. Other situations where this activity could be considered, if resources allow: when a window of opportunity opens in fully or partially inaccessible areas. In recently accessible areas with disrupted healthcare infrastructure, the frequency should be every 3–6 months.

### Challenges and anticipated issues
ACS has challenges such as:

- Lack of resources: untrained personnel, poor documentation, or inadequate budget.
- Security issues.
- Lack of access to, poor quality or non-availability of health facility records.
- Logistical constraints in reaching communities and health facilities.

### Enabling factors & tips for success
ACS is facilitated by:

- Community engagement.
- Presence of NGOs in inaccessible areas.
- Careful, in-depth analysis to prioritize areas, populations or health facilities.
- Knowledgeable and motivated field staff, experienced supervisors.
- Good ACS documentation.

### Interpretation of results
- The detection of unreported AFP cases demonstrates gaps in the AFP reporting network.
- Retrospective review of records in facilities within the reporting network will reflect whether regular active surveillance of designated sites was conducted.

Interviewing traditional healthcare providers and/or private sector practitioners will reflect whether the local surveillance team has been orienting and contacting them. It may also highlight the need to revise the reporting network.

### Monitoring & evaluation
- Number of unreported AFP cases detected through ACS (1) with onset less than 60 days and (2) with onset more than 60 days to six months (or older).
- Number of communities and health facilities that had unreported AFP cases found in the process.
- Assess impact of this activity on overall surveillance system, document any changes in routine active surveillance or reporting networks, and develop and implement improvement plans, where needed.

ACS = active case search; AFP = acute flaccid paralysis; NGO = nongovernmental organization
# Annex 12. AFP contact sampling

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AFP contact sampling</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Also known as</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Definition**

The collection and testing of one (1) stool specimen from three (3) individuals in contact with an acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) case. Children in frequent contact with an AFP case (e.g., touching, sharing toys, and sharing food) should be identified for specimen collection. Surveillance guidelines recommend:

- Children, preferably <5 years of age.
- In contact with AFP case within a week prior to and/or two weeks after paralysis onset.
- Examples include siblings and other children living in the same household and/or neighbouring children who played with the AFP case during the period of interest.
- Stool specimens from AFP case contacts may be collected up to 60 days after paralysis onset, as poliovirus may be excreted up to two (2) months or longer.
- Stool specimens are typically collected from the community of residence of the AFP case. However, if the AFP case stayed in other communities one week prior to and/or two weeks after paralysis onset, then collection of specimens from contacts of the AFP case at these locations may also be warranted.

**Purpose and rationale**

AFP contact sampling is used to provide laboratory evidence of poliovirus in an AFP case. Individuals in contact with AFP cases have a higher likelihood of asymptomatic infection and virus excretion than people who have not had contact. The collection of stool specimens from contacts of AFP cases provides an additional approach to determine if poliovirus is the cause of paralysis in an AFP case. Positive laboratory results of contact specimens are used to confirm poliovirus infection in an AFP case who is not otherwise laboratory-confirmed.

**Indications**

 AFP contact sampling should be performed as part of regular AFP surveillance activities. Expanded use of AFP contact sampling may also be done as part of outbreak response activities.

- Regular AFP surveillance activities: Recommendations per the Global Polio Surveillance Action Plan 2022–2024 for AFP contact sampling.
- All AFP cases with inadequate stool specimens. Examples of inadequate stool specimens are: (a) 0 or 1 stool specimen collected; (b) at least one stool specimen collected > 14 days after paralysis onset; (c) two stools collected <24 hours apart; and (d) poor stool condition (e.g., specimen was hot upon arrival at laboratory).
- After close coordination with national surveillance and laboratory colleagues, consider all AFP cases who reside in security-compromised or hard-to-reach areas to take advantage of the limited opportunity to reach these individuals and communities.
- Outbreak response activities: Expansion of AFP contact sampling to enhance AFP surveillance may be warranted under specific circumstances. Expansion should occur in close coordination and collaboration between the national surveillance and laboratory colleagues.
  - All AFP cases in an outbreak-affected country, to improve detection of all viruses
  - All AFP cases detected outside the subnational outbreak zone, to increase the probability of detecting virus movement beyond the designated outbreak zone

**IMPORTANT:** Results from AFP contact sampling cannot be used to confirm community-wide transmission of poliovirus. Because laboratory results cannot be used to guide surveillance or outbreak response activities, collection of stool specimens is **not recommended** from contacts of individuals with following classifications: (1) WPV, aVDPV, cVDPV, unclassified VDPV, SL2 positive, (2) poliovirus positive contacts of AFP cases; and/or (3) poliovirus positive healthy children.

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AFP = acute flaccid paralysis; aVDPV = ambiguous vaccine-derived poliovirus; cVDPV = circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus; SL2 = Sabin-like type 2; WPV = wild polio vaccine
### Additional important information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>When to conduct</th>
<th>AFP contact sampling should be conducted during the initial or follow-up activity of an AFP case investigation (i.e., before laboratory results are available).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• <em>Initial AFP case investigation:</em> Conduct AFP contact sampling if it is known that two stool specimens cannot be collected in a timely manner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• <em>Follow-up activity:</em> Conduct AFP contact sampling if the laboratory reports that the AFP case’s stool specimens were received in poor condition.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Specimen labelling | Each specimen should be labelled clearly as a contact of the AFP case. The unique identification number should be the same as the AFP case with an added contact indicator (“C”) and number (#) suffix (e.g., C1, C2, C3). |

| “Other” classification | Positive AFP contacts are not classified as confirmed poliovirus cases because they do not meet the case definition, which requires acute flaccid paralysis. Results are included as “others” in poliovirus isolation counts. |

| Procedures | Refer to the GPEI Global Polio Surveillance Action Plan 2022–2024 for further details. |

AFP = acute flaccid paralysis; GPEI = Global Polio Eradication Initiative
Annex 13. Targeted healthy children stool sampling


### Targeted healthy children stool sampling

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Also known as</th>
<th>Healthy children sampling, community stool sampling and community sampling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Definition</strong></td>
<td>The collection and testing of one (1) stool specimen from 20 healthy children to determine if there is community-wide transmission of poliovirus (i.e., outbreak). Healthy children who have not had contact with the confirmed poliovirus case should be targeted for specimen collection. Surveillance guidelines recommend:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• ideally children &lt;2 years old, though can be up to 5 years old;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• not in contact with the confirmed poliovirus case within the week prior to or two weeks after paralysis onset (i.e., not a contact);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• healthy with no evidence of acute flaccid paralysis (AFP); and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• specimens collected from the same community as the positive poliovirus case, specifically in another part of the community and not an immediate neighbour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Purpose and rationale</strong></td>
<td>Targeted healthy children stool sampling is conducted to determine if there is community-wide transmission of poliovirus. Community-wide transmission indicates an outbreak, which requires mobilization of resources to quickly launch an outbreak response. The collection of specimens from healthy children who have NOT been in contact with the positive poliovirus case is critical to establishing confirmation of community-wide transmission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indications</strong></td>
<td>Targeted healthy children stool sampling is useful in a very limited number of situations during an event or outbreak investigation, specifically those situations when community-wide transmission has yet to be confirmed. In situations where an outbreak has been confirmed, the use of targeted healthy children stool sampling is discouraged as it would be an inefficient and ineffective use of programme resources. Any decision to do a targeted healthy children stool sampling should be made in close coordination and collaboration with national surveillance and laboratory colleagues.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fig. 13.1. Flow chart for assessing situations for targeted healthy children stool sampling**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Poliovirus isolated</th>
<th>WPV</th>
<th>cVDPV</th>
<th>VDPV</th>
<th>Sabin-like type 2</th>
<th>Sabin-like type 1 or 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Confirm polio</strong></td>
<td>OUTBREAK</td>
<td>Outbreak. Targeted healthy children stool sampling not recommended</td>
<td>Genetically linked to another VDPV?</td>
<td>No. Conduct targeted healthy children stool sampling</td>
<td>Was there an mOPV2 campaign in the area in the previous 4 months?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No. Investigate source of SL2. Consider targeted healthy children stool sampling to help investigate efforts</td>
<td>Yes. Targeted healthy children stool sampling not recommended</td>
<td>Was genetically-linked VDPV identified?</td>
<td>No. Continue investigation for possible aVDPV or SL2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No. Continue investigation for possible aVDPV or SL2</td>
<td>No. Conduct targeted healthy children stool sampling</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AFP = acute flaccid paralysis; aVDPV = ambiguous vaccine-derived poliovirus; cVDPV = circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus; VDPV = immunodeficiency-associated vaccine-derived poliovirus; SL2 = Sabin-like type 2; mOPV2 = monovalent oral polio vaccine type 2; VDPV = vaccine-derived poliovirus; WPV = wild poliovirus
WPV: One case of wild poliovirus (WPV) is an outbreak; therefore, a targeted healthy children stool sampling is not recommended.

cVDPV: Circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV) indicate community transmission; targeted healthy children stool sampling is not recommended.

VDPV genetically linked to another VDPV: The vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV) will be reclassified as a cVDPV; targeted healthy children stool sampling is not recommended.

✓ VDPV not genetically linked to another VDPV: A targeted healthy children stool sampling may be recommended as part of the initial investigation to determine if there is community-wide transmission.

○ If a healthy child has a positive VDPV laboratory result and genetic information indicates it is linked to the VDPV case, this is confirmation of community-wide transmission. The positive test result is used to reclassify the VDPV case as a cVDPV case.

○ A positive VDPV result in a healthy child is also used to reclassify an existing ambiguous vaccine-derived poliovirus (aVDPV) case as a cVDPV case, if viruses are genetically linked. This is also confirmation of community-wide transmission.

○ If no VDPV is detected among the healthy children, the investigation should continue to assess if the VDPV case is possibly an immunodeficiency-associated vaccine-derived poliovirus (iVDPV) or aVDPV case.

Sabin-like 2 (SL2) virus detected within four (4) months of an mOPV2 campaign: SL2 virus detection is expected during an mOPV2 campaign; targeted healthy children stool sampling is not recommended.

✓ Sabin-like 2 (SL2) virus detected more than four (4) months after last mOPV2 campaign, or no recent mOPV2 campaign: In these instances, an investigation to the source of the SL2 virus is warranted – and targeted healthy children stool sampling may be considered to help guide investigation efforts.

Sabin-like 1 or 3 virus: Detection of Sabin-like 1 and 3 virus is expected given bOPV use in essential immunization schedules and outbreak response. Targeted healthy children stool sampling is not recommended.

IMPORTANT: Positive test results from targeted healthy children stool sampling cannot be used as laboratory evidence of poliovirus in an AFP case (see AFP contact sampling).

Conduct targeted healthy children stool sampling after confirmation that a VDPV is not genetically linked to another VDPV (i.e., after laboratory test results and sequencing information are available).

Each specimen should be labelled clearly as a targeted healthy children stool sampling specimen. The unique identification number should be the same as the positive poliovirus case with an added targeted healthy children stool sampling indicator (“CC”) and number (#) suffix (e.g., CC1, CC2, CC3).

Positive test results among healthy children are not classified as confirmed poliovirus cases because they do not meet the case definition, which requires acute flaccid paralysis. Results are included as “others” in poliovirus isolation counts.

Refer to the GPEI Global Polio Surveillance Action Plan 2022–2024 for further details.

aVDPV = ambiguous vaccine-derived poliovirus; bOPV = bivalent oral polio vaccine; cVDPV = circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus; iVDPV = immunodeficiency-associated vaccine-derived poliovirus; SL2 = Sabin-like type 2; mOPV2 = monovalent oral polio vaccine type 2; VDPV = vaccine-derived poliovirus; WPV = wild poliovirus
Annex 14. Rapid case and virus detection

Because delays in detection can happen at any stage of field, logistic and laboratory activities, countries must monitor timeliness at every stage of the process, particularly at the subnational level and especially in the collection and transport of stool specimens. Only with clear insight into delays can swift actions be taken to address the identified bottlenecks (Table 14.1). Furthermore, anticipating issues and proactively identifying alternatives as part of preparedness is highly recommended.

Table 14.1. Delays in detection and possible mitigation measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Possible cause</th>
<th>Mitigation measures &amp; solutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Onset to care seeking</td>
<td>AFP cases reported ≤ 7 days of onset (ideally immediately)</td>
<td>• Distance to nearest facility/person &lt;br&gt; • Distrust in the health system &lt;br&gt; • Cost of service &lt;br&gt; • Language barrier &lt;br&gt; • Gender barriers (including no female nurse/doctor, no authorization to travel to health facility)</td>
<td>• Modify data collection tools and analyse by disaggregated data: social or linguistic profile/at-risk population group, sex and health-seeking behaviour. &lt;br&gt; • Conduct periodic (six-month) social mapping as part of the active surveillance (AS) network review to identify gaps in coverage. &lt;br&gt; • Based on findings, address all issues (e.g., mobile clinics, female health workers, consultation and sensitization with the community).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care seeking to notification</td>
<td>AFP cases reported ≤ 7 days of onset (ideally immediately)</td>
<td>• Lack of awareness and sensitization of healthcare providers</td>
<td>• Conduct consistent, supportive supervisory visits to reporting units. &lt;br&gt; • Ensure training and sensitization of every new staff member. &lt;br&gt; • Provide information, education and communication (IEC) materials: case definition, reporting requirement and pathway, surveillance officer contact information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notification to investigation</td>
<td>≤ 48 hours</td>
<td>• Lack of training &lt;br&gt; • Absence of qualified person to conduct investigation &lt;br&gt; • Delay in locating the case &lt;br&gt; • Case is lost to follow-up (i.e., cannot find case) &lt;br&gt; • Competing priorities, challenging workloads</td>
<td>• Ensure case investigation kits (equipment, supplies, and materials) are readily available. &lt;br&gt; • Promote clear responsibilities and reasonable workloads (i.e., back-up should be available in the absence of the main surveillance officer). &lt;br&gt; • Conduct regular trainings for surveillance officers and back-ups (e.g., other public health staff) at the field level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigation to stool 1 collection</td>
<td>≤ 1 day</td>
<td>• Absence of kit &lt;br&gt; • Inability to locate the case (due to discharge, travel, etc.) &lt;br&gt; • Case has died</td>
<td>• Ensure case investigation kits (equipment, supplies and material) are readily available. &lt;br&gt; • Ensure contact information and address of case is available. &lt;br&gt; • If stool specimen collection must be done by caregiver, ensure it is adequately done.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stool 1 collection to stool 2 collection</td>
<td>≥ 24 hours apart</td>
<td>• Case has died &lt;br&gt; • Case is no longer at same location (follow-up issues)</td>
<td>• Provide clear instructions to nurses and caregivers on collecting the stool specimen. &lt;br&gt; • Provide clear instructions on contact sampling in the event of a case of inadequate specimens.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AFP = acute flaccid paralysis; AS = active surveillance; IEC = information, education and communication
Table 14.1 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Possible cause</th>
<th>Mitigation measures &amp; solutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Stool 2 collection to shipment to national level | Stools 1+2 arrival at laboratory ≤ 3 days of collection of stool 2 (ideally immediately) | ● No or poor communication on when stool 2 was collected  
● Poor coordination with courier services  
● Issues related to routes of transport (e.g., lockdowns, route closure)  
● Batching of specimens | ● Pilot electronic tracking of stool specimens.  
● Plan transport ahead of time, including plan for contingencies.  
● Obtain special permission to transport samples, if needed.  
● Identify alternative routes, carriers.  
● Increase storage capacity, identify storing points.  
● Don’t batch specimens.  
● Prioritize samples for shipment in event of suspected polio case (“hot” case). |
| Stool 2 collection to shipment to national level | Stools 1+2 arrival at laboratory ≤ 3 days of collection of stool 2 | ● Poor planning for transport, shipment  
● Insecurity or road closures  
● Samples kept at national level until several are collected and shipped (“batch” send-off)  
● International border closures  
● Suspension of flights | ● Pilot electronic tracking of stool specimens.  
● Create contingency plans with alternative routes or laboratory.  
● Explore and pursue ad hoc solutions in case of conflict or insecurity (e.g., using humanitarian flights for transport; sending samples to an alternative WHO-accredited lab). |
| Arrival at national level to shipment to (inter)national laboratory | Stools 1+2 are processed following standard GPLN procedures within defined GPLN target times for all procedures | ● International border closures  
● Issues with shipping isolates to sequencing laboratory  
● Shortage of critical reagents  
● Ambiguities in testing outcomes (e.g., mismatched or missing EPID numbers, suspicion of cross-contamination).  
● Receipt of large batches of specimens. | ● Ensure a minimum buffer stock (critical consumables and reagents) for a one-year workload when placing orders for 2022.  
● Secure a shipping contract with several in-country couriers.  
● Develop an alternative domestic and international shipping plan with different sequencing laboratories. |

AFP = acute flaccid paralysis; EPID = epidemiological identification; GPLN = Global Polio Laboratory Network; WHO = World Health Organization.
Annex 15. Polio committees and commissions

While the following terms of reference and descriptions of core activities are generic, groups may take on additional tasks, depending on current programme needs.

1. The National Polio Expert Review Committee (NPEC or ERC)

The National Polio Expert (Review) Committee (NPEC or ERC), or National Expert Group or National Polio Expert Panel is an honorary, volunteer group that meets regularly (between once per month to four times a year). Membership of the committee varies in size. Composition is usually composed of:

- a Chair and a Secretary (usually, the Expanded Programme on Immunization [EPI] manager);
- a paediatrician;
- a neurologist;
- a virologist or microbiologist; and
- an epidemiologist.

The role of the committee is to:

- classify cases of acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) with inadequate specimens that have residual paralysis at 60-day follow-up or those who either died or were lost to follow-up;
- provide technical advice pertaining to AFP cases and ensure AFP cases have a final diagnosis;
- review cases with adequate specimens and Sabin-like excretion to decide on vaccine-associated paralytic poliomyelitis (VAPP) diagnosis; and
- monitor quality of the AFP surveillance system in general.

To enable the committee to classify as accurately as possible:

- each case must have accurate, complete investigation in their case investigation form (CIF);
- a copy of the hospital clinical notes or investigations must be included in the case file;
- a copy of the death certificate should be placed in the case file, if the AFP case died;
- a 60-day follow-up form must be included with the district paediatrician’s clinical note; and
- if an AFP case needs to be discussed, the district surveillance team must gather all relevant documents, bring these to the committee meeting, and present the case.

How to prepare for the committee meeting:

- If the child has monoplegia, arrange for electromyography (EMG) or nerve conduction study (NCS) to be done before the NPEC meets and bring written results to meeting for discussion.
- Full information should be made available of any underlying conditions or past medical history that may have bearing on illness causing paralysis.
- A written clinical note from paediatrician describing 60-day follow-up exam with emphasis on the neurological examination is necessary for most cases.

How to present cases to the committee:

1. History of the illness
   - Presence of fever and other symptoms at onset
   - Description of progression of illness
   - Hospital course, including investigations results

2. Exam of child at initial presentation
   - Description of general physical exam
   - Site and extent of weakness
   - Reflexes and tone

3. Exam of child at 60-day follow-up exam
   - Detailed neurological exam
2. National Certification Committee (NCC)

National Certification Committees (NCCs) are groups of independent experts in disciplines relevant for the certification of polio eradication, such as public health, immunization, epidemiology, paediatrics, infectious diseases, neurology and virology. NCCs are appointed by the national government in consultation with regional offices of the World Health Organization (WHO). NCC members act in a personal capacity only and cannot have responsibility for any activities to implement polio eradication in the country.

NCCs are responsible for assessing and verifying national documentation on polio-free status, which is assembled by the Ministry of Health (MoH) with WHO support. NCCs cannot certify polio eradication in their country, which is the role of the Regional Certification Commission (RCC) and Global Certification Commission for the Certification of the Eradication of Poliomyelitis (GCC) in review of NCC-supporting documentation on the polio-free status of the country.

Certification, which is done at the regional level, requires the absence of WPV transmission from any source (AFP, community samples and sewage samples) for at least three (3) consecutive years and a timely and sensitive AFP surveillance that meets the GCC’s certification standards and the following performance indicators:30

- Detection of at least one (1) NPAFP case annually per 100 000 children younger than 15 years.
- Collection of adequate stool specimens from at least 80% of AFP cases.
- Testing of all specimens at a WHO-accredited laboratory.

In WHO regions not yet certified as wild poliovirus (WPV)-free and for Member States where no WPV has been detected from any source for at least three (3) years under conditions of “certification-standard” surveillance, NCCs provide the RCC with documentation on all aspects related to polio eradication, including immunization activities, surveillance (including environmental surveillance of polio-essential facility [PEF] wastewater), laboratory support, and containment.

Once the RCC formally accepts this documentation, signaling their agreement with the NCCs claim that WPV transmission in the country has been interrupted, the NCC will continue to provide annual reports to the RCC on the maintenance of polio-free status in the country.

Each NCC in their role also conveys recommendations on how to improve polio activities from the RCC to their national government.

3. Regional Certification Commissions (RCCs)

RCCs are independent panels of international public health experts advising the WHO on all issues related to the certification of WPV eradication at the regional level. RCCs have the authority to certify the eradication of indigenous WPV in the region after considering all necessary evidence, including the views of NCCs and results of field visits to countries.

In WHO regions not yet certified as WPV-free, RCCs monitor progress towards interrupting WPV transmission and will eventually certify the WHO region as free of wild WPV, provided that a period of at least three (3) years have passed without identification of WPV.31

In WHO regions already certified as WPV-free, RCCs annually review updated documentation from each Member State on the maintenance of WPV-free status, i.e., on immunization, surveillance, polio laboratory support and poliovirus containment. RCCs then report conclusions on risk assessment and any risk mitigation measures to the respective country and WHO Regional Director. Related to poliovirus containment, RCCs in certified regions work with NCCs to review national reports and documentation, specifically updating and maintaining complete inventories of facilities which previously hosted WPV or any other infectious or potentially infectious poliovirus materials.

30 Given programme advancements in genomic analysis and the widespread use of environmental surveillance in many countries, the GCC is reviewing the criteria and may recommend certification sooner than the traditional three years. Changes to these requirements will be posted on the GPEI website (https://polioeradication.org/polio-today/preparing-for-a-polio-free-world/certification).
4. Global Commission for the Certification of the Eradication of Poliomyelitis (GCC)

The GCC is the independent global oversight body which will issue, if and when appropriate, a final report to the Director-General of the WHO (DG-WHO) to certify that the global eradication of WPV has been achieved. The GCC also oversees global poliovirus containment. It receives annual reports from RCCs on poliovirus survey and inventory activities in all six WHO regions, as reported by NCCs in their annual reports to the RCCs on the achievement or maintenance of WPV-free status.

The GCC is expected to eventually certify that global containment of all retained live poliovirus materials—including WPV, Sabin and vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV) of all types—has been achieved and maintained. It is still yet to be decided whether the GCC will exist by the time containment of all poliovirus materials (WPV, Sabin and VDPV) will be achieved. As of this writing, the mandate to the GCC from the DG-WHO remains to certify WPV eradication.

As of 2022, five of six WHO regions have been certified wild poliovirus free; however, as long as wild poliovirus is not eradicated globally, NCCs and RCCs still have also a role to play in monitoring polio surveillance performance in their respective country and in updating the GCC.

For additional information on certification, refer to GPEI webpage on Preparing for a Polio-Free World (https://polioeradication.org/polio-today/preparing-for-a-polio-free-world/certification).
Annex 16. Safety surveillance for nOPV2

Countries facing outbreaks of circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2 (cVDPV2) may opt to use the novel oral polio vaccine type 2 (nOPV2), available under an Emergency Use Listing (EUL) of the World Health Organization (WHO). A required component for the deployment and post-deployment of nOPV2 is safety monitoring to detect possible adverse events that may occur following immunization.

Two kinds of adverse events are monitored through vaccine safety surveillance:

1. **Adverse event following immunization (AEFI)** is defined as any untoward medical occurrence which follows immunization and does not necessarily have a causal relationship with the usage of the vaccine. The adverse event may be any unfavourable or unintended sign, abnormal laboratory finding, symptom or disease.

2. **Adverse event of special interest (AESI)** is defined as a pre-identified and predefined medically significant event that has the potential to be causally associated with a vaccine product and needs to be monitored. AESIs of interest for nOPV2 surveillance are:
   - anaphylactic reactions;
   - aseptic meningitis / encephalitis;
   - acute disseminated encephalomyelitis (ADEM);
   - Guillain-Barré syndrome (GBS) / Miller Fisher syndrome;
   - myelitis / transverse myelitis;
   - acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) due to vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV) or vaccine-associated paralytic poliomyelitis (VAPP); and
   - unexplained deaths.

**Surveillance activities for nOPV2 adverse events**

**Passive and active AEFI surveillance:** Passive AEFI surveillance (spontaneous reporting) detects AEFIs for all vaccines, including nOPV2, and typically follows a process of case identification, notification, reporting, investigation and causality assessment separate from the AFP surveillance system. Active AEFI surveillance detects more complex adverse events that may be anticipated and, for nOPV2, include AFP surveillance and active AESI surveillance, both of which require the active involvement of the country’s immunization and surveillance programmes (Fig. 16.1).

**Active AESI surveillance:** AESI surveillance is conducted in sentinel sites (see nOPV2 AESI guidance among sources listed below). Matching the clinical and laboratory findings with prespecified case definitions is important for AESI case confirmation. AESI surveillance continues for six (6) weeks following each nOPV2 campaign and focuses on children in the eligible age range for nOPV2.

National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) and national immunization programmes are typically involved in the reporting structure for AEFI/AESI, and a national Vaccine Safety Advisory Committee (or Causality Assessment Committee) reviews the data on serious adverse events to conduct the causality assessment which determines the likelihood that an event was caused by a vaccine or vaccination (Fig. 16.1). The data generated from these surveillance systems are shared with the WHO for monitoring and assessment by the Global Advisory Committee on Vaccine Safety (GACVS) to verify continued safety of the vaccine and to support its full listing through the WHO prequalification process.

**Requirements for nOPV2 safety surveillance**

Prior to nOPV2 rollout, countries need to meet the following safety monitoring requirements:

1. Confirmation of nOPV2 safety surveillance monitoring activities including:
   a) a national AEFI surveillance manual or abridged guide and key forms; and
   b) an active AESI safety monitoring protocol for nOPV2 (if applicable – see below)

2. An operational plan for implementing nOPV2 safety surveillance, which includes:
   a) plans for implementing AEFI surveillance;
b) plans for managing a vaccine-related event (VRE); and

c) confirmation of data sharing processes and timelines.

3. Key nOPV2-related safety trainings have been completed or are planned.

4. Causality Assessment Committee terms of reference (TORs) and list of members, training plans and, if applicable, previous committee meeting minutes.

**Recommendations for nOPV2 safety surveillance as it relates to AFP surveillance**

GACVS recommends that active AESI surveillance for nOPV2 safety be implemented but does not require it for countries without sufficient technical capacity and human resources to implement the active AESI protocol. In these countries, detection of AESI and potentially other safety signals should build upon the ongoing AFP, passive AEFI, and environmental surveillance systems, and close monitoring of VREs. **AFP surveillance thus remains the critical source of safety data for the nOPV2 vaccine.**

**Fig. 16.1. Active AFP and AESI surveillance after nOPV2**

AESI = adverse event of special interest; AFP = acute flaccid paralysis; GPEI = Global Polio Eradication Initiative; nOPV2 = novel oral polio vaccine type 2; WHO = World Health Organization

**nOPV2 safety surveillance materials**

1. nOPV2 Safety Guidance | [English](#) | [French](#) | [Russian](#) | [Portuguese](#)

2. nOPV2 AESI Guidance | [English](#) | [French](#) | [Russian](#) | [Portuguese](#)
Annex 17. Surveillance activities in outbreak settings

The following is a checklist of surveillance strengthening activities during a poliovirus outbreak. Details are included in Quick Reference on Strengthening Polio Surveillance during a Poliovirus Outbreak.

**AFP surveillance**
- Immediately notify surveillance and laboratory personnel upon polio outbreak confirmation.
- Increase the annualized target non-polio acute flaccid paralysis (NPAFP) rate to > 3 per 100,000 children <15 years old per year.
- All districts and provinces should review and update (if necessary) their polio surveillance reporting network, including prioritization of reporting sites for active surveillance visits.
- Ensure active surveillance (AS) visits are conducted regularly and monitored nationwide.
- Ensure that routine (passive) surveillance is performing optimally.
- Conduct facility-based, ad hoc active case searches to identify any unreported cases of acute flaccid paralysis (AFP).
- Use all opportunities for community-based, ad hoc active case searches to find unreported cases.
- Verify that special populations within the outbreak-affected and high-risk areas are included in surveillance activities and implement tailored approaches, as necessary.
- Ensure supportive supervision and monitoring of surveillance officers are conducted.
- Monitor surveillance performance and use data for action.
- Prioritize investigation of silent districts or provinces within the outbreak-affected or high-risk areas.
- Establish regular review meetings among AFP surveillance partners.

**AFP case investigation**
- Collect key information that may not be included in the AFP case investigation form.
- Conduct AFP contact sampling for all AFP cases with inadequate stool specimens and consider expanding AFP contact sampling for all AFP cases in certain outbreak and polio high-risk settings.
- Prioritize 60-day follow-up investigations for AFP cases with inadequate stool specimens.

**Sensitization activities**
- Conduct re-fresher trainings on polio and polio surveillance for surveillance officers and teams.
- Conduct AFP surveillance sensitization activities among healthcare providers.
- Conduct polio and AFP surveillance sensitization activities among communities.
- Conduct polio and AFP surveillance sensitization activities among governmental and nongovernmental organizations and engage their support.

**Environmental surveillance**
- Determine the adequacy of existing environmental surveillance (ES) sites.
- Identify high-risk areas for ES expansion during an outbreak, including ad hoc ES sites.

**Laboratory surveillance**
- Establish regular, ongoing communication among surveillance and laboratory staff at all levels.
- Prioritize stool specimen and sewage sample testing from outbreak-affected and high-risk areas.
- Verify that stool specimens and sewage samples are collected as recommended and reverse cold chain is maintained from point of collection to arrival at a WHO-accredited laboratory.
- Adjust stool and sewage sample transport networks, as necessary, to ensure a well-coordinated and rapid delivery system is maintained.
- Ensure laboratory resources are available to meet the demand of increased testing – and have a contingency plan available in case it cannot.

**Additional considerations**
- Targeted healthy children stool sampling has limited use for strengthening polio surveillance.
- Include surveillance updates in the national Polio Outbreak Situation Report (SitRep).
- Prepare for GPEI’s Outbreak Response Assessment (OBRAs).
Annex 18. Gender and polio surveillance

The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) published its Gender Equality Strategy 2019–2023 to provide both direction and scope for advancing equality and for strengthening gender mainstreaming across all interventions, strategies and policies.31

Surveillance programme and staff should be alerted to:

- gender-related barriers in surveillance detection and response; and
- gender equality in the work environment and organizational culture

**Gender-related barriers in surveillance detection and response**

In any context and especially in high-risk areas and with special populations, the polio surveillance system must be able to identify the stages at which gender norms, roles and relations, as well as existing gender inequalities, may affect case detection and notification (**Table 18.1**).

To minimize the risk of gender-related delays in detection:

- programmes are encouraged to collect and analyse sex-disaggregated data on a systematic basis, including through adapted case investigation forms (CIFs) and analytic tools, and identify stages with consistent, recurrent (over a 12- to 24-month period) delays in detection, notification and investigation that may be linked to gender barriers; and
- where observed, surveillance officers and/or programme managers should conduct in-depth assessments with the support of the management and gender specialists and consider possible, locally acceptable actions to address the gaps (**Table 18.1**).

When considering actions to inform and support surveillance interventions, always:

- collaborate with and reach out to women's groups, women's health committees, grassroots networks and other organizations with a strong understanding and influence around health-seeking behaviours, gender-related barriers and children's health issues;
- consult with community authorities, religious leaders, opinion influencers, and elders, including women, to sensitize and negotiate access to women or households and increase women's participation;
- sensitize and promote fathers' and men’s equal participation in childcare, caregiving, and household responsibilities and tasks; and
- ensure communication channels, tools, materials, and messages are context-specific, informed by gender analysis, and free from harmful gender stereotypes.

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### Table 18.1. Examples of gender-related barriers in surveillance detection and response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Possible issues &amp; their causes</th>
<th>Proposed possible actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Onset of paralysis to care-seeking** | Not seeking care or delay in seeking care due to:  
  ● women caregivers lack decision-making power and/or faces challenges or restrictions in mobility (lack of transport, money, time, multiple household duties, need of authorization to travel to health facility, and/or of a male escort/traveling companion)  
  ● low awareness and literacy rate of women caregivers and lack of access to health information in suitable formats  
  ● discriminatory attitude in health-seeking behaviour for female patients (e.g., boys’ access to health care prioritized / delays in seeking care for girls, poor quality of services of health workers towards women)  
  ● absence of local female healthcare providers | Carry out gender analysis/assessment to identify specific gender barriers to the context/setting.  
  ● Advocate with local authorities.  
  ● Sensitize community and involve men in sensitization and outreach activities.  
  ● Adapt services to women’s need (adapt opening times for health services, outreach surveillance activities, etc.).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| **Notification**                   | Late or no notification due to:  
  ● insufficient knowledge and training opportunities provided for women care worker  
  ● unresponsive medical hierarchy when a female worker notifies an AFP case  
  ● active surveillance visits not conducted regularly and/or adequately due to lack of suitable modes of transport, and/or male escort  
  ● lack of women as community informants (e.g., in CBS) due to existing gender norms and roles | ● Ensure availability of training for all staff.  
  ● Engage with women workers at the forefront to identify and address their needs and challenges, esp. safety related (e.g., timing of trainings, transport options, location).  
  ● Sensitize local health workers (including to security/safety considerations).  
  ● Ensure availability of safe and adequate transport for personnel.  
  ● Reaching out to and collaborating with local women’s groups to find solutions.  
  ● Adjust CBS team composition.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| **Case investigation and stool collection** | Delayed investigation and/or stool collection due to:  
  ● insufficient training opportunities provided for women surveillance officers  
  ● lack of female surveillance officers needed to enter home of AFP case  
  ● inability of women caregivers to stay overnight in a health facility when case is hospitalized  
  ● safety and security risks faced by women workers | ● Training of healthcare worker/surveillance officers takes into account gender-related challenges and barriers to women’s participation (e.g., location, timing, transport, traveling companion if needed).  
  ● Adjust surveillance team composition.  
  ● Sensitize local health system and/or community.  
  ● Ensure safety of women working at the forefront.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |

**AFP** = acute flaccid paralysis; **CBS** = community-based surveillance

**Gender equality in the work environment, and organizational culture**

Managers of polio surveillance must ensure that a gender lens is also applied to the programme both to promote gender equality and to address any gender-related barriers or other factors impacting the safety and performance of its staff, as well as their career advancement. Below are actions to consider.
Institutionalize the systematic and regular provision of gender analysis in all reports.

Increase women's equal and meaningful participation in surveillance, including a gender balance among supervisors, and identify gaps in team composition that contribute to deficiencies in case investigation (e.g., all-male teams not being able to access homes in certain contexts).

Identify specific needs and barriers faced by women frontline workers (e.g., needs or barriers related to safety, mobility/transportation, literacy [including digital literacy], and training).

Ensure that the gender module is included in all polio surveillance trainings, with a focus on a description of gender and gender-related barriers in surveillance. Also conduct mandatory staff training on preventing and responding to sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment (PRSEAH).

Share information about existing reporting and support mechanisms and systems in place to address all forms of sexual exploitation, abuse or harassment. If not already in place, set up communication mechanisms for women involved in polio surveillance to be able to voice and discuss in confidence those issues impacting their physical and emotional wellbeing at work (e.g., mentorship, staff representative).

Ensure that training and sensitization sessions at health facilities or within communities:

- include gender-related barriers to immunization and surveillance;
- highlight equal parenting, shared caregiving responsibilities and fathers' equal participation in childcare, caregiving and household tasks (preferring the words “parents and caregivers”);
- try to ensure that diverse women and men are represented in training visuals and images;
- provide sex-disaggregated data and gender analysis whenever possible, with “real life” examples and illustrations, and highlight the importance of collecting and analysing data disaggregated by sex in all monitoring and evaluation (M&E) activities (Table 18.2); and
- are accessible to all participants (e.g., facilities are safe and easily reached, timing is accommodating, seating arrangement is appropriate, and organizers and facilitators know how to facilitate sessions to ensure participation from all).

Table 18.2. Gender-related indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Calculation (expressed as a percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Case detection</strong></td>
<td># of AFP cases** by sex with final lab results ≤35 days of onset / # of AFP cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Timeliness of field activities</strong></td>
<td># of AFP cases by sex with 2 samples collected ≥ 24 hrs apart, both within 11 days of paralysis onset / # of reported AFP cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Timeliness of notification</strong></td>
<td># of AFP cases by sex reported within 7 days of paralysis onset / # of reported AFP cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Health contact</strong></td>
<td># of AFP cases by sex with ≤2 healthcare encounters between onset and before notification / # of AFP cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Professional profile by sex</strong></td>
<td># of women [professional profile] / total # of staff or informants (by category: surveillance officer, supervisor, CBS informant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Staff with completed PRSEAH</strong></td>
<td># of surveillance staff having completed PRSEAH training / # of staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AFP = acute flaccid paralysis; CBS = community-based surveillance; PRSEAH = preventing and responding to sexual exploitation, abuse, and harassment

**Aggregated results: all lab results (AFP + contacts) used to classify AFP case as confirmed/discarded
## Annex 19. Scientific resources

### Table 19.1. Resources to support surveillance for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus area</th>
<th>Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Programme information</strong></td>
<td>● Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI): polioeradication.org</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● The GPEI website includes updated global counts on wild and vaccine derived poliovirus cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>For additional polio publications on topics such as surveillance, outbreaks, and testing, as well as special topics such as on containment, visit the following website:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Weekly Epidemiological Record (WER): <a href="http://www.who.int/wer/en">www.who.int/wer/en</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AFP surveillance</strong></td>
<td>● Global Polio Surveillance Action Plan 2022-2024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Global Polio Surveillance Action Plan 2018-2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Quick Reference on Strengthening Polio Surveillance during a Poliovirus Outbreak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Guidelines for Implementing Polio Surveillance in Hard-to-Reach Areas &amp; Populations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Job Aid: Use of AFP contact sampling and targeted healthy children stool sampling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Best practices in active surveillance for polio surveillance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Guidelines for Implementing Poliovirus Surveillance among Patients with Primary Immunodeficiency Disorders (PIDs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Classification and reporting of vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPV).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Standard Operating Procedures: Responding to a Polio Event or Outbreak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Polio Field and Laboratory Surveillance Requirements in the Context of nOPV2 use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Interim guidance for the poliomyelitis (polio) surveillance network in the context of coronavirus disease (COVID-19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><a href="http://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-POLIO-20.04">www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-POLIO-20.04</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Community-based surveillance**  | ● Technical Contributors to the June 2018 WHO meeting. A definition for community-based surveillance and a way forward: results of the WHO global technical meeting, France, 26 to 28 June 2018. Euro Surveill. 2019;24(2); pii=1800681.  
|                                   | doi.org/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2019.24.2.1800681 |
|                                   | apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/68762/WHO_IVB_04.10.pdf |
### Gender training

- Gender and Polio Introductory Training: Facilitation Guide
- Gender and Polio Introductory Training: Presentation Slides
- Gender and Polio profile

### VPD surveillance

- Global strategy for comprehensive Vaccine-Preventable Disease (VPD) surveillance.
  [www.who.int/publications/m/item/global-strategy-for-comprehensive-vaccine-preventable-disease-(vpd)-surveillance](www.who.int/publications/m/item/global-strategy-for-comprehensive-vaccine-preventable-disease-(vpd)-surveillance)