Global Programme Update
Polio Partners Group Meeting, Geneva, 3 December 2018
On behalf of the GPEI: Michel Zaffran, Director Polio Eradication, WHO / Chairman, GPEI Strategy Committee
Wild Poliovirus Cases (2017 and 2018)

Afghanistan:
- 20 WPV1 in 2018 (14 WPV1s in 2017)
- Most Recent Onset: 9 Oct 2018

Pakistan:
- 8 WPV1 in 2018 (8 WPV1s in 2017)
- Most Recent Onset: 7 Oct 2018

Nigeria:
- Last reported case: 21 Aug 2016
- Last WPV detected: 27 Sep 2016

Last WPV 3 > 6 years ago
- July 2012 (FATA, Pakistan)
- November 2012 (Yobe, Nigeria)
Global Wild Poliovirus & cVDPV Cases\(^1\)
Past 12 Months\(^2\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Wild poliovirus</th>
<th>cVDPV2</th>
<th>cVDPV3</th>
<th>cVDPV1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Onset of most recent case</td>
<td>Total WPV1</td>
<td>Onset of most recent case</td>
<td>Total cVDPV2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17-Oct-18</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
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<td>09-Sep-18</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
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<td>25-Sep-18</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFR</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<td>17-Oct-18</td>
<td>58</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
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<td>02-Sep-18</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMR</td>
<td>07-Oct-18</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>02-Sep-18</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNG</td>
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<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPRO</td>
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<td>Global</td>
<td>07-Oct-18</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>17-Oct-18</td>
<td>64</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\)Excludes viruses detected from environmental surveillance
\(^2\)Onset of paralysis 21 Nov. 2017 – 20 Nov. 2018

Data in WHO HQ as of 20 Nov. 2018
**Wild Poliovirus & cVDPV Environmental Positives\(^1\)**

**Past 12 Months\(^2\)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Wild poliovirus</th>
<th>cVDPV</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most recent collection date</td>
<td>Total WPV</td>
<td>Most recent collection date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
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<td>08-Oct-18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21-Mar-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>08-Oct-18</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>25-Oct-18</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>25-Oct-18</td>
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<td>Somalia</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNG</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPR</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\)Excludes viruses detected from AFP surveillance.

\(^2\)Collection date: 21 Nov. 2017 – 20 Nov. 2018
Wild Poliovirus & cVDPV Environmental Positives

Past 12 Months

Public Health Emergency of International Concern
First declared under the International Health Regulations in May 2014
Confirmed on 27 November 2018

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Wild poliovirus</th>
<th>cVDPV</th>
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<td>Most recent collection date</td>
<td>Total cVDPV</td>
<td>Most recent collection date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
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<td>35</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>25-Oct-18</td>
<td>112</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>25-Oct-18</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
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<td>WPR</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>01-Oct-18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1Excludes viruses detected from AFP surveillance.
2Collection date: 21 Nov. 2017 – 20 Nov. 2018
Pakistan and Afghanistan
Pak /Afg poliovirus transmission corridors
WPV1 (AFP and ENV) reported over the past 12 months

Northern Corridor
Torkham border used for population Movement between Peshawar and Khyber in Pakistan to Nangarhar, Kunar and Laghman in East Afghanistan

Central corridor
Southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the FATA in Pakistan travelling across rugged, smaller borders crossings to Paktika, Paktia and Khost provinces in the south east of Afghanistan.

Southern Corridor
Friendship Gate (Chaman) border crossing from Pakistan’s Quetta Block to the Greater Kandahar area in south Afghanistan

Total 2600 KM border shared between PAK and AFP

Karachi

Data in WHO HQ as of 20 Nov. 2018
WPV1 Cases & Environmental samples
by genetic cluster, 2018

- Blue = R4B5C5B2
- Black = R4B1C1
- Light Blue = R4B5C3A
- Green = R4B5C4B
- Red = R4B5C4C
- Orange = R4B5C4D
Afghanistan

• 19 WPV1 cases in 2018 vs 10 at the same time in 2017) – Most recent case onset on 2 October, 2018

• Ongoing transmission of wild poliovirus in Northern and Southern corridors

• Genetic sequencing data shows that population groups harboring transmission in the Northern Corridor have not been reached.

• Ban on house to house campaigns: Over 1 million children missed since May

• Gaining & maintaining access remains the most significant bottleneck to stopping transmission
Does the fact that there are no blue bar in September mean that we have zero missed children in all the accessible areas of Afghanistan? Is that realistic? Is this extrapolated from IM data?

Jalaa', 28/11/2018
Pakistan

- 8 WPV1 cases in 2018 vs 5 at same date in 2017. Most recent case onset on 7 October, 2018
- Environmental positive samples isolated primarily in core reservoirs but also in many other areas of the country areas.
- General fatigue and resistance to vaccination
- Northern and Southern Transmission Corridors, and Karachi, remain the greatest risk to polio eradication in Pakistan & Afghanistan
Pakistan/Afghanistan: Main risks

- Sustaining government commitment and drive at district and sub district levels
- Ongoing transmission in the Southern & Northern corridors
- Accessing all children in highly mobile populations
- Systemic weaknesses in EPI throughout many parts of both countries
- Resistance to vaccination (both overt and covert)
- In Afghanistan
  - Bans on house to house campaigns in Southern Province
  - Increasing inaccessibility in Eastern region
  - Deteriorating security situation creating environment of fear
  - Challenges in getting female front line workers particularly in high risk areas
Nigeria
~70,000 Children unreached in Borno

In August 2016 ~650,000 children were trapped in Borno. Today, with innovative strategies, ~70,541 children remain unreached in ~ 6,000 settlements (data aggregated from satellite imagery, Vaccinates tracking system, Reach Inaccessible Children strategy and profiling)
cVDPV Outbreaks
The good news: Syria cVDPV2 outbreak likely interrupted

- Last cVDPV2 sample detected 13 months ago: 21 September 2017
- Recent outbreak assessment review concluded:
  - Absence of cVDPV2 detected for 12 months, in the context of continued high quality surveillance, makes it highly likely that cVPDV2 transmission has been interrupted;
  - Extraordinary achievement on the part of Regional and Syria teams in a particularly challenging context.
Nigeria cVDPV2 outbreak

2 separate cVDPV2 outbreaks:

- **Sokoto North** – 1 case, 14 Env. positives
- **Jigawa outbreak** – 23 cases, 29 Env. positives including 6 cases in Niger.

**Key Risks**

- Inaccessibility in Borno State
- Large scale population movement within and across the countries
- Weak political engagement in Niger
Other cVDPV outbreaks

DRC: 37 cVDPV 2 cases since May 2017

HoA: 5 cVDPV 2 cases, 6 cVDPV 3 cases and 1 co-infection since October 2017

PNG: 21 cVDPV 1 since 25 April 2018
Polio Eradication and Endgame Strategy

1. Poliovirus detection & interruption

2. OPV2 withdrawal, IPV introduction, immunization system strengthening

3. Containment & Global Certification

4. Transition Planning
Countries using IPV vaccine

Data source: WHO/IVB Database, as of 11 October 2018
Map production Immunization Vaccines and Biologicals (IVB), World Health Organization

- Introduced to date (176 countries)
- Re-introduced (15 countries)
- Formal commitment to introduce in 2018-2019 (3 countries)
- Not available
- Not applicable

126 countries targeted in 2014 for IPV introduction
Countries already using IPV in 2014
Not applicable
IPV introduction
An unprecedented achievement
Countries affected by IPV supply shortage

~43 million children missed

Disclaimer:
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Health Organization concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Dotted and dashed lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not be full agreement.
Polio Eradication and Endgame Strategy

1. Poliovirus detection & interruption
2. OPV2 withdrawal, IPV introduction, immunization system strengthening
3. Containment & Global Certification
4. Transition Planning
27 countries plan to retain poliovirus type 2 materials in 79 Facilities

- **National Authorities for Containment**: 24 /27 established
- **Poliovirus Essential facilities**: 6 applications for containment certification (certificate of participation) submitted to GCC
  - Application endorsed by GCC: 1
  - Applications on hold: 2
  - Applications under review: 3

Data in WHO HQ as of 26 Oct. 2018
Certification of polio eradication

Global Certification Commission: 29 October – 1 November

• Certification of the eradication of the wild polio virus will follow a **sequential approach** with WPV3 eradication being certified ahead of WPV1

• **The validation of the absence of cVDPVs** will only be possible after the total cessation of use of all OPVs

**The sequential approach:**

– WPV type 3 eradication certification (after African region certification)
– Certification of WPV1 eradication (~ 3 years after last WPV1 detection)
– Validation of the absence of cVDPVs (after global OPV cessation)
GPEI Strategy 2019-2023
GPEI Strategy 2019-2023

• The Polio Eradication & Endgame Strategic Plan (PEESP) 2013-2018 was developed to guide the program to the anticipated goal of polio eradication with a cost of $5.5B

• Though progress continues, transmission has not been interrupted in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

• The program is being extended to achieve eradication
  ▪ Provisional budget for 2019-2023 approved by the Polio Oversight Board in September 2018 at the level of US $ 4.3bn, of which US $ 3.27bn must be mobilized;
  ▪ GPEI is reviewing current strategies to define the changes and innovations required to achieve eradication, reflecting ways to address IMB recommendations
  ▪ Overlap with the WHO GPW budget in the context of transition will be clarified.
Overview

2013-2019

- Objective 1: Poliovirus detection and interruption
- Objective 2: Immunization systems strengthening and OPV withdrawal
- Objective 3: Containment and certification
- Objective 4: Legacy Planning

2019-2023

Eradication: Stopping transmission
Certification: Certify eradication and containment of all WPVs and ensure long-term polio security
Integration: Leveraging polio assets and lessons learned to protect populations
Cross-cutting areas: (management, research, budget and finance)

2019-2024

- Goal 1: Contain polioviruses
- Goal 2: Protect populations
- Goal 3: Detect and respond

CERTIFICATION (GPEI DISSOLVES)

GVAP 2.0
Gavi 5.0
WHO IVB Strategy
UNICEF Immunization Strategy
Global Health Security Agenda

2019-2023 2013-2019

TRANSITION

POST-GPEI PROGRAMMES

EVERY LAST CHILD

27
What’s next?
Main activities for the next six months

Global
• Identify “disruptive” changes to address outcomes of IMB external review
• Develop strategy for 2019-2023 and adjust budget
• Mobilize resources to support 2019-2023 strategy

Endemic countries
• Maintain political commitment in the face of changes of governments
• Intensify deployment of qualified personnel
• Address pockets of resistance and “fatigue”

Outbreak Countries
• Secure high level political commitment to respond to outbreaks
• Improve quality of outbreak response in DRC, PNG, HoA, Nigeria and Niger
• Secure additional quantities of mOPV2
• Leverage GPEI efforts to contribute to strengthening routine immunization beyond initial acute outbreak response
Thank you
Merci